

plants are not designed to bring out these qualities. Indeed, most managers have little conception how much ability is going to waste through not being used."

Encouragement of productivity through a system of bonuses, providing workers with additional pay whenever the ratio of payroll costs to sales is reduced, has proved effective in the industries that have tried it. Stock options to labor as well as management increase the sense of partnership. Still, the use of these procedures is not widespread enough and their more general adoption will depend on an increasing degree of mutual confidence and a change in some of the adversary philosophies of management and labor. I believe that these and other new management methods, designed to enlist all units of production in improved teamwork, hold great promise for checking rising costs.

Labor, likewise, must exercise statesmanship and restraint in its constant drive for higher pay and better working conditions. It must be remembered that higher labor pay may be almost totally canceled out by the higher prices of the commodities that labor must buy. Some inflationary force has been previously provided by union-management bargaining in key industries, for although only less than one-fourth of our workers are unionized—the effect of increased wages was often felt throughout the labor market. But the situation is now changing, and the developments in the steel strike indicate that the settlement is likely to produce no substantial increase in the price of steel. If the changed attitude in steel and auto negotiations will be heeded by other labor contracts, the increases in the cost of labor and the resultant impact on prices will be much more moderate in the early 1960's than it has been since the end of the war.

Generally, public encouragement should be given to the nongovernmental sector of our economy in any of its endeavors to increase national productivity, to guide production into items with greater durability, less obsolescence and lower prices. For as the chief manager of the Union Bank of Switzerland put it recently:

"Higher productivity will be able to keep prices down and money sound, provided that management will finally feel the moral responsibility to pass technical progress on to the consumer in the form of lower prices."

I have, therefore, noted with full agreement the recent statement of Dr. Raymond J. Saulnier, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, that in order to achieve general price stability, price re-

ductions must be accomplished in the industry: "where productivity gains are especially rapid." In fact, Dr. Saulnier urged both labor and management in those fields to forego part of the gains of productivity in the public interest; labor by accepting lesser wage increases than the productivity gains, and management by cutting prices instead of taking the productivity advances in higher profits. Thus, both labor and business should be urged to exercise better judgment and more responsibility in setting prices and wages consistent with general stability. And competition should be preserved in both products and in labor so as to limit the power of business and labor to set unreasonably high prices and wages. England and Germany are apparently finding solutions, cannot we—we reasonable Americans—exemplify our reasonableness by using good judgment?

GOOD ECONOMICS WILL MAKE SENSE

It has been said the term "inflation," like the term "rheumatism" at the turn of the century, covers a multitude of ailments. With the multiplicity of factors which contribute to inflation, it is obvious that no one all-purpose pill will cure it. We have listed the reforms that are needed in several fields, and it would be unrealistic if we forgot that there always are formidable obstacles to changes in public policy. Such comprehensive Government and private sector policy to curb inflation may appear to present some difficult problems, because at first glance it may seem to pit the general interest in a stable dollar against many organized and vocal special interests. But I believe that the program outlined by me demonstrates that anti-inflation action can be taken without serious or lasting damage to any of the constituent parts of American economy. Still, all these interests and groups must be educated to understand that their own welfare turns, in the long run, upon a strong and effective national economy, adaptable to change and capable of competing in the international market.

I believe that the essential first step in the campaign for a stable dollar is the restoration of the public confidence in the stability of our currency. A legislative statement proclaiming the goal of stabilizing the purchasing power of the dollar is one appropriate way of demonstrating Government's determination to act.

The second necessary step is the development of an economic plan which will combine our desire for stability with our need for growth. A strong statement urging creative thinking on the economic future ap-

peared recently in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch:

"There is not much doubt that the economy can be expanded rapidly if the Federal budget is rapidly inflated. But to conclude . . . that we need only spend a lot more Federal money fast is to ignore the crucial parts of the problem. How can we get a satisfactory rate of growth without inflation and without relying on a vast military effort? . . . Perhaps the answer lies in some kind of economic plan based on a controlled increase in creative public expenditures, accompanied by taxes to pay for them. Devising such a plan is the task of economic statesmanship, and putting it into effect the task of political leadership. Cannot our society generate the political and economic resources necessary to meet such a plain challenge? This much is certain: Unless we do meet this supreme challenge of our times, we shall see more and more peoples drifting toward communism, fewer and fewer committed to the islands of freedom."

To help produce such a plan and to create better and high-level coordination of the several departments and units of government in pursuing both stability and growth, I have introduced legislation for the establishment of a National Economic Council for Security and Progress. I am convinced that the economic challenge posed to the free world by international communism is one of the most serious aspects of the cold war, and that this war may well be won or lost in the markets of the world and on the production line. The proposed Economic Council is patterned after the existing National Security Council, whose main functions are military, and is founded on the belief that planning economic security and progress is as important as planning military defense. Consisting of Cabinet secretaries and other top-level Government officers, it will be the Council's function to advise the President with respect to national and international economic development, and to enable the departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively, amongst themselves and with private business, in matters relating to national economic developments and the role of America in world economy.

I should like to say this in conclusion: Let us restore the faith of the people, and we would have taken the first step. But let us not fail to pursue a comprehensive and long-term program that will guarantee our citizens, young and old, working and retired, employed, self-employed, and employing others, the security and stability that are derived from knowing better what tomorrow will bring.

SENATE

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 1960

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, and was called to order by the President pro tempore.

Dr. Claud B. Bowen, pastor, First Baptist Church, Greensboro, N.C., offered the following prayer:

O God, our help in ages past, our hope for years to come, we are grateful to Thee for Thy blessings upon our Nation. We pray for wisdom and the guidance of Thy spirit through these days of decision. Grant, we beseech Thee, that we may always prove ourselves a people mindful of Thy goodness, and of a sincere desire to do Thy will.

May we take seriously the stewardship of our obligations, believing Thy purpose is for the good of all.

Give unto us strength, both physical and spiritual, to bear the burdens placed

upon us. Especially do we pray for these Senators, our statesmen, as they serve our Nation and Thee.

We ask these things in the name of Christ. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Tuesday, March 22, 1960, was dispensed with.

SENATOR FROM OREGON

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, a colleague is about to join us in the Senate. There is on my desk the certificate of his appointment by the Governor of Oregon, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of the late, beloved Senator Richard L. Neuberger.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I send to the desk a certificate from the Governor of Oregon and ask that the clerk read it.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will read the certificate.

The certificate of appointment was read, and ordered to be placed on file, as follows:

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

This is to certify that pursuant to the power vested in me by the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the State of Oregon, I, Mark O. Hatfield, the Governor

of said State, have appointed this 16th day of March 1960, HALL S. LUSK, a Senator from said State to represent said State in the Senate of the United States until the vacancy therein, caused by the death of Richard L. Neuberger, is filled by election, as provided by law.

Witness: His Excellency, our Governor, Mark O. Hatfield, and our seal hereto affixed at the capitol, this 16th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1960.

MARK O. HATFIELD,
Governor.

By the Governor:

[SEAL] HOWELL APPLING, JR.,
Secretary of State.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, the Senator designate is present and ready to take his oath.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. If the Senator designate will present himself at the desk, the oath will be administered.

Mr. HALL S. LUSK, escorted by Mr. Morse, advanced to the Vice President's desk, and the oath of office prescribed by law was administered to him by the President pro tempore, and was subscribed by him.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 471. An act to amend chapter 561 of title 10, United States Code, to provide that the Secretary of the Navy shall have the same authority to remit indebtedness of enlisted members upon discharge as the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force have;

H.R. 2565. An act to promote effectual planning, development, maintenance, and coordination of wildlife, fish, and game conservation and rehabilitation in military reservations;

H.R. 9599. An act to provide transportation on Canadian vessels between ports in southeastern Alaska, and between Hyder, Alaska, and other points in southeastern Alaska, and between Hyder, Alaska, and other points in the United States outside Alaska, either directly or via a foreign port, or for any part of the transportation; and

H.R. 10455. An act to amend the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED OR PLACED ON CALENDAR

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles and referred or placed on the calendar, as indicated:

H.R. 471. An act to amend chapter 561 of title 10, United States Code, to provide that the Secretary of the Navy shall have the same authority to remit indebtedness of enlisted members upon discharge as the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force have; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 2565. An act to promote effectual planning, development, maintenance, and coordination of wildlife, fish, and game conservation and rehabilitation in military reservations; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H.R. 9599. An act to provide transportation on Canadian vessels between ports in southeastern Alaska, and between Hyder,

Alaska, and other points in southeastern Alaska, and between Hyder, Alaska, and other points in the United States outside Alaska, either directly or via a foreign port, or for any part of the transportation; placed on the calendar.

H.R. 10455. An act to amend the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

LIMITATION OF DEBATE DURING MORNING HOUR

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, under the rule, there will be the usual morning hour, and I ask unanimous consent that statements made in connection therewith be limited to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE AND STATE (S. DOC. NO. 90)

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a communication from the President of the United States, transmitting, for the consideration of the Congress, proposed supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 1960, in the amount of \$500,000 for the Department of Justice, and \$220,000 for the Department of State, which, with an accompanying paper, was referred to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDENT pro tempore:

Memorials signed by Mrs. Gregory Harris, and sundry other citizens of the State of Wisconsin, remonstrating against the adoption of the resolution (S. Res. 94) relating to the recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in certain disputes hereafter arising; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

RESOLUTION OF BENTON COUNTY, WASH., DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I have received the following resolution of the Benton County, Wash., Democratic Central Committee, urging passage of my proposal, Senate Resolution 94, to repeal the self-judging reservation to U.S. adherence to the statute of the World Court.

Mr. PRESIDENT, I ask unanimous consent that this strong endorsement of repeal of the U.S. reservation be printed in the Record, and appropriately referred.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Whereas the U.S. adherence to the International Court of Justice is unnecessarily

qualified by the so-called "self-judging" or "Connally reservation"; and

Whereas this reservation has seriously hampered the operation of the World Court and threatens to work against this country in its efforts to protect American interests abroad; and

Whereas Senate Resolution 94, which was introduced by Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, to repeal this reservation is supported by both the administration and Democratic leadership; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Benton County Democratic Central Committee strongly endorses the repeal of the crippling Connally reservation to our adherence to the International Court of Justice, and to this end urges the passage of Senate Resolution 94.

HEALTH BENEFITS FOR THE AGED—RESOLUTIONS

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the Board of County Commissioners of Hennepin County, Minn., and the Town Board of the Town of White in St. Louis County, Minn., have added their support to those who are concerned about the urgent health needs of our aged men and women and have endorsed programs to provide health and hospitalization benefits, such as that of Representative FORAND and my own proposal, S. 1151.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolutions of the Board of County Commissioners of Hennepin County and the Town Board of the Town of White be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the resolutions were referred to the Committee on Finance, and ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

RESOLUTION OF HENNEPIN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

Whereas the Hennepin County Board of Commissioners knows, of its own experience, the urgent need of retired people for hospital and medical care, and a study of one union alone showed 25 percent of their pensions absorbed by hospital and surgical insurance; and

Whereas the Forand bill (H.R. 4700) now in Congress, would pay in full for 60 days of hospital care for all persons eligible for old age and survivor benefits, including dependent children of widows, meet the costs of combined nursing home and hospital care up to 120 days a year, and cover certain surgical expenses; and

Whereas social security records will be used to establish rights of applicants, and will include safeguards as to the quality of care, negotiation of rates, and freedom of cooperating institutions from Government interference; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That this Hennepin County Board of Commissioners hereby endorses the Forand bill and recommends its passage by Congress; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be sent to each Senator and Representative from the State of Minnesota.

RESOLUTION OF TOWN BOARD OF TOWN OF WHITE

Be it resolved, That the Town Board of the Town of White, St. Louis County, Minn., does hereby go on record in support of the Forand bill (H.R. 4700), an insurance plan to help retired people pay their hospital and surgical bills through our Social Security System; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be mailed to Congressman WILBUR MILLS, chairman, Ways and Means Committee;

Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY; Senator EUGENE MCCARTHY; and Congressman JOHN A. BLATNIK, all of Washington, D.C.

(See the remarks of Mr. WILEY when he introduced the above bills, which appear under separate headings.)

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. COOPER:

S. 3259. A bill to authorize adjustment, in the public interest, of rentals under leases, entered into for the provision of commercial recreational facilities at Lake Cumberland, Ky.; and

S. 3260. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Army to modify certain leases entered into for the provision of recreation facilities in reservoir areas; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. HOLLAND:

S. 3261. A bill for the relief of Recep (Ali) Onur; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CHAVEZ (for himself and Mr. ANDERSON):

S. 3262. A bill to amend the act of October 31, 1949, with respect to payments to Bernalillo County, N. Mex., for furnishing hospital care for certain Indians; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. KERR:

S. 3263. A bill for the relief of Cesar S. Wycoco; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MURRAY (by request):

S. 3264. A bill to abolish the Arlington Memorial Amphitheater Commission;

S. 3265. A bill to amend the law relating to mining leases on tribal Indian lands and Federal lands within Indian reservations; and

S. 3266. A bill to amend the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 857, 25 U.S.C. 406, 407), with respect to the sale of Indian timber; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. MURRAY (for himself, Mr. BARTLETT, and Mr. GRUENING):

S. 3267. A bill to amend the act of October 17, 1940, relating to the disposition of certain public lands in Alaska; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. HARTKE:

S. 3268. A bill to promote the air-transportation system of the United States by requiring the use of air carriers authorized as such under the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 for certain transportation of persons and freight; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

(See the remarks of Mr. HARTKE when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. FONG:

S. 3269. A bill authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to convey certain property to the State of Hawaii; to the Committee on Armed Services.

(See the remarks of Mr. FONG when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. BUTLER:

S. 3270. A bill for the relief of Adamantios Demoglou Andrew; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WILEY:

S. 3271. A bill for the relief of Josef Enzinger; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WILEY (for himself and Mr. PROXMIER):

S. 3272. A bill to provide for reimbursement of termination costs involved in termination of Menominee Tribe from Federal jurisdiction; and

S. 3273. A bill to provide that documentary stamp taxes shall not be applicable to transactions involved in termination of Menominee Tribe from Federal jurisdiction; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

AUTHORIZATION TO PRINT AS SENATE DOCUMENT REVISED EDITION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MANUAL

Mr. WILEY submitted a concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 96) authorizing the printing of a revised edition of the Internal Security Manual as a Senate document; and providing for additional copies, which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

(See the above concurrent resolution printed in full when submitted by Mr. WILEY, which appears under a separate heading.)

PROMOTION OF THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF AIR TRANSPORTATION

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to promote the air transportation system of the United States. The bill will require the Secretary of Defense in contracting for the use of civilian aircraft to transport persons or freight to contract only with an air carrier as defined in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.

This act specified the national transportation policy to be "the encouragement and development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense."

The CAB has made ample and liberal regulations to carry out the will of Congress. At this time any person may go before the CAB and be granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity with a minimum of qualifications.

The airlines certificated by the CAB form a ready reserve to assist in the national defense should the need arise. This was amply demonstrated during the Berlin and Korean airlifts when the military had to depend on civilian aircraft.

Since these air carriers must maintain this "reserve status" our Government should assist them whenever possible. Each year the Department of Defense contracts for the hire of civilian aircraft to transport persons and freight. In awarding these contracts the Defense Department should consider the necessity for helping certificated carriers as a part of the national defense. These contracts should be awarded on a competitive basis to the certificated air carrier with the lowest bid. If these carriers know that this incentive exists they will be able to develop and carry into effect long-range plans for upgrading and improving equipment and service.

This bill will in no way harm any legitimate airline operation in the country. As I said before, any person may receive a CAB certificate upon a showing of minimum qualifications.

If a balanced air transportation system is to be effected and encouraged for

reliability in time of mobilization of war, it seems to me the military should accept the criteria which the CAB uses in certifying carriers of the general public by air. To do otherwise, would, I believe, be contrary to national transportation policy. The military by regulation will not accept the CAB criteria as they should. It is necessary therefore for Congress to act and insist upon this requirement.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record, together with a memorandum which I have prepared on this matter, and that the bill may lie on the table for 2 days in the event that there are others who wish to become sponsors.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill and memorandum will be printed in the Record, and the bill will lie on the desk, as requested by the Senator from Indiana.

The bill (S. 3268) to promote the air transportation system of the United States by requiring the use of air carriers authorized as such under the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 for certain transportation of persons and freight, introduced by Mr. HARTKE, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

S. 3268

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress finds and declares that it is in the public convenience and necessity to foster and protect the continued development and growth of the air transportation system of the United States, comprised of air carriers, certificated or otherwise authorized as such by the Civil Aeronautics Board, which system is vital to a strong economy and the needs of national defense in time of peace and national emergency; that to attain the objective of securing an adequate and sound air transportation system properly to serve the national defense needs in time of peace and emergency, it is essential that the Secretary of Defense and any department or agency within the Department of Defense enter into any contract or other commercial arrangement for the transportation of persons or freight by air only with an "air carrier" under the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board and authorized to engage in "air transportation" as defined by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958; that discharge of the duties and obligations imposed by Congress upon the Civil Aeronautics Board in the regulation and maintenance of a balanced air-transportation system in such a manner as to best fulfill the needs of national defense requires the assistance and cooperation of the Secretary of Defense and the departments and agencies within the Department of Defense through the utilization of "air carriers" as defined by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and authorized as such by the Civil Aeronautics Board.

Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense or any department or agency within the Department of Defense shall enter into any contract or other commercial arrangement for the transportation of persons or freight by air only with an "air carrier" authorized as such under the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.

The memorandum presented by Mr. HARTKE is as follows:

ROLE OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD IN ADAPTING A SOUND TRANSPORT SYSTEM TO THE NEEDS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE

In 1938 Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act for the regulation of air commerce and to foster, promote, and encourage the development of a sound air transport system comprising U.S. air carriers, regulated pursuant to the terms of the act and in accord with the policy expressed by Congress. The act was the result of a chaotic economic condition of the then unregulated air industry of the United States. Like the regulatory bodies of all utilities and quasi-utilities, the Civil Aeronautics Board was by the act created to foster the purposes as therein set forth as follows:

"(a) The encouragement and development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the postal service and of the national defense.

"(c) The promotion of adequate, economical and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices.

"(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of the air transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the postal service and of the national defense (sec. 102, 'Declaration of Policy,' Federal Aviation Act)."

In furtherance of the foregoing delegation of authority the Congress, by the act, gave the Board the power to control the entry of aspirants into the field of air transportation by section 401 of the act, which requires any person desiring to become an "air carrier" within the meaning of the act to apply for and prove its fitness, willingness, and ability to perform the air transportation sought by its application. After such application and full hearing, an applicant may be awarded a certificate of public convenience and necessity if the Board determines also that the issuance of such certificate is in the public interest (according to its policy directives set forth in sec. 102 of the act). If successful, then the new air carrier becomes a part of the air transportation system which is to be "properly adapted to the present and future needs of the national defense," and the Board is compelled to regulate "competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the national defense."

The Board, under provisions of the act, has only one other means of licensing persons desiring to become carriers within the Air Transportation System. Under section 416 the Board:

"From time to time and to the extent necessary, may exempt from the requirements of this title . . . any air carrier or class of air carriers if it finds that the enforcement of this title . . . would be an undue burden on such air carrier . . . by reason of the limited extent of, or unusual circumstances affecting the operations of such carrier . . . and is not in the public interest."

Thus, the Board cannot allow a person to become a part of the balanced and regulated "Air Transportation System" unless such person has been awarded—

(a) A certificate of public convenience and necessity, or

(b) An exemption from the provisions of the act.

Both licenses are contingent fully upon a finding of "public need" as directed by section 102 of the act requiring the Board to

encourage and develop such an "Air Transportation System" adapted to the needs of the national defense.

Since its creation in 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board has, pursuant to its policy directives and in accord with the licensing provisions of the act, expanded soundly the Air Transportation System to include some 80-odd air carriers including such classifications as "Major trunk carriers," "Local service carriers," "Supplemental carriers," and "All-cargo carriers."

Throughout the history of air carriers, including all classes thereof, the Board has been unmistakably and instantaneously responsive to the air transportation needs of the military. Although air carriers may each have limited areas of performance in accord with their certificates or exemption and their particular roles in the system as a whole, the Board has, in accord with requests from the military, exempted all air carriers desiring such, to the extent that each may perform unlimited charter transportation in either domestic or international air transportation. In further recognition of the military's desire, all air carriers, of any class may be exempted, upon application, from tariff requirements in international charter service, thereby allowing the military to obtain the lowest competitive bid rate without regard to a given carrier's filed tariffs ordinarily controlling such rate.

The foregoing represents only a small part of the regulatory agency's efforts to continuously provide for the needs of the national defense. Not mentioned are numerous specific instances where the Civil Aeronautics Board, pursuant to its directive from Congress, has lessened the requirements of air carrier regulations where military augmented lift was required—all, however, directed to the end that the air transport system remain sound and undiluted economically by forces unduly competitive to air carriers regulated.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN UTILIZING THE NATION'S AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IN RECOGNITION OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY AS LAID DOWN BY CONGRESS

Generally, it may be said that the military augmentation airlift is required and utilized in two broad areas—domestic and international.

In the domestic use of commercial airlift, the Secretary of Defense has designated the Secretary of the Army as Single Manager for all traffic management within the United States. In accord with the authorities and responsibilities contained in the Secretary of Defense directive, the Military Traffic Management regulation was promulgated by the Single Manager. The regulation contains policy guidance and procedures which are applicable to the performance of traffic management functions including the direction, control, and supervision of all functions regarding the "effective and economical procurement and use of commercial freight and passenger transportation service by the military departments within the United States." The Single Management Agency thus created on October 1, 1956, was entitled the Military Traffic Management Agency (MTMA) and in its role as traffic manager represents the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

In the international phase of airlift augmentation for the military, all air movement of persons and cargo is procured by the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). MATS is operationally responsible to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, although the command does include personnel from both the Air Force and Navy. MATS operates on a worldwide basis, furnishing airlift for the three services, either with its own equipment or with equipment of commercial carriers under contract.

Both MTMA and MATS are required by either law or other directive to employ commercial transportation services according to

the specific wording of the law or directive governing each. For example, the Military Traffic Management regulation of MTMA directs that—

"Commercial transportation service will be employed by the military departments for the movement of persons and things between points within the United States when such service is available or readily obtainable and satisfactorily capable of meeting military requirements."

MATS, by law, is required to utilize a substantial amount of its appropriated funds for the procurement of "commercial air transportation service."

(a) MTMA, the national transportation policy and commercial airlift

For purposes of clarity in discussing the military's role in supplementing the soundness of the Nation's air transportation system, MTMA and MATS shall be treated as distinct from one another although it should be borne in mind that Congress' policy statement as contained in the national transportation policy is entitled to the respect of all agencies of the Federal Government.

The policy directive of the Military Traffic Management Regulation, MTMA, is clear in the plain meaning of chapter 102, section 102003, "Selection of carriers or modes of transportation:

"In the employment of military-owned transportation and in the procurement of commercial transportation, the economic resources of the military departments will not be employed in such a manner as to affect adversely the economic well-being of the commercial transportation industry. In the selection of commercial carriers, the means of transportation selected will be that which produces the lowest overall cost consistent with military requirements, the objectives of governing procurement regulations and the transportation policies as expressed by Congress (appendix II), contingent upon carrier ability to provide safe, adequate and efficient transportation."

Significantly, and appropriately, appendix II as contained in the foregoing, is included in the regulation as the full text of the national transportation policy as prefacing both the Interstate Commerce Act and the Federal Aviation Act, or in short, section 102 of the act, i.e., "the encouragement and development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs . . . of the national defense."

In further recognition of the necessity for maintaining a sound air transportation system, the MTMA regulation accords the military ways and means of securing such additional lift as may be required in the event of a deficiency. But the means provided is by and through a cooperative effort with the Civil Aeronautics Board—again recognized to be that agency primarily responsible for maintenance of a sound system. Thus, chapter 105, section 105002 of the Military Traffic Management Regulation, states as follows:

"In proceedings before transportation regulatory bodies involving matters of public interest or public convenience and necessity to new or additional operating authorities . . . participation by representatives of the military departments will be undertaken only when . . . (2) the Executive Director, MTMA, determines that there is no carrier authorized to perform the required service, or that the existing authorized service is inadequate to fulfill the needs of the military departments."

Section 105004, chapter 105, goes further and gives MTMA full opportunity to cooperate with the regulatory agency in the event of insufficient lift to meet MTMA's requirements:

"The Executive Director, MTMA, will support applications (before the Board) only when a definite need for new or additional

service is evident and service by carriers with existing authority does not meet military traffic requirements."

Thus, it readily appears from the plain meaning of congressional directives (Interstate Commerce Act, Federal Aviation Act, and the national transportation policy) and from the single manager's recognition thereof as contained in the Military Traffic Management Regulation, MTMA, in procuring commercial airlift for the service departments, must cooperate with that agency designated to regulate air commerce—all to the interest of the development of a sound air transportation system. And, the air transportation system can, by law, be comprised only of carriers holding either one or both of the "air carrier licenses which, under the Federal Aviation Act, the Civil Aeronautics Board may grant" i.e., "certificate" or "exemption."

(b) *MATS, commercial airlift, and the law*

The national transportation policy would appear to be equally applicable to all branches of the Federal Government in requiring the development of a sound air transportation system. The Defense Appropriations Act, 1960, section 631, specifically requires MATS to utilize the services of "civil air carriers" in "commercial air transportation."

The far-reaching efforts of the Civil Aeronautics Board in providing MATS with an air transportation system have become manifest over the last several years. In fact, the Board emphasized with caution the vital necessity for maintaining, in the face of a serious economic condition of the industry, a balance which would continue to assure the excellent safety records of air carriers. Thus, in continuing air carrier exemptions from tariff requirements while performing MATS augmentation lift, the Board expressed an ominous warning: "Our concern, as we have heretofore noted, stems from our belief that contracts awarded on such a basis (uncontrolled competitive bids) do not contribute to the long-range economic strength of the industry" and "that a prolongation of such uneconomic operation may impair the fine safety record of those carriers which have historically provided the bulk of the military augmentation service" (p. 5, Board Order No. E-13040).

The Board thus indicated its extreme concern in the area of military use of the air transportation system, yet cautiously continued the carrier exemptions from controlled rates. This was about as far as the Board could possibly go in providing MATS with low cost transportation. In further consideration of the problem, however, it was made perfectly clear to MATS that cooperation with the Board must be increased if the long range objectives of Congress were to be met and the safety factors inherent in an economically sound air transport system preserved:

"It is evident, we believe, that the fundamental problem of distributing needed military augmentation airlift among the civil air carriers—with due regard for the national interest in economic transportation for military traffic and a sound air transportation system—can be solved administratively only through positive cooperative activity on the part of the Department of Defense and the Civil Aeronautics Board" (p. 5, Board Order No. 13040).

THE AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND ITS EXTENT AS DEFINED IN THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY

To properly approach the vacuum in the various laws and directives giving rise to a need for further legislation, an understanding is necessary as to what does or may make up the Nation's air transportation system which, in turn, is subject to sound regulation in the interests of the needs of the national defense.

Without qualification, Congress has given the Civil Aeronautics Board power over only air carriers engaged in air transportation as defined respectively by the Federal Aviation Act. As such, Congress has construed the makeup of the Nation's air transportation system as adequate in extending the system to include only air carriers engaged in air transportation. Thus, the act contains the following definitions:

"Section 101(3) 'Air carrier' means any citizen of the United States who undertakes, whether directly or indirectly or by a lease or any other arrangement, to engage in air transportation."

"Section 101(10) 'Air transportation' means interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation or the transportation of mail by aircraft."

"Section 101 (21) 'Interstate air transportation,' 'overseas air transportation,' and 'foreign air transportation,' respectively, means the carriage by aircraft of persons or property as a common carrier for compensation or hire or the carriage of mail by aircraft."

It is patent, then, that the Nation's air transportation system can only comprise common carriers under the Civil Aeronautics Board's jurisdiction and holding either/or certificates or exemptions. The Board has no jurisdiction whatsoever over carriers not so designated and the air transportation system cannot embrace carriers not so licensed. Thus, any person or company which undertakes to engage in air transportation as defined by section 101 (10) and 101 (21) of the act is subject to the Board's jurisdiction and must have applied for and have been awarded either a certificate or exemption as provided for in the act. Thus, the shelter of the system extends only to regulated air carriers.

If, however, a person desires to operate an aircraft, not as a common carrier, but in private carriage of persons or property, he may do so by simply obtaining an aircraft and an operating certificate from the Federal Aviation Agency. So long as he confines his activities to private carriage (not to the general public) he is not subject to jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board nor any of the Board's rules and regulations promulgated for the purpose of encouraging the development of a sound air transportation system. Indeed, he is no part of the air transport system, being neither an air carrier nor subject in any manner to the certificate or exemption requirements of the act or the tariff and other requirements of the Board's rules and regulations.

MATS AND MTMA UTILIZATION OF CARRIERS OUTSIDE THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD'S JURISDICTION—THE EXTENT AND EFFECT UPON THE NATION'S AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND ITS REGULATED AIR CARRIER COUNTERPARTS

Despite the millions of dollars spent by Congress, beginning in 1938, in providing for the complex and sound regulation of the air carrier industry and despite the clear terms of the national transportation policy and the cooperative efforts on the part of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the military, through both MATS and MTMA, currently utilizes air operators other than air carriers to an extent that a sizable proportion of charter airlift, domestic and international, is provided by carriers unregulated in any respect by the Civil Aeronautics Board.

The military has stated that it considers such carriers or operators as air carriers and that "this class of air carriers would be considered equally with other carriers" by the Military Traffic Management Agency.

Of paramount significance is the fact that bona fide and authorized air carriers doing business with MTMA are subject to detailed regulation, such as are necessary to the development of a sound system and appropriate to utilities and quasi-utilities, and must adhere to all sections of the economic

regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Act, including filing of approved tariffs, complicated monthly and quarterly filing procedures, and other and diverse commitments necessary to the Government regulation of the air transportation system. Thus, the operators which the military treats as air carriers perform passenger service for MTMA completely free from any of the Board's requirements and in fact are not subject to the Board's even cursory jurisdiction. The money savings to an operator not so confined is obvious from the nature of the business; however, the injury to carriers under CAB jurisdiction, or bona fide air carriers, is compounded to the greatest extent by the unregulated rates which may be and are offered to the military by operators not authorized or regulated by the Board. By having none of the burden and obligations imposed upon air carriers, components of the air transportation system, operators other than air carriers have so diluted the military passenger charter market that little or no incentive exists for certificated carriers to consider long-range plans for upgrading and improving equipment and service. This is so despite the fact that there exists adequate lift within the Board-regulated industry and despite the fact that any person may now obtain a certificate with a minimum showing of qualifications.

THE NON-AIR-CARRIER PARTICIPANTS IN MILITARY AUGMENTATION—THEIR RELUCTANCE TO SEEK CAB CERTIFICATION, EVEN UNDER THE LIBERALIZED BOARD PROCEDURE

With certification by the CAB readily available to any qualified applicant, there would appear to be no reason why any participant in military airlift augmentation should not apply for and obtain certification—where only the minimum qualifications need be proven. By the same token, there is no reason why the military should utilize carriers not so qualified. Indeed one of the prime reasons for the needed legislation would be to provide our Armed Forces and their dependents with transportation on carriers qualified to carry the general public.

THE NEEDED LEGISLATION AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH AIR CARRIERS SHOULD BE UTILIZED BY THE MILITARY

Inasmuch as the air transportation system is comprised only of air carriers holding Civil Aeronautics Board authority, little or no argument can be made supporting use by the military of carriers not so qualifying—especially in view of the stated ease with which certificates may now be awarded. Therefore legislation is warranted which will preclude any military augmentation airlift from being performed by other than air carriers as defined by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and having CAB authority to engage in air transportation.

CONVEYANCE OF CERTAIN PROPERTY TO STATE OF HAWAII

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to convey certain property, known as Salt Lake Boulevard, to the State of Hawaii.

Although the street in question has been under the jurisdiction of the Navy for many years, it has been used extensively by the civilian population as well. The roadway has never been improved or maintained in proper condition. The transfer of title would eventually result in the road being improved and maintained in good condition at the expense of the State, which would therefore inure to the benefit of the Navy as

well as to the State. Furthermore, the property has been declared in excess of Department of Defense needs.

I therefore urge early consideration of this measure.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 3269) authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to convey certain property to the State of Hawaii, introduced by Mr. FONG, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS INVOLVED IN TERMINATION OF FEDERAL CONTROL OVER MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE, WISCONSIN

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, in further regard to the problems confronting the Menominee Tribe, we recall that Public Law 399—providing for termination of Federal control over the Menominee Indians—required the tribe to “formulate and submit to the Secretary of the Interior a plan for the future control of the tribal property and service functions now conducted by or under the supervision of the United States, and for all other matters involved in the withdrawal of Federal supervision.”

As amended by Public Law 755 of the 84th Congress, authorization was also provided for reimbursement to the tribe for all expenditures involved in the costs of termination.

Following the enactment of the legislation, the Menominee Tribe has proceeded, since 1953, with good faith and diligence, to solve the numerous complex termination problems necessitating much time, study, planning, and expense.

Overall, I think the tribe has done a splendid job.

In 1958, the Congress—unwisely, I believe, and I so stated at that time—further amended the law providing only 50 percent reimbursement of costs incurred in carrying out termination of Federal control over the tribe.

If allowed to stand, this law would, regrettably, impose an additional expense burden on the tribe—despite the fact that they have made a realistic attempt to design practical plans for termination of Federal control over the tribe, for the most part, with the assurance under law of full reimbursement.

Consequently, in the light of these factors, I believe that Congress should now approve legislation to provide such full reimbursements for costs incurred in termination of Federal control over tribal affairs.

I introduce, on behalf of my colleague, the junior Senator of Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE], and myself, a bill to provide full reimbursement for costs involved in termination of Federal control over the tribe.

I hope my colleagues on the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee will give early and favorable consideration to this proposed legislation.

I request unanimous consent to have the text of a bill for 100-percent reimbursement of termination costs, and a

memo in support of the bill prepared by representatives of the tribe, printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ENGLE in the chair). The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill and memorandum will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 3272) to provide for reimbursement of termination costs involved in termination of Menominee Tribe from Federal jurisdiction, introduced by Mr. WILEY (for himself and Mr. PROXMIRE), was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the last sentence of section 6 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for a per capita distribution of Menominee tribal funds and authorize the withdrawal of Menominee Tribe from Federal jurisdiction,” approved June 17, 1954, as amended by the Act of July 2, 1958 (72 Stat. 290), is further amended as follows:

“In order to reimburse the tribe for expenditures of such tribal funds as the Secretary deems necessary for the purposes of carrying out the requirements of this Act and for such other expenditures incurred in preliminary planning commencing from June 20, 1953, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, an amount equal to all of such expenditures.”

The memorandum presented by Mr. WILEY is as follows:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMENDMENT TO PROVIDE FULL REIMBURSEMENT OF TERMINATION COSTS

During the 84th Congress, two bills were enacted which amended Public Law 399, 83d Congress, the Menominee Termination Act. One of these, Public Law 755, 84th Congress, amended the original act to authorize the appropriation of sufficient funds to reimburse the tribe for all expenditures of tribal funds authorized by the Secretary of the Interior in carrying out the purposes of Public Law 399.

In the session of the 85th Congress, a further bill to amend the Termination Act by extending the dates for preparation of a plan and for final termination was introduced. This bill, H.R. 6322, was amended in the Senate committee to provide for only 50 percent of reimbursement of costs incurred subsequent to the date of the enactment of the amendment. In conference, the House managers accepted the Senate amendment.

The present bill was requested by the Menominee Indians since they proceeded with good faith and diligence toward solution of the numerous and complex termination problems that necessitated much time in study, planning and expense. The planning deadlines established by Congress have been met. Plans will be complete and termination of Federal responsibility can be accomplished, provided funds can be reimbursed on a 100-percent basis to enable the tribe to continue the last steps in termination.

The amount that will be incurred in termination costs will in no case exceed the authorized appropriation established by the Congress.

The Menominees have endeavored to model a plan of operation for their future through establishing a business corporation. In the recent session of the Wisconsin Legislature, an act creating a new Wisconsin County out of the Menominee Reservation was enacted. These various activities were necessary to

integrate the people and their properties as citizens under the laws of the State of Wisconsin.

It is believed the legislation sought will reimburse the Menominee Tribe with the necessary funds for them to carry their responsibilities under committed contracts and other expenses incident to tribal government until the effective termination date.

EXEMPTION OF MENOMINEE INDIANS FROM DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX INVOLVED IN TERMINATION OF FEDERAL CONTROL

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I introduce, on behalf of my colleague, the junior Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE] and myself, a bill to provide that documentary stamp taxes not be applicable to transactions involved in termination of Wisconsin's Menominee Indians from Federal jurisdiction.

It will be recalled that Public Law 399 of the 83d Congress called for termination of Federal control over the assets and affairs of the Menominee Tribe.

It will be recalled in the intervening years, the tribe and its leaders have made a constructive, dedicated, realistic effort to meet the requirements.

Because of the complexity of termination of negotiations, a series of unforeseen problems have arisen. For example, it was not foreseen that the transfer of property from the Government to the tribe might be subject to a variety of taxes, such as the documentary stamp tax.

According to early determinations, this tax—on stocks and certificates of a corporation and real estate—could possibly result in an additional \$30,000 to \$80,000 cost to the tribe, depending on the form of the new corporation organized to handle tribal assets.

With the wide variety of complex problems developing out of Federal control, many of which are expensive, the members of the tribe are hard put to find money to meet all their expenses.

We recognize, of course, that the economic stability of the members of the tribe is essential to integration—without Federal control—into our economic structure. The imposition of such high costs as the documentary taxes could adversely offset their stability.

I believe, therefore, that exemption from this substantial amount of taxation would not only be in the best interests of the tribe itself, but of the State and of the country.

I ask unanimous consent to have a copy of the bill, as well as a supplementary statement prepared by the representatives of the tribe, printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill and statement will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 3273) to provide that documentary stamp taxes shall not be applicable to transactions involved in termination of Menominee Tribe from Federal jurisdiction, introduced by Mr. WILEY (for himself and Mr. PROXMIRE), was received, read twice by its title, referred

to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 9 of the Act entitled "An Act to provide for a per capita distribution of Menominee tribal funds and authorize the withdrawal of the Menominee Tribe from Federal jurisdiction," approved June 17, 1954, as amended by the Act of July 2, 1958 (72 Stat. 290), is further amended as follows:

"Sec. 9. No distribution, conveyance, issuance, or transfer of title to assets, land, or securities pursuant to the plan adopted by the tribe and approved by the Secretary under the provisions of this Act shall be subject to any Federal or State transfer, issuance, or income tax: *Provided*, That so much of any cash distribution made hereunder as consists of a share of any interest earned on funds deposited in the Treasury of the United States pursuant to the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1952 (65 Stat. 736, 754), shall not by virtue of this Act be exempt from individual income tax in the hands of the recipients for the year in which paid. Following any distribution, conveyance, transfer, or issuance of assets made under the provisions of this Act, such assets and any income derived therefrom in the hands of any individual, or any corporation or organization as provided in section 8 of this Act, shall be subject to the same taxes, State and Federal, as in the case of non-Indians, except that any valuation for purposes of Federal income tax on gains or losses shall take as the basis of the particular taxpayer the value of the property on the date title is transferred by the United States pursuant to section 8 of this Act."

The statement presented by Mr. WILEY is as follows:

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF AMENDMENT TO PROVIDE STAMP TAX IMMUNITY

Under the termination plan submitted to the Secretary of the Interior by the Menominee Indian Tribe, a conveyance of the Menominee Forest lands will be made by the Secretary to a corporation formed by the tribe (Menominee Enterprises, Inc.) for the purpose of operating the tribal forest and mills for the benefit of the tribal members. The corporation will then issue 327,000 shares of \$1 par value stock to the tribal coordinating and negotiating committee, which, in turn, will transfer the stock to certain voting trustees. The voting trustees will issue voting trust certificates to the individual members of the tribe. In addition, the termination plan contemplates issuance by Menominee Enterprises, Inc., of \$9,810,000 face value, 4-percent income bonds directly to the tribal members. The securities mentioned will be delivered to tribal members as listed on the final roll of the tribe approved December 12, 1958, under section 3 of Public Law 399, 83d Congress.

The termination plan thus submitted was prepared by the tribe for approval of the Secretary pursuant to section 7 of the act of June 17, 1954 (68 Stat. 250), as amended by Public Law 718, 84th Congress (70 Stat. 549), and Public Law 85-488 (72 Stat. 290), which provides:

"The tribe shall . . . formulate and submit to the Secretary a plan for the future control of the tribal property and service functions now conducted by or under the supervision of the United States . . . and for all other matters involved in the withdrawal of Federal supervision."

With regard to taxes, the act specifically provides:

"Sec. 9. No distributions of the assets made under the provisions of this Act shall be subject to any Federal or State income tax; *Provided*, That so much of any cash

distribution made hereunder as consists of a share in any interest earned on funds deposited in the Treasury of the United States pursuant to the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1952 (65 Stat. 736, 754), shall not by virtue of this Act be exempt from individual income tax in the hands of the recipients for the year in which paid. Following any distribution of assets made under the provisions of this Act, such assets and any income derived therefrom in the hands of any individual, or any corporation or organization as provided in section 8 of this Act, shall be subject to the same taxes, State and Federal, as in the case of non-Indians, except that any valuation for purposes of Federal income tax on gains or losses shall take as a basis of the particular taxpayer the value of the property on the date title is transferred by the United States pursuant to section 8 of this Act."

Chapter 34 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, sections 4301 through 4384, imposes certain documentary stamp taxes on the issuance and transfer of capital stock and certificates of indebtedness by a corporation, sales or transfers of capital stock and certificates of indebtedness of a corporation, and conveyance of real estate.

These specific taxes involve from \$30,000 to \$80,000 of cost to the tribe, depending of course on the final form the new corporation is organized. This phase of taxation was overlooked in the original termination legislation. At the time termination was considered by the Congress, it was not known what form of organization was to be created, therefore, it appears the tribe in its infant stage may be amenable to such described taxes.

It is to the best interest of the Government and the Menominee Indians, as well as the State of Wisconsin, that tax relief contained in this bill will give the new tribal organization some assurance of success, since the immediate termination impact will greatly affect tribal and economic stability.

AUTHORIZATION TO PRINT UPDATED INTERNAL SECURITY MANUAL AS A SENATE DOCUMENT

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I submit, for appropriate reference, a concurrent resolution to authorize printing of an up-dated version of the Internal Security Manual.

As my colleagues will recall, I sponsored, in 1953, the publication of an original manual. Revised in 1955, it has proved an extremely valuable compendium of Federal statutes, Executive orders, and congressional resolutions relating to the internal security of the United States. Over the years, it has been utilized by Government agencies, business firms, attorneys, teachers, writers, and many others concerned with the problems of internal security.

We recognize, of course, that internal, as well as external, security continues to be a major challenge.

The oft-quoted adage "the price of liberty is eternal vigilance" is as meaningful, if not more so, in 1960 as it was at any other time in our history.

On the domestic front, communism, the deadly enemy of freedom, attempts to carry on clandestine activities behind many masks, including seemingly harmless and sometimes meritorious organizations, drives, and other movements. Not exclusively a military effort of "kill

off" freedom, the antifreedom activities include such fields as industry, agriculture, atomic energy, educational and cultural activities, and other areas to undermine our progress, spread the cancerous Communist ideology, and generally weaken our free way of life.

To counter these activities, we have a system of laws, regulations, and Federal orders to prevent such actions, and, if discovered, punish the perpetrators.

The Internal Security Manual, a compendium of these statutes, has proved to be helpful to individuals and agencies working in this field.

Recognizing the value of the previous editions of the manual, I requested the American Law Division of the Library of Congress to revise this handy, useful booklet. Through the cooperative, constructive efforts of the Library, the revision is now complete.

At this time, I should like particularly to commend Mrs. Mollie Z. Margolin, attorney adviser of the American Law Division, for her splendid work in expeditiously carrying out the long, complex, and exacting task of updating the manual.

The availability of this fine publication, for which there is constant demand, even though previous printings have long been exhausted, for internal security purposes, would, I believe, serve the overall public interest.

Consequently, I am urging approval of the concurrent resolution authorizing the publication of 5,000 copies of the manual.

I request unanimous consent to have the concurrent resolution printed in the *RECORD*.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The concurrent resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 96) was received and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration; and, under the rule, the concurrent resolution was ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there be printed as a Senate document a revised edition of the Internal Security Manual; and that five thousand additional copies be printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary.

AMENDMENT OF MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED—AMENDMENT

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I have had correspondence with the Department of Defense regarding black market currency operations of U.S. military personnel stationed in Turkey. Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations have had an opportunity to discuss this matter informally with General Norstad, the Commander in Chief of U.S. forces in Europe.

I shall say no more about the Turkish matter now except to say that what I have learned so far points to a very important problem in our foreign representation. U.S. personnel, civilian and military, are serving all over the world. When they conduct improper currency

transactions or improperly sell personal property in such a way as to violate local law or U.S. Government regulations, our country is placed in disrepute.

The Committee on Foreign Relations will be going into this subject soon in connection with the mutual security legislation. For the convenience of the committee I submit an amendment to S. 3058, the administration's proposed Mutual Security Act of 1960, dealing with the subjects of disposal of personal property and of black market currency transactions abroad.

My amendment will provide a remedy, I think, for one cause of black market currency dealings. U.S. Government employees are supposed to exchange the dollars which they receive for salary and allowances at Government disbursing offices abroad. This procedure for acquiring local currency which they need to pay their local expenses is required so that their dollars will be exchanged at the legal rate of exchange instead of some black market rate inside or outside of the country. Experience has shown that in some countries the procedures which I have mentioned either are difficult to enforce or they have not been adequately enforced. One solution is to require some portion of salaries and allowances to be paid in local currency, thus reducing the potential for speculation.

My amendment would give the Ambassador authority, when he determines that the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives in a country requires it, to issue regulations of uniform applicability to all Government employees regarding their disposal of personal property and regarding the extent to which their pay and allowances received in that country must be paid in local currency.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this amendment may be printed in the RECORD, and appropriately referred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

On page 8, after line 2, insert the following: "(d) Amend section 523, which relates to coordination with foreign policy, by adding the following new subsection:

"(d) Whenever the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission in a country determines that the achievement of United States foreign policy objectives there requires it, he may issue regulations of uniform applicability to all officers and employees of the United States Government and of contractors with the United States Government governing the extent to which their pay and allowances received in that country shall be paid in local currency. Notwithstanding any other law, United States Government agencies are authorized and directed to comply with such regulations."

LEASING OF PORTION OF FORT CROWDER, MO.—CIVIL RIGHTS—AMENDMENT

Mr. ERVIN submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by him, to the

amendment proposed by Mr. JAVITS and Mr. CLARK to the bill (H.R. 8315) to authorize the Secretary of the Army to lease a portion of Fort Crowder, Mo., to Stella Reorganized Schools R-I, Missouri, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

CIVIL ACTIONS FOR REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS AS TO USE OF CERTAIN LANDS FOR GRAZING PURPOSES—ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILL

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the names of Senators BIBLE, CANNON, MOSS, BENNETT, MURRAY, MANSFIELD, ENGLE, and ALLOTT may be added as additional cosponsors of the bill (S. 3174) to authorize civil actions for the review of administrative determinations as to the use of lands of the United States for grazing purposes to be instituted in judicial districts in which such lands are situated, and for other purposes, introduced by me, on behalf of myself and my colleague, the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. DWORSHAK], on March 10, 1960.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE RECORD

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

By Mr. RANDOLPH:

Invocation; article by Sol Padlibsky, published in the Charleston (W. Va.) Daily Mail of March 21, 1960; and address by Senator RANDOLPH, at the Israel 12th anniversary dinner, sponsored by the Charleston Committee for State of Israel Bonds, on March 20, 1960, in Charleston, W. Va.

SENATORS DESIGNATED TO SERVE ON COMMITTEE ON PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I was notified recently that there was contemplated the creation of a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. That committee is sponsored by the United Nations. Two Senators were to be designated, one from each side, to serve on that committee. It was my pleasure to suggest, for that purpose, Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH, of Maine, and the majority leader suggested Senator THOMAS J. DODD, of Connecticut.

I wish to say, in connection with this proposal, which has been submitted to the State Department by the Vice President, that I am intensely proud of the fact that Senator SMITH, of Maine, was willing to assume this responsibility. She presently serves on the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, and she has been for a long time a member of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate. She has indeed rendered yeoman service in this field, and has done it courageously.

In her capacity on this special committee, she will serve as a sort of adviser, and I am confident she will render

excellent service. So I am proud indeed that she will accept this preferment, and I am glad I had the opportunity to suggest her name.

DEATH OF BISHOP CARROLL OF THE DIOCESE OF ALTOONA AND JOHNSTOWN, PA.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, Pennsylvania and, indeed, the Nation, have lost a distinguished spiritual leader with the death of Bishop Carroll of the diocese of Altoona and Johnstown. A member of a family which has given the church three extraordinary leaders, Bishop Carroll, like his brothers, brought to his work a combination of humanitarian warmth and dedicated vigor.

As assistant general secretary and then general secretary of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, he became the friend of many Members of Congress and executive branch leaders, and was an important contributor to national progress in fields like immigration, education, and family life. His remarkable record of accomplishment in Altoona—adding a dozen new parishes to the diocese and many new schools and directing the restoration of the cathedral, in only a little over a year—indicates the zeal with which he customarily worked.

Bishop Carroll's absence will be grievously felt, and he will be mourned both by churchmen and the laity to whom he gave so much devotion throughout his career of service.

LENDING CAPACITY OF BANKS AND TREASURY BILL RATE

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at this point in the RECORD two articles, one from the Wall Street Journal of March 21, 1960, entitled "Lending Capacity of Banks Raised Sharply in Week," and, second, an article from the New York Times of March 22, 1960, entitled "Bill Rate Takes Third Hard Fall."

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, Mar. 21, 1960]

LENDING CAPACITY OF BANKS RAISED SHARPLY IN WEEK—RESERVE SYSTEM'S INCREASE OF \$254.6 MILLION IN TREASURY BILL PURCHASES CITED—LOANS ROSE \$345 MILLION

NEW YORK.—The Federal Reserve System sharply expanded the lending capacity of the Nation's banks in the week ended Wednesday, according to figures released by the New York Federal Reserve Bank.

A chief factor in boosting the banks' reserves—which govern their lending ability—was a big, \$254.6 million increase Wednesday in the Federal Reserve System's holdings of U.S. Treasury bills.

Federal Reserve purchases of Government securities, usually Treasury bills, tend to pump up bank reserves because the System pays the sellers by check which they deposit in their bank accounts. As a result, the banks on Wednesday were under less pressure than at the end of any weekly reporting period in the past 13 months.

The New York Federal Reserve Bank also reported business loans at New York City banks in the week ended Wednesday rose \$345 million—evidently spurred by borrowings to meet March 15 income tax payments.

The sharp improvement in the banks' reserve positions likely aided banks in meeting the increased loan demand during the week, observers noted.

The \$345 million increase in business loans at the 15 largest New York City banks compared with a drop of \$30 million the previous week and a rise of about \$177 million in the comparable 1959 week.

The big increase in business loans in the statement week raised the total of such borrowings on the books of the New York banks to \$10,714 million—a rise of \$84 million so far this year. It was the first week so far this year that total business loans have topped the loan level at the start of the year. In the comparable 1959 period, business borrowings were still \$175 million below the total at the beginning of the year.

Stepped-up borrowings by metal and metal products companies, public utilities and transportation concerns and tobacco companies accounted largely for the business loan rise in the week ended Wednesday.

In the two statement weeks prior to the March 15 tax payment date, New York business loans showed a net rise of \$315 million, slightly more than the \$276 million increase in the comparable 2 weeks of last year.

Borrowings by nonbank financial institutions, such as commercial and sales finance companies, also rose sharply in the week ended Wednesday at New York City banks, climbing \$182 million, compared with a drop of \$156 million the previous week. Borrowings by these companies totaled \$1,859 million on Wednesday, about \$21 million under the level at the start of this year. Comparable 1959 figures are not available due to a change in Federal Reserve reporting methods last July 1.

The lending capacity of the Nation's commercial banks is governed by their reserves—a specified portion of deposits which they must keep in cash at Federal Reserve banks plus a part of the cash in their own vaults. On a given day, some banks may have reserves which exceed their legal requirements while others may have to borrow from Federal Reserve banks to meet requirements.

When total borrowings are greater than total excess reserves—as has been the case for more than a year—it means the banking system as a whole has gone into debt to the Federal Reserve to make some loans.

On Wednesday, net borrowed reserves—borrowings less excess reserves—plunged to only \$11 million from \$623 million the previous Wednesday, revised from the \$612 million previously announced. It was the lowest level for net borrowed reserves since February 18, 1959, when the Nation's banking system had net free reserves of \$3 million.

Accounting for the substantial easing on reserves Wednesday to Wednesday was the increase in Federal Reserve holdings of Treasury bills as well as a rise of \$360 million in the "float"—checks delayed in collection for which member banks automatically receive Federal Reserve credit.

On an average day in the week ended Wednesday, net borrowed reserves rose slightly to \$240 million from \$230 million on an average day the previous week, revised from the \$219 million previously reported. This was still well under the level of net borrowed reserves that has prevailed in recent months. During January and February, for example, average net borrowed reserves generally ranged from \$300 million to more than \$500 million.

A tightening factor on bank reserves on an average day during the week was a drop of \$180 million in the "float" from the previous week. But this was largely offset by an increase of \$174 million in Federal Reserve holdings of Government securities.

Uncle Sam's gold stock, which has declined \$47 million so far this year through sales to

foreign government buyers, held unchanged in the week ended Wednesday at \$19,409 million, Federal Reserve figures showed.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 22, 1960]

BILL RATE TAKES THIRD HARD FALL—91-DAY AVERAGE IS 3.033 PERCENT—182-DAY LEVEL 3.176 PERCENT, THE LOWEST IN A YEAR—CEILING SEEN REMAINING—SENATOR PREDICTS REPEAL WILL NOT WIN, IN VIEW OF RECENT INTEREST DIPS

WASHINGTON, March 21.—The Treasury bill rate took another dive this week, the Treasury reported tonight.

It was the third straight week of large declines, and brought the 91-day bill rate to within a hair's breadth of 3 percent; 3 weeks ago it was about 4½ percent.

The average discount rate on \$1,200 million of 91-day bills auctioned today fell to 3.033 percent, compared with 3.451 percent last week. This week's rate was the lowest since last May 25, when it was 2.878 percent.

The average discount rate on \$400 million of 182-day bills was 3.176 percent, compared with 3.619 percent last week. This week's rate was the lowest in almost exactly a year. The bills of March 24 last year sold at a discount rate of 3.093 percent.

CUT IN SUPPLY NOTED

Money market sources said one factor contributing to the sharp decline in bill rates may be the impending reduction in the supply of bills by \$4 billion tomorrow, when that amount of tax anticipation bills matures. Some will be turned in for cash, which will in turn probably be invested in outstanding bills.

However, the decline in bill rates has been so great that purely technical factors such as this could not account for all of it. One possibility is that the decline reflects an increase in funds available for investing stemming from a switch of Federal Reserve policy toward less restraint.

Weekly banking figures for the last 2 weeks have shown a condition of less restraint. This could be temporary, but there is some reason to believe that the Federal Reserve has decided to ease the pressure for a while.

Today, in the Senate, Senator PAUL H. DOUGLAS, Democrat, of Illinois, said the recent reduction of interest rates, on long-term as well as short-term securities, meant that the request of the administration for repeal of the interest rate ceiling on long-term bonds will not be granted.

BIG SAVING CLAIMED

Senator DOUGLAS said the resistance of Democrats in Congress to the proposal had meant and would mean a saving of hundreds of millions of dollars in future interest payments by the Treasury.

The Senator said he took great pleasure in the decline in interest rates, but experienced great pain at the killing made by investors from the concurrent rise in bond prices.

Today's tenders for 9-day bills totaled \$1,953,990,000, of which \$1,200,163,000 was accepted, including \$304,205,000 accepted on a noncompetitive basis. The high bid was 99.241 for a discount rate of 3.003 percent, the low was 99.220 for a discount rate of 3.086 percent and the average was 99.233 for a discount rate of 3.033 percent. The average discount rate was equivalent to a yield to investors of 3.10 percent on the basis of a 365-day year. Of the amount bid for at the low price, 65 percent was accepted. In the New York Federal Reserve district, tenders totaled \$1,366,580,000, of which \$712,637,000 was accepted.

Tenders for the 182-day bills totaled \$719,089,000, of which \$400,075,000 was accepted, including \$63,553,000 accepted on a noncompetitive basis. The high bid was 98.418 for a discount rate of 3.129 percent, the low was 98.352 for a discount rate of 3.260 percent and the average was 98.395 for

a discount rate of 3.176 percent. The average discount rate was the equivalent of a yield to investors of 3.27 percent on the basis of a 365-day year. Of the amount bid for at the low price, 7 percent was accepted. In the New York Federal Reserve district, tenders totaled \$549,152,000, of which \$259,688,000 was accepted.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, these two articles deal again with the problem of easing the money rate, and the appearance of an increasing lack of necessity to remove the 4¼-percent interest ceiling. One of the questions raised is whether the Federal Reserve Board has really changed its policy and is now prepared to promote an easing in the money market which would carry with it a decrease in interest rates.

While all of this has been going on, the yields on Government securities have been shrinking, and we are getting closer and closer to a situation where there can be really no sensible excuse for the Treasury Department's not attempting to float an issue of long-term Government bonds. In fact, I understand that on the 30th of this month an announcement will be made as to how \$2 billion of the outstanding debt will be refinanced. I hope very much that the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board will get together to decide to issue long-term bonds which, under current yields, could be done easily now under the terms and conditions outlined by the Under Secretary of the Treasury. In particular, I hope the Federal Reserve Board will come out of the smoke-filled room and let the American people know whether it intends to carry forward the tight-money, high-interest-rate policy, or, as the indications seem to be, it is going to ease it, which certainly should have happened a long time ago.

Mr. President, I desire to speak on another subject.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor.

RESEARCH IN MARINE SCIENCES—ADDRESS BY SENATOR MAGNUSON

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, on February 17, at the invitation of the Franklin Institute, which maintains research laboratories and a remarkable museum of science and industry in Philadelphia, my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], was honor guest at a reception and dinner and delivered the institute's annual Philip C. Staples lecture.

The Senator from Washington spoke on "Research in the Marine Sciences," a topic suggested by the institute, which has evinced marked interest in S. 2692, introduced by the Senator, which would establish a comprehensive 10-year program of oceanographic research and surveys.

I, my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], the New Jersey Senators, and nine other Members of the Senate are cosponsors of this proposed legislation, designed to meet a pressing scientific need which has been aggravated by the massive efforts which Soviet Russia and several other nations are undertaking in this field.

The Franklin Institute, I may add, was founded in 1824 as a memorial to the great statesman and scientist who, among his many other notable achievements, pioneered the science of oceanography in America. Benjamin Franklin directed the first detailed study of the Gulf Stream, advanced theories on the causes and movements of our violent coastal storms which have proven remarkably sound, and extended his marine studies even to the farming of oysters.

Mr. President, the Franklin Institute is to be commended for its interest in oceanography, and for selecting as its 1960 Philip C. Staples lecture my colleague from the State of Washington who has given so much of his time and thought to the expansion of our Government's activities in marine research and in support of the aquatic sciences.

I ask unanimous consent that the remarks of the Senator from Washington before the Franklin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania on February 17 be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESEARCH IN THE MARINE SCIENCES

(By Senator WARREN G. MAGNUSON before the Franklin Institute, Philadelphia, February 17, 1960)

President LePage, members of the Franklin Institute and their guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honor and a privilege to be with you tonight and to meet so many distinguished scientists, science students and patrons of the sciences.

I must confess that I accepted your kind invitation with some trepidation. Talks I have made from time to time during my public career have been called many things, but this is the first time they have been billed as a lecture. Tomorrow, when my colleagues in the Senate ask what I did tonight, and I tell them I was in Philadelphia delivering a science lecture, they will say: "Come again. Surely you can give us a more lively story than that."

It would indeed be presumptuous of me to discuss the scientific aspects of oceanography. I am sure that most of you in this audience know far more marine science than I do. So I shall talk about the role of the Federal Government in this field—what it is doing in marine research, what many of us in the U.S. Senate think it should be doing, why we think the way we do, and what we are proposing Congress do to assure expansion of the marine sciences.

First, let us consider what business the Government may have in the field of scientific research, particularly basic scientific research. All of us agree that maximum scientific achievement requires great scientific freedom and a minimum of Government direction and control.

I recall that the question of Government involvement in basic research was raised when, in 1937, I introduced the bill to establish a National Cancer Institute, the first legislation of this kind to be enacted by the Federal Government. Today we have seven National Institutes of Health, all doing splendid work in medical research. The question of Government participation in research designed to alleviate the afflictions that beset mankind appears to have been resolved.

The question again was raised when, in 1945, I introduced the first bill to create a National Science Foundation. This bill authorized and directed the Foundation to encourage and support basic research and education in the sciences. The Government had never entered the field of basic research

before. Dr. Vannevar Bush worked with me on this legislation and assisted in its drafting. It required 5 years to convince Congress and the administration that we needed a National Science Foundation, but we finally succeeded. Today, although the agency certainly has proved its value and is being continually expanded, there are some people who question the Government's support of basic research.

Research that has immediate and demonstrable application appears easier to advocate successfully than does research that promises general gains at some undetermined time in the future. Yet we know there must be a foundation of basic scientific knowledge before we can anticipate effective application.

Why must the Federal Government invest in science?

One reason is that we are living in a scientific age. Our security, health, welfare, economy—perhaps our very survival as a free nation—depends on keeping abreast in science with the other great powers.

A second reason is that national benefits accrue from expanded scientific research far outweighing the costs, and where there is a national benefit I feel there is a national duty to support such research.

A third reason is that scientific research in many fields is today too costly for most private or State institutions and laboratories to undertake to the extent the demands and tensions of these times require without the assistance of the Federal Government.

Government grants to these laboratories and institutions assure that the required research will be done where effective results can best be accomplished.

That is the theory behind the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, and it is the basic theory of the proposed Marine Sciences and Research Act.

For many years basic research in the marine sciences was conducted in the United States in institutions privately endowed or as an activity of State universities and colleges.

The scientists in these institutions did a magnificent job. They are still doing a magnificent job although their funds and facilities have become increasingly strained as the job has grown to an enormity undreamed a few years back.

Interest of the Federal Government in the oceans was limited almost exclusively to studies that would safeguard and improve surface navigation. To this end Congress in 1807 established a Coast and Geodetic Survey, restricting its marine jurisdiction to the edge of the Continental Shelf. That provision remains unchanged today. I have legislation pending to remove this archaic structure and permit the Coast and Geodetic Survey to probe the deep and open seas. We certainly should make maximum use of all the ships and skilled manpower we have.

From 1843 until his death in 1867, the Coast and Geodetic Survey was headed by Dr. Alexander Dallas Bache, a great grandson of Benjamin Franklin, for whom your institute is named. Dr. Bache, I am told, also for many years directed the research activities of this institute. He had a profound interest in the oceans as did his great grandfather.

The U.S. Navy, to meet its own particular needs, in 1930 set up a Hydrographic Office to conduct surveys desired by that Department. This Office has made valuable contributions to the Navy in the area in which it operates.

World War II demonstrated that surveys are not enough, that all marine sciences are important to naval operations, offensive or defensive, and that they are particularly vital to submarine operation, antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, and amphibious warfare.

Modern naval warfare, so much of it conducted beneath the surface of the oceans, requires broad knowledge of bottom topog-

raphy, sound velocities, subsurface temperatures and currents, biological activity, nuclear components, ambient noise, and ocean sediments.

Even now the Navy admits a significant lack of this knowledge in the North Pacific, the Northeast Atlantic, the Pacific Ocean, and many other areas.

The chemistry of the oceans must be known at varying depths and samples taken for nitrates, oxygen, salinities, and phosphates. We should learn much more than we know now about magnetism and gravities in the ocean, about wave motion, and about the mineral treasures of the sea.

Congress, recognizing the increasing role of science in national defense, in 1946 created an Office of Naval Research. ONR was given authority to conduct research and development work both in Government facilities and through contracts with individuals and educational and scientific institutions. The latter grant was based on the premise referred to earlier in my remarks that basic research, as distinguished from applied, could best be done in an academic environment.

ONR also was directed by Congress to promote and encourage initiation, planning, and coordination of naval research, and given authority to make ships available to oceanographic institutions, or to assist in financing operations of the research ships these institutions already had and would make use of in contract programs.

These research contracts were and are from year to year dependent on allocations from the annual naval budget. Demands for naval hardware and fleet operations are such that ONR almost invariably finds itself pushed to the foot of the lineup at the budget table.

Science suffers, all marine sciences suffer, under this procedure. A comprehensive, long-range program of oceanographic research and surveys, approved by Congress and directed by statute, is necessary to correct it.

Ocean research is done from ships. To quote from an official Navy publication only about \$11,500,000 was spent in support of ships working on the Navy's research program in the 11 years immediately following ONR's creation, or an average of slightly over \$1 million a year.

In fiscal 1959 the Navy increased this amount to approximately \$2,500,000 and in fiscal 1960 to about \$3,500,000, a total of \$17,500,000 in 13 years. This does not buy much ocean research.

I do not have the figures for other agencies but none are doing more work in the marine sciences than the Navy.

Our research fleet consists of old, slow, relatively small vessels inadequate in laboratory space and in accommodations for scientists, operationally inefficient and uneconomic. Average age of the ships is 24 years and the youngest was built 11 years ago.

With the exception of the 298-ton *Atlantis*, built in 1931, all are reconversions—reconverted tugs, trawlers, druggers, and surplus auxiliary naval craft, a motley assortment of marine has-beens ill-suited for their present vital mission.

No replacement of these old ships has been made to date, although Congress last year appropriated funds for two new vessels. Nor has there been any replacement of survey ships in more than a decade although most of these ships have been found "obsolete, overage, inefficient, or a combination of these" by an interdepartmental inspection board. Nor has there been any replacement of fisheries research vessels, although the fleet has been reduced by the withdrawal of several ships from service because they were no longer safe or seaworthy.

Marine scientists tell me we have a 25-year replacement program to accomplish within the next 10 years.

Let us hope that we are given that much time.

Our marine laboratory facilities are, for the most part, equally inadequate, although facilities grants made last year by the National Science Foundation to several institutions for biological laboratories will ease the situation somewhat in those institutions.

Our museums, like the laboratories, lack funds for necessary taxonomic and classification work and are cramped for space. Provision for new ships and laboratories is made in S. 2692, the proposed Marine Sciences and Research Act, and I hope to include in the bill a provision to assist the Smithsonian Institution, and through it other repositories, in housing marine specimens and for taxonomy.

Marine research has lagged, and because it has lagged there has been little incentive for young students in our universities to study and train to become marine scientists. The result is a shortage of oceanographers.

This is bad news when we note what other countries are doing, among them Soviet Russia.

Congress first became fully aware of our lag in oceanographic research at about the same time we discovered we had been lagging in our space program.

The shock of the latter realization, however, perhaps was more dramatic. We can see the moon but we cannot see the bottom of the ocean. For a number of years we had been spending several hundreds of millions of dollars annually—leisurely and all over the lot, so to speak, in the blind assumption that no nation could seriously challenge us in any science field—on various space efforts, and then Russia launched her sputniks.

We have been following about the same pattern in oceanography.

When sputnik was launched many of us wondered why we had been lagging and why there was so little coordination of our space effort. A Special Committee on Space and Aeronautics was created in the Senate for the purpose of bringing about coordination of space activities through appropriate legislation. This committee, of which I was a member, drafted the National Aeronautics and Space Act and established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The special committee has since been replaced in the Senate by a standing Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Many of us on the first committee serve on the present committee.

We are now appropriating a billion dollars a year for development and research in the space sciences, exclusive of military applications. But, because we were lagging in this field when sputnik was launched, we still lag. Those of us on appropriations committees in Congress are well aware that it is a great deal more expensive to try to catch up with a program than to be on top of the program from the beginning. It will cost billions to do now what could have been done with millions a few years back, but we must catch up.

In my opinion our lag in marine research can be as fatal to our welfare and security as failure to match Russia in space research and development.

When the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences was set up I rather hoped that it would consider the scientific problems of inner space—represented by the oceans and the earth beneath them—as well as those of outer space, and I regret that it has not done so.

It has now become a cliché but the facts are that we know more today about the hind side of the moon than we do about most of the ocean bottom.

I have sometimes, in the absence of Chairman LYNDON JOHNSON, opened sessions of the committee by saying: "The committee on space and depth will please come to order." Mention of depth used to draw a

chuckle. It doesn't any more. Our lag in the marine sciences is now a serious, a very serious matter.

We are investing more in space research in a week than we do in ocean research in an entire year.

The oceans cover 72 percent of the earth's surface, an area nine times greater than that of the moon.

They are where life on this planet originated.

They control, in a very large measure, our weather and climate.

They are the last open range for future protein foods.

They are the vast repository for wastes and sediments, organic and inorganic, of a billion years, and hold untold wealth in minerals and fossil fuels.

The major highways of international commerce, they hold the key to the free world alliance. They intervene between ourselves and 57 other nations of the free world.

Trade, commerce, and in large measure the economy of these nations is largely dependent on keeping the oceans open.

In contrast, no ocean separates Soviet Russia from any of her Communist satellites, nor is she dependent on ocean transportation for raw materials.

Despite this fact, Russia today has embarked on an unprecedented research program, the most extensive in world history.

The Soviet oceanographic research effort far surpasses that of the entire free world.

The Soviet oceanographic fleet, in numbers of ships, in tonnage, and in laboratories and accommodations for marine scientists, surpasses that of the free world.

The Russians have built and are building ships solely for marine research; floating scientific laboratories they have been called. One of them, the 5,960-ton *Mikhail Lomonosov*, visited New York City last September. Its mission this spring and summer is to study the Gulf Stream which sweeps along our Atlantic coast. A 5,546-ton research vessel, the *Vityaz*, previously visited San Francisco and Honolulu, after charting our Pacific coast. It is now working in the Indian Ocean where we have no research ships at all and never have had. Soviet ships equipped for aerological, meteorological, and oceanographic research combined have replaced the *Vityaz* in the Pacific.

The *Lomonosov* and the *Vityaz* have accommodations for more scientists than have all of the U.S. research ships, and they are younger than any U.S. research ship. The former is 2 years old. Russia claims three more like it are being built.

Soviet fishing fleets in both the Atlantic and Pacific, in addition to having scientists aboard, have been found to possess "capabilities for other than routine fishing operations," to quote a guarded report in a recent issue of U.S. Naval Institute proceedings.

"Soviet effort in oceanography is massive, of high caliber, and is designed to establish and demonstrate world leadership," Adm. John T. Hayward, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, has told Congress.

Soviet Russia's top 10 research ships—and this is only a fraction of her oceanographic fleet—displace 52,106 tons. Ocean-going ships of the U.S. research fleet displace a total of 7,260 tons.

The Soviet Government employs 800 professional oceanographers, of whom a majority are on sea duty aboard Russia's floating laboratories. The United States has about 500 oceanographers, of whom only a minority are at sea at any given time. Our entire research fleet has accommodations for only 125 oceanographers and the ships of this fleet are engaged only in part-time ocean operations.

We lag in ships, ship operations, scientific manpower, and in the education and

training of marine scientists. To meet Russia's challenge we should, within the next 10 years, double the number of marine biologists, physicists, chemists, and geologists. We can meet Russia's challenge by adopting a constructive, long-range program which would cost us about \$60 million annually for the next 10 years, or approximately 6 percent of what we are currently spending for space research exclusive, as I have stated, of military applications.

This is what a number of Senators, of whom I am one, propose in S. 2692, the marine sciences and research bill, which would authorize a sustained, coordinated, 10-year program, a program that would ultimately reimburse the Government far more than its investment in this field of science.

It would not be a crash program such as Russia is undertaking but a consistent, expanding, balanced program in which many agencies of the Government would participate.

Why, one may ask, has Russia embarked on a gigantic crash program? Why should her scientific effort in the field of oceanography be excelled only by her effort to conquer space?

An answer is that Russia seeks to dominate the world and to achieve this goal she must control the oceans. Her entire naval construction program since World War II has been directed to this end. Her oceanographic research program has been directed to this end. Russia's fleet of 500 submarines is the largest any nation has ever possessed, either in peace or war, and 12 times larger than that of Hitler's Germany at the beginning of World War II.

Russia's submarine fleet, like her oceanographic research fleet, surpasses that of the entire free world. Today she is the world's greatest undersea power. In addition to building up her own subsurface fleet, she has supplied enough submarines to Communist China to place that country fourth in submarine strength and significantly she is also supplying Red China with ocean research ships.

Early in my remarks I pointed out that, to quote a U.S. Navy publication, "submarines cannot function properly in strategic areas without adequate knowledge of currents, bottom topography, sound velocities, ocean temperatures, and weather." It was further cited that our own Nation is presently ill-equipped to supply this knowledge because we lack the ships for more than a limited and sporadic program.

Russia has the research ships and marine scientists to provide the knowledge commanders of her submarine fleets seek, and the knowledge also which those who command her surface fleet wish to have, for many marine studies also affect surface operation.

It may not be generally known that Russia also has carried on an extensive construction program of surface warships in recent years. With the exception of aircraft carriers she has built more combatant ships than any nation in the world.

The Soviets since World War II have outbuilt us in submarine tonnage 6 to 1, in destroyer tonnage 9 to 1, and in cruiser tonnage 14 to 1, and I quote Navy figures. They are now slackening their cruiser construction program to build more submarines. We cannot extend the ratios to include research ships because during the postwar period the United States has built none at all.

It is obvious, I think, that the Soviet objective is not only military but political, and in the present political phase Soviet research ships are playing an important role.

Trim, white, 5,000- to 12,000-ton ships of the Russian oceanographic fleet are dropping in on ports, large or small, of the newly established African Republics and welcoming citizens by the thousands aboard. They

have done the same in the islands of the South Pacific, in India and Ceylon, and, shortly before Khrushchev's visit there, in the East Indies. Port cities in South America likewise have not been neglected, and with their advanced equipment the scientists on these research ships can chart the waters for future submarines.

What do we have at stake in this unprecedented activity of an unfriendly nation? What does the free world have at stake?

Russian dominion over the oceans would give her control of 95 percent of the earth's surface and imperil the remaining 5 percent with ballistic missiles fired from submarines hovering along the Continental Shelf.

Control of the oceans would enable the Communist bloc to fragmentize the free world alliance, cut the lifelines to the United States, and block the supply lines from the United States to our overseas allies.

Soviet Russia then would have the power to terminate our assistance, both military and economic, to other countries at the whim of the Kremlin, and to bully and blackmail the nations to which that aid has gone.

If Russia ruled the seas she could, with impunity, shut us off from overseas sources on which we are dependent in some measure for 66 of the 77 strategic raw materials necessary for defense. From such sources now come 95 percent of our tin and chrome, 90 percent of our antimony and cobalt, 80 percent of our asbestos, and 75 percent of the bauxite from which we produce aluminum.

Control of the seas would enable Russia to interdict our commerce and that of other nations trading with us, and it would give her preferential access to the markets of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and South America, where live five-sixths of the peoples of the world.

Someone may say that Soviet Russia could never hope to supply these markets. Perhaps not, but Sino-Soviet bloc trade has doubled in the last decade, and if Russia could enjoy the carrying trade alone she would reap profits from it, as does every other nation but the United States.

Commerce and navigation are closely allied and both are on the threshold of a new age which Russia, through her oceanographic research and construction capabilities, is in a favorable position to exploit.

The great carriers of the future will be nuclear powered and many of them will travel not on the surface, but under the surface of the sea. Many of us will live to see great undersea commercial carriers in addition to naval submarines.

Subsurface carriers will travel faster and more safely, and in many areas of the world will be able to take much shorter routes to their destinations than do surface ships. The sea mileage from Seattle to Oslo, for example, will be 3,000 miles less than it is now when commercial submarines follow the path of the *Nautilus* and *Skate* under the arctic ice.

Ships of the future will pass under storms, not through them. Like an airplane, submarines will be operating in a continuous medium and absence of wide density variations will do away with gravity waves. Resistance will be much less for fast, deep-diving submarines than it is for surface ships. This will permit more efficient use and conservation of propulsion energy.

Sonar and related systems will enable submarine officers to hear better and in effect to see farther than their counterparts on surface vessels. Cavitation is reduced in undersea operation and some marine scientists dream of a day when it may be eliminated entirely, as nature has done with the dolphin.

Commercial undersea navigation will require all the scientific knowledge and aids that naval undersea craft need today. The

Russians are making aggressive efforts to supply this knowledge to their own subsurface mariners. One of their objectives is, of course, year-round navigation of the Northern Sea route.

Russia has another important objective for ocean research, to increase her deep sea fisheries catch. Russians, with their cold climate, have an urgent need for high protein foods, and her meat supply is deficient and probably will remain so. To offset this deficiency Russia has turned to the sea.

Today Russia is operating the largest and most efficient fishing vessels afloat. Some of her huge floating combines, as they are called, will take as many fish in one trawl as our ships will catch in a month. Russia is operating fishing fleets off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and along the coast of Alaska, and has fisheries also in the Central Pacific, the mid-Atlantic, and along the African coast.

Russia's fisheries research fleet is the finest and largest in history and includes at least one submarine. All of her major fishing vessels carry the latest scientific equipment for locating rich fisheries and scientists to operate this equipment, so these ships supplement her research fleets.

Our own fisheries are dwindling; our fisheries research is degressing, and our fisheries catch is dropping every year. Our research fleet, always small and always limited to coastal waters, has declined in quality and numbers, and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries cannot even operate all the ships it has because of lack of funds.

What are we doing about the Russian challenge, or complex of challenges, for mastery of the oceans?

A year ago the Committee on Oceanography of the National Academy of Sciences issued a report and recommended a 10-year program of research and surveys, ship construction and engineering, and training and education, designed to approximately double our present oceanographic effort by 1970.

All members of this committee are scientists. All are connected with nongovernmental institutions, and none of them are on Federal payrolls.

All are persons of great scientific stature and eminent in their respective scientific fields.

Separately, but at about the same time, the Navy Department issued a report of the Office of Naval Research projecting a 10-year program for expanded basic research to be undertaken by oceanographic institutions and laboratories under contracts with the Navy. This report, known as the TENOC report, was warmly endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Arleigh Burke.

Members of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce studied these reports and were intrigued with them. On June 22, I introduced a Senate resolution endorsing these reports and recommending that the basic recommendations be adopted. All members of the Senate Commerce Committee joined in cosponsoring this resolution, including the junior Senator from Pennsylvania. It was cosponsored also by my colleague, Senator Jackson of Washington, a member of the Armed Services Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The resolution was reported unanimously to the Senate by the committee on July 13, and on July 15 the Senate adopted it without a single dissenting voice.

This resolution outlined what should be done, but did not provide legislative authorization or direction. For that reason it was necessary to draft a bill which was done with the advice and counsel of oceanography committee representatives.

This bill, cosponsored by myself and 13 other Senators, including both Senators from Pennsylvania, was introduced on the final day of the 1959 session in order to give scientists and educators throughout the Nation

an opportunity to study it during the congressional recess and to present their views. As a result the committee has received many fine comments from many scientists.

The Federal agencies to which the bill was sent also for comment have not been equally responsive, and some Government officials, it is reported to me, have taken the view that no legislation is needed at all.

In this connection I will refer to a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, written to me on June 16, 1959, in which he said in part, and I quote:

"The interest of the Congress in this vital area is timely since legislative assistance will be required if all the recommendations of the Harrison Brown committee are to be implemented for a sustained 10-year effort."

Dr. Brown is chairman of the Committee on Oceanography, previously referred to.

With reference to education and training of aquatic scientists and the Navy's participation in this program Admiral Burke said, and again I quote:

"The expansion of curriculum and enrollment at each of these institutions represents a major capital venture that can quickly become a serious fiscal loss to these research centers if Federal support vacillates from year to year."

S. 2692 would expand the education and training of scientists in these institutions, and would expand research in the oceans and Great Lakes, would provide ships and laboratories for this research and would do these things under a sustained 10-year program.

Even in the absence of a specific bill, I think the interest of Congress in the Committee on Oceanography's report and the Navy's report has been of benefit.

As a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee and chairman of the Subcommittee on Appropriations for Independent Offices, I took part during the last session of Congress in providing funds for the National Science Foundation with which to build the first U.S. ship specifically designed for ocean research in 29 years. It will displace 1,040 tons and have accommodations for 19 scientists.

Although contracts have not yet been let for construction of this vessel, I have proposed that it be named the *Benjamin Franklin* in honor of the scientist and statesman who very properly, in my opinion, has been called the Father of American Oceanography.

Two new small survey ships are proposed in the 1961 budget and two additional naval research vessels of about 1,200 tons displacement. This is hardly keeping pace with the Russian program.

This is a start toward facilitating our ocean research but, I think you will agree, it is a small start. The Committee on Oceanography had recommended construction of four new research ships in fiscal 1960, 11 in 1961, and a total of 70 during the next 10 years. The Navy had recommended that 18 research ships, including 4 large ones of 2,000 to 3,000 tons, be built within the next 10 years to supply universities and institutions engaged in marine research under Navy contracts.

The next 2 years, in my opinion, will tell the story of whether or not we are content to take second place to the Soviet Union in marine research. It is my hope to hold hearings on the pending bill and obtain Senate action on it this session.

The bill, in my opinion, is in the national interest, and the longer this program is delayed the more our national interest is bound to suffer.

BEEF IMPORTS

Mr. SCHOEPPPEL. Mr. President, I am concerned with the increasing amount of meat being imported into this

country and its consequent effect on the domestic production of meat.

I am told that the number of beef cattle on feed in the 26 big feeding States at the beginning of this year was up 9 percent over a year ago. The numbers on feed establish a new record.

The number of sheep and lambs on feed on January 1 of this year fell 7 percent from the previous year.

Beef imports, especially during the past 2 years, have become increasingly large; in fact, during 1959 all recent beef import records were broken. The increasing size of these imports poses a serious problem for cattlemen and presents an overall picture which could become serious to agriculture generally.

In the year ended December 31, 1958, the imports of live animals, fresh or frozen beef as well as canned beef and veal, was in excess of \$300 million. During this same year we had exports of slightly less than \$18 million. For the year ended December 31, 1959, these same imports had jumped to over \$321 million while, at the same time, our exports of these same products amounted to slightly less than \$29 million. These imports exceeded 1 billion pounds of meat, enough to provide 5½ pounds of meat per person in this country, this is roughly 9 percent of our total meat supply.

Livestock producers and feeders take market declines, caused by a surplus of meat, in their stride. These cycles in their business occur with reasonable regularity and usually soon correct themselves. On the other hand the livestock producers and feeders should not be required to operate in a market that is abnormally flooded by imports, and I say to Senators that 9 percent of our meat supply is an abnormal import. Most all producers as well as feeders operate on moderate or low economic levels.

Under conditions of normal meat supply in the United States the market can absorb some imports without causing serious economic consequences. However, when there is a surplus of meat, as there is today, even a small amount of imports can cause serious economic conditions for the livestock producers as well as the feeders.

The legislature of the State of Kansas in its last session recognized the danger to livestock producers and feeders from the increasing quantities of meat imports by passing House Concurrent Resolution No. 13, urging the Congress as well as the United States Tariff Commission and the Secretary of Agriculture to look into the meat import problem with a view to reducing the amount of the imports and imposing stricter controls on the importation of beef and other red meats from foreign countries, thus providing American producers and feeders with some needed protection and the encouragement necessary for the maintenance and welfare of their industry thereby insuring its future prosperity.

My attention has just been called to the fact that still larger quantities of beef, especially fresh or frozen, appear on the horizon for this calendar year and unless checked will exceed even the imports for last year.

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Mr. President, something positive must be done soon to prevent serious damage to this great industry.

ACTION NEEDED AGAINST BUSINESS RACKETEERS

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, one of the difficult problems of law enforcement is dealing with business racketeers who operate in a fly-by-night fashion, moving into different States whenever the heat is on.

The attorney general of the State of New York, the Honorable Louis J. Lefkowitz, who has done outstanding pioneer work in this field in my State, has proposed the establishment of a national clearinghouse which would serve as the center for an exchange of information concerning these shady and corrupt commercial parasites. Attorney General Lefkowitz has for some time been alerting the public to the dangers from such practices.

At the attorney general's request, I am preparing a bill which would implement his proposal for the establishment of a national clearinghouse. I believe such a measure is essential to a complete overall solution of this problem, as the attorney general of New York has suggested. It would actually, to a large extent, alleviate the criminal practices which are being followed in this field, and which the States now cannot reach. Sooner or later we must cope with this problem at the Federal level. I hope it will be sooner rather than later.

Mr. President, I desire to speak on another subject.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.

BIRTHDAY TRIBUTE TO THE INCOMPARABLE BILLY HILL

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, today marks the 84th birthday of former Representative William H. Hill, of Binghamton, N.Y., revered and respected as "the grand old man" of New York State Republican politics. I take a warm personal pleasure in the opportunity this occasion affords to pay tribute to this splendid gentleman whom so many of us know affectionately as Billy Hill.

Public service has been a lifetime career of Billy Hill, and his dedication to the welfare of his community, his State, and his Nation, stands as an inspiring example for all public servants. When only 21, he embarked on his political career by becoming mayor of his home town of Johnson City, N.Y. Subsequently he served as a member of the New York State Senate, as a Member of Congress, and as a member of the New York State Parks Commission. He has been a delegate to numerous Republican national conventions, and for many years has stood in the forefront of political life in the southern tier of New York State.

In his role as publisher of the Binghamton Sun, Billy Hill has directed his immense energies to the welfare of his community and to the multitude of worthy causes that have commanded his interest.

Mr. President, I am proud to join with the legion of friends and admirers of Billy Hill on this 84th anniversary of his birth to honor this man of heart, of wisdom, and of integrity, and to wish him many more years of health and happiness in this life that he has so greatly enriched for others.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA VOTE AMENDMENT

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, earlier this session the Senate approved a proposed amendment to the Constitution to enable the people of the District of Columbia to vote for national representation. This amendment would rectify one of the most incongruous limitations on the exercise of the right of a franchise in America, namely, the denial of the right to vote to all Americans who happen to reside within the borders of the Nation's Capital.

The plight of the District of Columbia's citizens has aroused considerable interest. In this morning's New York Herald-Tribune, Roscoe Drummond urges action on a District of Columbia vote amendment. In another recent article in the New York Herald-Tribune, Victor Wilson pointed out the irony of denying Americans in the Nation's Capital the right to vote.

This whole subject is discussed very ably in a draft of a proposed report on the District of Columbia vote amendment which was never formally approved because of Senate action on the amendment prior to action by the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the columns by Mr. Drummond and Mr. Wilson, as well as the draft report on the District of Columbia vote amendment, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles and draft report were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 3, 1960]
VOTE FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RESIDENTS
URGED

(By Roscoe Drummond)

Every American has two cities close to his heart—his hometown and the Nation's Capital. If you share this affection, I want to tell you that Washington, D.C., urgently needs your active interest now.

You have a precious right denied to the residents of Washington, D.C.; that is, a constituent's voice which is listened to attentively by your Senators and Congressmen.

Most of the time Congress runs Washington absentmindedly, and in dealing with Congress, a Washingtonian without a vote feels like a man talking over a dead wire to somebody who isn't there.

That is why your voice and your interest in Washington as a city is so vital. Congress will listen to you.

I am not arguing and most Washingtonians do not argue that the right to govern the Capital should be lodged anywhere else than with Congress. This is a Federal city and the Federal Government should have final responsibility.

But the residents of Washington have no one to represent them in Congress. Surely this is taxation without representation. Washington, D.C., can hardly become a State but it ought not to be treated as a colony.

What Washingtonians—who are citizens without voting rights—need and deserve are:

The right to vote for nationally elected officials—President and Vice President of the United States.

The right to elect a Member of the House of Representatives from the District.

A more equitable payment by Congress to the District Government to cover the costly public service and housekeeping duties rendered to the vast nontaxable property. This imposes an unfair tax burden upon local residents. President Eisenhower has made specific recommendations to this session of Congress to correct these inequities.

The extension of voting rights to resident citizens of Washington was pledged by both parties in 1956 and Congress is almost entirely composed of Democrats and Republicans who supported these platforms.

Before these Members of Congress help write another national platform with the same pledges, we have the right to ask them to live up to the commitments already made to the nonvoting citizens of the District of Columbia.

More than half of the land and property in the District of Columbia is not taxable. Either the Federal Government or other tax-exempt institutions own it.

This is why Congress makes a payment to the District so as to bear part of the services for these tax-exempt holdings. But the payment is inadequate. In 1924 the United States paid 40 percent of the District's costs but in 1956 Congress authorized an annual payment of \$32 million for 1960, or about 16 percent of the District budget. The House has now cut this figure to \$25 million. Though the Senate Appropriations Committee voted to add a million, this still covers only 11 percent of the budget. And so it goes.

And so it will go unless people in all the States of the Union will tell their Senators and Congressmen that they want to make Washington, D.C., democracy's finest capital city.

Surely citizens who serve the Federal Government shouldn't be penalized by being deprived of their voting rights.

If you say so, these inequities will be corrected.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Mar. 15, 1960]

WASHINGTON AND CIVIL RIGHTS

(By Victor Wilson)

WASHINGTON.—One of the great ironies of the filibuster in the Senate to prevent enactment of civil rights legislation, including voting, for Negroes in the South, is that it took place in voteless Washington.

Whether the civil rights issue wins or loses in the high-vaulted Senate Chamber at the Capitol, Washingtonians will remain without franchise in either local or national affairs.

The result is that the adults among the District of Columbia's 800,000-plus population are watching this contest between two schools of thought with an air of personal detachment.

Of the city's three newspapers, two of them have played the filibuster story as a rather minor local happening, while the third has given it a bit more front-page display. The editors seem to have gaged the interest of their readers rather accurately.

As one Washington resident put it: "We're something like the kid with his nose pasted against the window of the candy shop. All the stuff in the window sure looks good, but it's beyond our purchasing power."

The story of why Washington residents aren't permitted to vote, even in local affairs, is well known. The House's District of Columbia Committee, which, with its Senate counterpart, runs this Capital through a board of three Commissioners, is dominated by southerners. These House Members won't

budge toward giving the large Negro population of this city the vote.

An intriguing question is whether Washingtonians would vote, if they were given the chance, in any greater percentage than more fortunate Americans. In the 1956 presidential election, only 60.4 percent of eligible American voters actually cast ballots.

The only clews available on this question came in the 1956 presidential preference primary held here. The right to vote in such primaries was granted to District residents late in 1955, the southerners not particularly objecting to this harmless pastime.

The election board setup had to start from scratch to get a brandnew voting system in working order before the May 1956, preference primary, including the registration of eligible voters.

Despite the rush job handicap, 58,408 Washingtonians took the trouble to visit firehouses and schools to register for voting their choice among presidential candidates.

There was no choice at all on the Republican side, since President Eisenhower was unopposed for renomination. Nevertheless, 26,636 District residents registered for the Republican primary. Another 31,772 enrolled for the Democratic primary.

The voting itself was a revelation.

On primary day that May, 21,670 of the 26,636 Republicans actually cast ballots. Of the 31,772 Democrats enrolled, 23,912 went to the polls.

This was a total of 45,582 votes cast out of a total registration of 58,408. It is doubtful if any other large community in the Nation turned out a higher percentage of registered voters at the polls than did the District of Columbia.

Admittedly the 58,408 registration turnout was a small one from the eligibles among some 800,000 persons. But it also should be recognized that Washingtonians might have gotten out of the habit of such routine, since they hadn't cast a ballot for anything between 1874 and that May day in 1956.

June 1874, was the month they lost their right to vote by congressional fiat. Previously they were ruled by a Presidential-appointed Governor and council, though they could vote for a lower house of 22 delegates, and a nonvoting delegate to Congress.

It should be noted, too, that Congressional parsimony in financing the 1956 presidential preference primary left a sour taste in Washington residents' mouths. Congress voted a meager \$40,000 for the new board of elections to build a voting system from the ground up, including registering voters, providing ballots, erecting voting booths, staffing the voting precincts, and paying for ballot checkers and counters.

The upshot was that funds ran out before the ballot count could be completed. The harassed election board then sent out an emergency call for volunteer counters.

To quote the board, "The result was most gratifying." The volunteers, who worked without pay, were sworn in by notaries public, and began the count, working in 4-hour shifts.

Then—11 days after the voting booths closed—the results were finally announced. This delay certainly took some of the glow from the fine voter turnout.

There will be another presidential preference primary here this May, with three Democratic candidates already entered—Senators HUMPHREY, KENNEDY, and MORSE. The election board is quietly hoping that Congress will loosen up just a bit more this time on money.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Sunday Star, Feb. 7, 1960]

WHY THE PEOPLE OF THE DISTRICT SHOULD HAVE THE VOTE

BACKGROUND OF THE REPORT

The Star presents herewith the partial text of the draft of a proposed report from

the Senate Judiciary Committee recommending Senate approval of a resolution for a constitutional amendment permitting residents of Washington to vote for President, Vice President, and delegates in the House.

This report was approved by a majority of a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, but was not presented to or approved by the full committee. Had it been presented, it is possible that there would have been minority or individual views. In view of the Senate's action Wednesday approving the same resolution as an amendment to another resolution, it is unnecessary that the resolution be considered again at this session by the Judiciary Committee.

On condition that the above explanation be made, Senator KEFAUVER, chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee which held hearings on the District vote amendment, has agreed to publication of this draft of the favorable report.

The Star presents it herewith as an excellent argument in support of worthwhile voting rights for the people of the District of Columbia. The proposal outlined in this report is now before the House Judiciary Committee.

"Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States granting representation in the House of Representatives and in the electoral college to the District of Columbia

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is hereby proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution only if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:

"ARTICLE —

"The people of the District constituting the seat of the Government of the United States shall elect, in such manner and under such regulations as the Congress shall provide by law:

"A number of Delegates to the House of Representatives equal to the number of Representatives to which they would be entitled if the District were a State with such powers as the Congress, by law, shall determine; and

"A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in the Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State; such electors shall possess the qualifications required by article II of this Constitution; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and cast their ballots as provided by the twelfth article of amendment."

NOT HOME RULE

The committee wishes to stress at the outset that this proposed constitutional amendment is not intended to have and does not have any bearing upon the question of home rule for the District of Columbia. That is a separate and distinct issue. However, it would insure that the citizens of the District would be represented in the Congress, which is the governing body for the District of Columbia.

Of course, it also provides the citizens of the District with a vote in presidential and vice presidential elections, of which they have been deprived since the election of 1800. It is a minor national disgrace that the citizens of the Capital City of the free world should continue to be disenfranchised in the election of their Chief Executive.

Sight is often lost of the fact that the District of Columbia has not always been completely disenfranchised. Citizens of the District voted in the national elections of 1792, 1796, and 1800. They also had a Delegate in Congress for several years during the 1870's.

VOTING RIGHTS HISTORY

Under article 1, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States, Congress was given the power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District * * * as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States." In 1788 and 1789 Maryland and Virginia made cessions contemplated by the foregoing clause. The District of Columbia was established by acts of Congress approved July 16, 1790, and March 3, 1791, and was officially proclaimed the National Capital after the national elections of 1800.

Under the act of July 16, 1790, which provided that the laws of Maryland and Virginia would govern citizens in those sections of the District which the two States had ceded for the Capital site until formal establishment of the seat of National Government, District citizens were permitted to vote in the national elections of 1792, 1796, and 1800. However, in the absence of a constitutional provision specifically granting District of Columbia residents the privilege of voting in national elections, District residents have not participated in any national election since that of 1800.

By an 1871 act of Congress, which provided Washington with a territorial form of government, the District was given a delegate in the House of Representatives. Three years later a temporary commission form of government was installed, and in 1878 the present commission form of government was established. The 1871 act was superseded by these measures, and the District of Columbia lost the small measure of national representation which it had briefly enjoyed. The District has not subsequently been represented in Congress.

HISTORICAL ACCIDENT

In discussing constitutional provisions which would give the Federal Government, in the person of Congress, "the indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of the Government," James Madison stated in the *Federalist* No. 43 that the prospective inhabitants of the Federal City "will have their voice in the election of the Government which is to exercise authority over them." But at the time that the constitutional provision establishing the seat of government was written, it was not known where the seat of government would be, who would live there, or what would be the size of the area ceded to the Federal Government for that purpose. Under the circumstances, no provision for national representation for residents of the seat of government was included in the Constitution. As the remarks of James Madison suggest, the failure to do so was due to an oversight rather than to any intention on the part of the Founding Fathers to deny such residents the right to vote.

(Various constitutional amendments protect the right of American citizens to vote from abridgement or denial in other respects—on account of race, color, sex, or previous condition of servitude.)

Thus, for more than a century and a half those American citizens who reside in the District of Columbia have been denied the right to vote for their President and Vice President or to be represented in the national legislature simply because the necessary constitutional provisions for the exercise of these basic rights of self-government have not been enacted.

ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY

Some 65 resolutions providing for national representation have been introduced in Congress since the formal establishment of the District of Columbia as the seat of the Federal Government. The proposed constitutional amendments would variously have granted the District representation in one or both Houses of Congress and in the electoral college. There have also been proposals to retrocede the District of Columbia to Maryland and Virginia, the lack of voting representation being one source of such proposals. In 1846, Alexandria citizens passed a resolution complaining of being denied "the rights and privileges enjoyed by our fellow citizens" and requesting retrocession; in the same year and in part because of this dissatisfaction the Virginia portion of the District of Columbia was retroceded by presidential proclamation.

In 1954, a summary of past legislative attempts to provide the District of Columbia with national representation was prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, as follows:

"A survey of proposed amendments to the Constitution of the United States introduced in Congress from 1789 to 1954, inclusive, reveals that they have included 65 resolutions providing for national representation in some form for the District of Columbia. National representation in this context means representation for the District of Columbia in one or both Houses of Congress and in the electoral college.

"A constitutional amendment has been considered necessary for the purpose because the Constitution provides that the Members of Congress shall be chosen by the people of the several States, and the District of Columbia is not a State.

"Of these 65 resolutions, the first was introduced in the House of Representatives on November 27, 1877 (H.R. 57, 45th Cong., 1st sess.) by Mr. Corlett of Wyoming. It proposed to grant one Member each in the House of Representatives to the Territories and the District of Columbia. The most recent of these proposals was introduced in the Senate by Senator CASE of South Dakota on March 8, 1954 (S.J. Res. 136, 83d Cong., 2d sess.). It proposes an amendment to the Constitution empowering Congress to grant representation in the House of Representatives and in the electoral college to the District of Columbia.

"Of these 65 resolutions, 20 were introduced during the period 1888-1926, 29 were introduced during the period 1926-47 and 15 have been introduced during the 80th to 83d Congresses, inclusive; 37 of them were introduced in the Senate, and 28 in the House of Representatives. Such resolutions have been introduced in both Houses of every Congress since 1915.

"All of the 65 resolutions were referred to the appropriate committees of the respective Houses, usually to the Committees on the Judiciary which have jurisdiction over proposals to amend the Constitution. Beyond such committee reference, only 19 out of the 65 resolutions were acted upon in some manner. On 10 of the resolutions, committee hearings were held. Three of the resolutions were favorably reported by the full committee. Two of these favorable reports were made to the Senate, in 1922 and 1925 (S. Rept. 507, 67th Congress., 2d sess., and S. Rept. 1515, 69th Cong., 2d sess.). The third favorable report was that made by the Judiciary Committee to the House on the Summers resolution (H.J. Res. 257) on August 5, 1940 (H. Rept. 2828, 76th Cong., 3d sess.).

"Of the 19 resolutions acted upon, 3 were reported adversely by the full committee. Each of the adverse reports was made in the Senate. The two Blair resolutions of 1889 were reported jointly and ad-

versely by the Committee on Privileges and Elections, debated and passed over without vote (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 51st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 297, 802). The Capper resolution of 1941 (S.J. Res. 35) was reported unfavorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee on August 4, 1941 (S. Rept. 646, 77th Cong., 1st sess.).

"Apparently only five full committee reports on the subject of national representation for the District of Columbia have been submitted during the last 65 years. Three favorable reports were made, in 1922, 1925, and 1940; two unfavorable reports were received, in 1889 and 1941.

"Apparently no committee report on this subject has been debated on the floor of Congress since the first report on the Blair resolutions of 1889. However, the question of extending national suffrage to the residents of the District of Columbia has been considered on the floor of Congress from time to time. In 1917, for example, the resolution of Mr. Austin of Tennessee (H.J. Res. 73) was debated."

PRESENT LEGISLATION

During the 1st session of the 86th Congress, separate resolutions to amend the Constitution so as to provide the District of Columbia with national representation were introduced by Senators BEALL, of Maryland, CASE, of South Dakota, and KEATING, of New York. The aforementioned Senators subsequently agreed on a single resolution which combined the three earlier versions. The new resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 138, was jointly sponsored by Senators KEATING, CASE, and BEALL.

Hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 138 were held on September 9, 1959, by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments. Testimony delivered before the subcommittee, by Senators and witnesses representing various civic groups, overwhelmingly supported the measure. In addition, a letter from President Eisenhower strongly supporting the Keating-Case-Beall proposal was received by the subcommittee. The subcommittee approved the proposal, recommending that the original wording, which would have granted the District three delegates in the House of Representatives, be amended so as to give the District a number of delegates "equal to the number of Representatives to which they would be entitled if the District were a State."

CONCLUSIONS

In any democratic society, and particularly in one which was created in no small part to rectify the inequity of "taxation without representation," the denial to any group of citizens of a voice in the government which taxes them and can send them to their deaths in the country's defense is both an anomaly and an injustice. Federal cities, modeled after the American Capital, have been established in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. But the residents of the capital cities in each of these Latin American countries have full citizenship rights, including national representation, as do the residents of capital cities in every other major republic. In this respect, America lags behind the other democracies.

The Keating-Case-Beall proposal is designed to give citizens of the District of Columbia both a voice in the selection of the national executive and representation in the National Legislature. As has frequently been pointed out, the District of Columbia, with more than 850,000 residents, has a greater population than 12 States—New Hampshire, Vermont, North Dakota, South Dakota, Delaware, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, New Mexico, Alaska, and Hawaii. The District's population in fact exceeds the combined population of Alaska, Nevada, and Wyoming, three States which are represented by nine men in Congress

while the District remains unrepresented. In 1948, the last time District tax contributions were reported separately, the District paid \$363,210,489 in Federal taxes, more than the contributions of 25 States. The number of District citizens who have served in the Armed Forces during World War II and after has likewise been greater than that of many States.

The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the exclusive legislative power for the seat of Government, while the President appoints judges and certain administrative officials. The right to vote for presidential electors and for delegates to Congress would provide residents of the District of Columbia with the fundamental right to a voice in their own government which they have for so long been denied.

The District of Columbia not being a State, it can only be provided with national representation through a constitutional amendment. The provision in the Keating-Case-Beall proposal relating to presidential electors was designed to give citizens of the District proportionately equal rights with other citizens in national elections, as is their just due. The District of Columbia being a unique entity and not a State, the problem of providing representation in a national legislature which recognizes the principle of State representation is not so easily resolved. The Keating-Case-Beall provision relating to representation in the national legislature, as amended, would preserve the principle of State representation in the Senate, but would give the District a number of delegates in the House of Representatives proportionate to its population. The wording of this latter provision would enable Congress, once the resolution has been adopted as a constitutional amendment, to confer on the District's delegates powers equivalent to those of other House Members, if it chooses to do so. The proposal under consideration would in no way lessen the control by Congress over the seat of the National Government. It merely insures that citizens of the District of Columbia have an equal voice with citizens of the States in matters relating to their vital interests.

Both the Democratic and Republican Parties, by their 1956 platforms, are committed to national representation for the District of Columbia. And, as previously noted, President Eisenhower has recently indicated his strong support for the Keating-Case-Beall proposal.

REFERENCES IN DEBATE TO ABSENCE OF SENATORS

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, the very distinguished Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER], in opening his remarks yesterday on the general subject of drugs and drug prices, stated that he had given notice to the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA], the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BUTLER], and myself that he would speak at 1 o'clock on yesterday, and that he hoped we would be present in the Chamber to ask questions, inasmuch as all of us had been critical of the chairman and the subcommittee in the drug hearings, and had not given him notice of our remarks.

First, let me say that last Thursday, through the ticker tape, I learned that the distinguished Senator would issue a 25-page blast, but he chose Tuesday at 1 o'clock instead.

I think the Senator might have known from experience that on every Tuesday the minority leadership is first engaged

at the White House Conference in the morning; that on every Tuesday, with few exceptions, there is a minority policy luncheon; and that after the minority leader makes a report to the Senators attending the luncheon there follows an "automatic" press conference, which usually takes care of all the time until 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

So my distinguished friend from Tennessee could not well expect that any minority Members would be present in the Chamber at that time; and certainly the minority leader could not be here.

On January 22 I made a speech on the floor of the Senate and placed in the RECORD a statement which I had prepared earlier in answer to what I regarded as misleading statements and exhibits made by the staff during the hearing in the week of December 7. I purposely withheld placing that statement in the RECORD for a week or so, so that I could make it at the resumption of the drug hearings on January 21, and so that the Senator from Tennessee would have an opportunity to hear it at first hand, and reply to it, which he did.

I made a rather lengthy statement, and in the course of the hearings I stated that substantially that statement, with some amplification, would be presented on the floor of the Senate. That I did. So I felt that everyone was on notice.

I think also I should point out that on February 8 I was not in the Chamber during the discussion of the appropriation for the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, to which I raised no objection whatsoever at any time, either in the Judiciary Committee or in the Committee on Rules and Administration.

It was at that time that the distinguished chairman placed a written statement in the RECORD which answered my remarks of January 21 and 22. It was apparent that the chairman decided to answer the second time with his speech on March 22.

I point out, in connection with all this discussion, that I feel that Members of the Senate sometimes become a little careless—and I do not quarrel or scold on the point. Only yesterday or the day before my absence from the Chamber was remarked by another Senator, who thought I should have been here to hear his speech.

I can only say that the minority leader, like the majority leader, is beset with a great amount of detail, and it is simply impossible, in the nature of things, to fulfill my responsibilities and be here at the same time.

I believe Members of the Senate should be very careful about remarking on the absence of a Senator. If that is to be the settled practice here, I am afraid it could raise many difficulties. I certainly would not want to be impelled to that course of action, because I know how difficult it is to fulfill my responsibilities, with the callers who come to two different offices, one in the Capitol and one in the Senate Office Building; visitors who call me to the reception room or to the President's Room; and all the other chores that go with such a responsibility. So

I am not here to apologize. I know what my duties are. I know what my responsibilities are. I shall never call attention to the fact that a Senator is absent from the Chamber, even though I might feel that he should be present to hear some worldshaking statement I am prepared to make.

I leave that admonition with the Senate, because I think the practice to which I have referred is indeed unfortunate.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I agree with the distinguished minority leader with respect to references being made to Senators who do not happen to be in their seats at a particular time. I think that is the responsibility of the individual Senator; and the fewer references made in that respect, the better off we shall all be.

ORDER FOR RECESS FOR 1 HOUR BEGINNING AT 2 O'CLOCK P.M.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the hour of 2 o'clock the Senate may stand in recess for 1 hour in order to attend the presentation and unveiling by the State of Nevada of a statue of the late distinguished Senator Patrick Anthony McCarran.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ENGLE in the chair). Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Illinois? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. At 2 o'clock, the Senate will stand in recess for 1 hour.

THE SECOND GERMAN CRISIS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 20 minutes in addition to the minutes allowed under the unanimous-consent request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in recent weeks two serious incidents have taken place in connection with Berlin. They reveal once again, with stark clarity, the potentiality of conflict which is inherent in that situation. The first incident was that of the allied military plan to fly planes above the 10,000-foot level on the airlines to Berlin. The second involved an attempt of Communist border guards to switch the passes of allied personnel traveling the land routes to Berlin. Had the switch worked, allied personnel would have been compelled to acknowledge the authority of the East German regime in place of the Soviet Union over the approaches from the West. Hence, the Russians would have been in a position to absolve themselves from responsibility for subsequent interference with allied passage to Berlin. This second incident led to a prompt reprisal against the movement of Soviet personnel in Western Germany.

These incidents, each in its own way, represented the placing of the chip on the shoulder. They were the dares of children carried over into the deadly game of devastating military confrontation.

Fortunately, the interaction of reprisal—counterreprisal—came to a halt

before it had gone very far. Fortunately, the chips were removed from the shoulders by those who had placed them there instead of being sent flying at some point by one side or the other. That these incidents did not lead to serious consequences may well have been due solely to the intervention of the highest political authorities, President Eisenhower in one instance and Mr. Khrushchev in the other.

In this fashion is the way to the summit kept open, but—let us not delude ourselves—the way of almost haphazard descent into disaster is not closed. It is avoided for the moment but it is not closed. Nor will it be closed so long as the problems of a divided Berlin, encased as they are in the problems of a divided Germany and the still larger problems of a divided Europe are not faced, so long as they are not faced with policies which fit today's realities rather than with yesterday's generalities.

What are these antiquated generalities on Germany, Mr. President, to which all involved appear still to cling? On the Soviet side, the generalities are these: In some fashion, at some time, all of Germany will become a Communist state if only the Western presence can be removed from Berlin and the two parts of Germany kept sharply separated for the indefinite future.

And the generalities on the part of the Western allies? Our policies hold that at some time, in some fashion, all of Germany will be drawn into the Western camp if only the allied presence remains in Berlin and if we can will out of existence that half of Germany which is held by the Communists until such time as it can become a part of and subject to the political control of a united Germany.

There are certain similarities, Mr. President, in the two positions. In Communist policies, no less than in those of the Western allies, great significance is attached to control of Berlin. Further, both positions tacitly regard the present division of Germany as preferable to the alternative to unity which have so far been proffered. And, apparently, at least the highest political leadership on each side is fully cognizant of the catastrophic consequences of total military conflict in present circumstances and seeks, therefore, to avoid its use in the pursuit of political objectives in Germany.

If these are the generalities, what are the realities? The overriding reality is that there are two German authorities in one Germany and there is no indication whatsoever that either is going to go away in peace. The present division is maintained, on one side, by a German authority with a high degree of public support and popular participation, by the presence of allied forces in Berlin, by the symbol of NATO's protection. It is maintained, on the other side, by a very low degree of public support propped up with totalitarian controls, backed by Soviet armed forces and such guarantees as are contained in the Communist Warsaw pact. In short, the

division of Germany into two political entities exists whether it is recognized or not.

In these circumstances, I see no likelihood that the generalities of Soviet policy on Germany lead anywhere but in circles endlessly traveled. Nor do I see—in present circumstances—that Western generalities lead anywhere but in circles endlessly traveled. That has certainly been the experience of the past decade and a half.

In short, Mr. President, as between the Western allies and the Soviet bloc there is stalemate in Germany. There will be no Western retreat in peace. Nor do I see the probability of a Soviet withdrawal in peace. We may be able to maintain the situation without total war—at Berlin no less than in Germany as a whole—if we are prepared to pay the price. The Communists can maintain it, too, and even challenge it at Berlin if they are prepared to pay the price.

The question for us, no less than for them, is not: Can the present situation be maintained? Rather, it is: Do we want to maintain it? Is this situation in the highest interests of the Western nations? Is it, in all truth, in the highest interests of the Soviet people? Is there an alternative which better serves these highest interests on both sides?

The need for an alternative is indicated, I believe, by historic experience. German unification will not wait forever. At some point the Germans themselves will tire of the present disunity which is imposed upon them largely by the ideological differences of the Western nations and the Soviet Union. If the mood of a plague on both your houses sweeps through that country it may well upset the delicate balance upon which the peace of Europe and perhaps of the world is now hinged. For that reason, alone, Mr. President, we must seek, even as the Russians must seek, in a mutual interest in the survival of a recognizable civilization, a way to end the present stalemate. It is too great a risk for mankind—for the Russians no less than the Western nations—to assume an indefinite German acquiescence in the present division.

We need, further, Mr. President, to devise a new situation at Berlin, not for West Berlin alone, as the Russians would have it, but for all Berlin. For, it is at that point that the intimate juxtaposition of opposing military forces creates the gravest danger of careless or accidental sparks which may go beyond the control of those who play with the fire. This point is underscored by the incidents to which I referred at the beginning of my remarks and by others of a similar nature going back to the time of the Berlin blockade. The point of no return has not yet been transgressed in these incidents but let no one assume that, with the hair-triggering of modern military establishments, that point will continue indefinitely to be avoided.

Finally, Mr. President, some way other than stalemate in Germany is essential, if the huge burden of armaments is not to grow beyond the capacities of all peoples to bear. Certainly it is essential if we no less than the Russians mean se-

riously to lighten this burden. We may well ask ourselves: How much of our annual military budget of \$40 or more billions is occasioned by this stalemate? How much of the budgets of the Russians, the British, the French, indeed, the budgets of just about every nation in Europe?

We are correct when we stand firm in the face of a Soviet provocation at Berlin. But standing firm, alone, meets only the immediate provocation. It does not face these other factors in the German situation, the factors which strongly indicate that the present stalemate is not adequate. Standing firm, alone, does not meet the question of the essential need for peaceful progress on German unification. Standing firm, alone, does not meet the question of the danger of accidental war or war by childlike provocation at Berlin. Standing firm, alone, does not meet the question of the interrelationship between a dangerously divided Germany and a dangerously divided Europe—the delicate balance between peace and war. Hence, it does not meet the question—let alone of disarmament—but even of the capacity of the nations involved to bear the burden of armaments, along with all the other burdens of an increasingly complex civilization.

We may believe that we are countering the immediate provocation, but we do not face these essential questions by proposing to hold plebiscites in Western Berlin on the eve of a summit conference, especially plebiscites whose results are a foregone conclusion. In election after election—the most recent in December 1959—the people of Berlin have made clear beyond any doubt that when faced with a choice between freedom and Communist absorption, they will choose overwhelmingly, for freedom, even freedom on the razor's edge. I can see no virtue in a parade of West Berliners to the polls once again to prove what has been proved over and over again, even to the point of Soviet acknowledgment. I can see harm in it, particularly in a world that has had a surfeit of propaganda in recent years. A gesture of that kind may hammer home more firmly the existing stalemate. It does not face the questions which suggest that it is time to end the stalemate.

Nor are these questions faced by Mr. Khrushchev when he seeks to alter the status of West Berlin alone. To be sure the situation in West Berlin may be "abnormal," as the President and Mr. Khrushchev apparently have agreed. But one does not achieve normalcy by compounding the abnormality. If the situation in West Berlin is abnormal now, it would be even more abnormal to substitute for it the situation which Mr. Khrushchev has proposed. For, he would leave as the sole German authority in what will one day be again the capital of all Germany, a militant minority, the German Communist regime of East Germany. He would leave, in this fashion, the symbolic citadel of German unification in the hands of those with the least claim to it. As for the international enclave of freedom, which would remain in West Berlin, it would matter little

whether its safety were guaranteed or not. It would be to the German authority in Berlin, their capital, not to a sleepy international enclave, to which more and more Germans would look for leadership and inspiration.

Nor are the questions faced on our part by a continued advocacy of free all German elections. Communism will not write its death warrant in East Germany in this fashion, not when it is holding the gun. We may call for free elections and, indeed, we should; but let us not delude ourselves into believing that this will bring about unification or in any way act to end the present stalemate. We have called ourselves hoarse on this point for a decade and a half; and so far as anyone can see, the German totalitarian regime in the East has used this time to drive the stakes of possession more firmly into the ground.

Nor are the questions of the stalemate faced by the Russians, Mr. President, when they call for formal recognition of the division of Germany and certification of the division in peace treaties with two Germans. How many wars need to be fought before it is perceived, at last, that a numerous and determined people once seized with the sense of national unity are not likely to be kept forever apart in peace? Countless forgotten agreements which have presumed to make permanent by paper such cleavages gather dust in the archives of history.

What I am suggesting, Mr. President, is that if there is to be reasonable hope for peace, there must be reasonable hope soon for the reunification of Germany. The absence of such hope may very well convert the rational urge to national unity into the irrational urge for conquest; and, in this connection, it is significant to note that a substantial body of Germans already identify East Germany as middle Germany and look to the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse as the true east. It is not farfetched to assume that the patterns of the past may repeat themselves, in modern garb, in circumstances provided by the continued German cleavage, by the deep divisions in Europe, by a world which hangs continually by fingertips from the sill of incipient disaster.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator from Montana is performing a real service in again presenting a suggestion for the settling of the German situation, before we can be certain of the establishment of world peace.

I noticed a statement which the Senator just made to the effect that some Germans already regard East Germany as middle Germany, which gives an implication that the Polish situation is seriously involved. What is the Senator's opinion with regard to the Polish boundary? Would that matter have to be settled simultaneously with the unification of Germany, or how would the Senator deal with that situation?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I can only make assumptions. It appears to me that regardless of events, even if the pres-

ent two Germanys are unified, there still would be people in the unified Germany who would be looking beyond the Oder-Neisse. However, I believe that so far as the great majority of the people of Germany are concerned, they would be content—to bring about the unification of the two Germanys into a complete whole. If we act in time, it might be possible to bring about a recognition of the situation as it exists, and perhaps the problems of the Oder-Neisse line could be brought to some sort of successful and reasonable conclusion.

Mr. AIKEN. I thank the Senator from Montana for his observation. I am certain that this matter will be discussed more fully at a later date.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I hope so. I hope it will be discussed fully at the forthcoming meetings which the President of the United States will attend.

It is my understanding that all or most all of the former German inhabitants have been removed from the former German area now held by Poland to the east of the Oder-Neisse, and that that particular area has been settled almost entirely by the Poles. It is my belief, if I may repeat what I have said previously, that the big concern of the two Germanys would be to bring about the greatest possible degree of unification, so that one Germany could, as a result, be brought into being.

I anticipate that into the foreseeable future there will perhaps be Germans among the dispossessed, as well as among others, who will look longingly to the east of the Oder-Neisse. That will be one of the problems to be faced. But I think the first thing to do to reduce the dangers in that would be to face the problem of the two Germanys. When that has been dealt with, the Germans themselves and the Poles might see what they could do about the Oder-Neisse line.

Mr. AIKEN. It is entirely possible that a matter like that might come, some day, before the presently impotent World Court.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is a possibility.

The pressures of the German situation are little different today from what they were when a year ago their prolonged neglect led to the first German crisis. That they did not erupt then was due to the round of goodwill tours, the visiting back and forth and hither and yon. How much longer these safety valves will operate, it is difficult to say. What can be said with certainty is that it is unsafe to rely indefinitely on safety valves.

Sooner or later the nations involved must come to grips with the realities of the German situation as it is today. It is probable that the longer the moment of reckoning is put off, the smaller will be the margin for peace, a durable peace.

If the pressures in the German situation are the same as they were a year ago, it seems to me that the means with which they may be dealt in peace are similar to those which were indicated then. At that time, as the Senate will recall, I advanced for discussion nine

essentials upon which a firm Western policy for peace might conceivably be built. It is among these points, I believe, that we may still find the way to a solution.

As then, so now, the focal point of potential conflict is Berlin, where the military confrontation is most intimate and unstable. As then, so now, the answer to this problem does not lie in propaganda stances or gestures; nor does it lie in the incantation of the words of firmness while the first of the deferred payments of appeasing concession is made for the dubious privilege of maintaining the existing stalemate; nor does it lie in the astute proposal of Mr. Khrushchev to alter the status of West Berlin alone, even if the guarantees which he proffers for that altered status were absolute.

The answer, the answer for peace, it seems to me, lies in a change of status for all Berlin, for East Berlin no less than West Berlin. The answer, it seems to me, lies in agreement which permits this city—this entire city—and its routes of access to be held in trust by the United Nations or some other international body, with neutral forces responsible to its authority, until such time as it is once again the capital of all Germany. Let this new interim status for the entire city be guaranteed by the allied nations, by the Communist nations, by the United Nations. Let the cost of maintaining the city in trust be borne by the two principal German political authorities which have the greatest stake in it—by Bonn and Pankow—in proportions equal to the authority which they claim. Beneath an international authority, let the two German authorities begin the long and difficult task of merging the two parts of what is now one city.

In a setting of that kind, Mr. President, we might contemplate the beginning of the end of the present dangerous juxtaposition of Soviet and Allied forces. We might find as valid the withdrawal of both Soviet and Allied forces from Berlin.

In the microcosm of Berlin, moreover, could be cast the molds of reunification for all of Germany. I think it is clear that that reunification is not going to begin on the basis of free all-German elections in the foreseeable future; nor does the formula offered by the Russians offer any greater hope, for they would formalize the division of Germany into two German nations, with a vague provision for future negotiations between these two nations on the question of unification.

If there is to be a well-founded hope for German reunification in peace, it must be recognized by all that we are dealing with one German nation in which there are two German political entities. I say that, Mr. President, not to play with words, but in an effort to define more precisely the reality which confronts us, for it is only in terms of that reality that we can hope to act for peace in Germany.

To divide Germany into two nations, as the Russians suggest, will not change the fact that there is one Germany. It

may postpone the day when that unity will reassert itself, but it will also increase the violence of the pressure for unification, and may well thrust that pressure from rational into irrational channels.

Similarly to insist upon free all-German elections at this time, as the route to unification, is also to postpone the day of unification, in all probability, with the same consequences. This route, unfortunately, is closed by the inescapable fact that there are two political entities in the one Germany. While one entity might achieve supremacy by this route, the other is not likely to conduct its own burial in peace by this route.

If these are the facts, as I believe them to be, and if it is desirable to break the stalemate now in Germany, as I believe it to be, then it follows that there should be one peace treaty with Germany, with both German political entities sharing responsibility for it. It follows that both, with such assistance and persuasion as can be provided from without, must assume deep responsibilities in the task of unification, because that task will be most difficult; in the lapse of 15 years, there have grown up in the two parts of Germany institutions which will not readily be reconciled, one with the other. It follows, too, that if there cannot be free all-German elections at this time, there must be at least a guaranteed measure of equal political freedom and of equal political participation for all Germans living in each of the two political entities at this time.

Finally, to act for peace, not only in Germany, but in all Europe, and to give substance to the professed universal desire for a lightening of the burden of armaments, there must be recognition on all sides that present military arrangements in Germany, and, indeed, in all Europe, are not sacrosanct. If there is an end to the military confrontation at Berlin, if there is visible progress in peace toward German unification, then there can be, there ought to be, a general easement of the entire European military confrontation and the development of all-European agreements for safeguarding the peace. The Eden, the Rapacki, and similar proposals of the past warrant the most careful consideration in this connection.

Mr. President, what I suggested in February 1959, and what I say today, seems to me to encompass the essential elements of a new Western approach to the problems of Germany and Europe. If one holds that the present stalemate is greatly in our interest, then I suppose there is little point in considering these elements. If one holds, as I hold, that the present stalemate is not in our highest interest, and if we are to have a chance to avoid the pitfalls of both appeasement and conflict in the days, months, and years ahead, then these elements of a new policy, I believe, are worthy of the most careful and continuous consideration.

During the past year, I believe they have received such consideration in this country and elsewhere. It seems to me that Western policy, particularly as manifested at the Geneva Conference of

Foreign Ministers, last spring, reflects a movement away from the generalities of yesterday, toward the realities of today. I hope that in the period ahead Western policy will reflect the views of all the allied nations, but the domination of no single nation, and, in so doing, will continue the process of transition to new tenets.

There is no assurance that this transition will bring about the settlement which Europe and the world needs. There is no assurance that a similar and an essential transition will take place in Soviet policies; and that without it, there will be no agreement. But whatever the Soviet reaction, this transition in our own policies needs to continue in the highest Western interests and in the interests of mankind.

We cannot ignore our own responsibilities on the assumption that others will ignore theirs. We cannot, for we shall suffer along with others, for our own neglect. There is no escape. There is no retreat. We must seek a change, and hope that others will do the same. But we must not avoid a change if it is in our interests, regardless of what others may do or may not do. We must seek, in new policies, an agreement which eases, rather than appeases, at Berlin, an agreement which paves a practical way to the peaceful unification of Germany, an agreement which begins to stitch the cleavage between Europe—East and West. Let others obstruct such an agreement if they will; but let us not ignore these needs in our policies, these needs which are the most compelling that confront the people of the Western World—the people of Russia and Eastern Europe no less than those of Western Europe and the United States.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TALMADGE in the chair.) Does the Senator from Montana yield to the Senator from Tennessee?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. GORE. I wish to congratulate the able junior Senator from Montana upon once again delivering on the floor of the U.S. Senate an able, thoughtful, and provocative address. This is characteristic of the periodic addresses of the distinguished Senator.

With respect to the unification of Germany, I understood it to be the view of Chancellor Adenauer that the unification of Germany could be achieved, perhaps, only after substantial progress in disarmament had been achieved. If the Chancellor's view in that regard be correct, then, would not the greatest contribution toward the unification of Germany, toward peace, toward disarmament, toward an easing of political tensions—which I think must precede the other three—arise from a renunciation by the Soviet Union and the leaders of international communism of the tactics of revolution, subversion, and economic penetration, and the threat of military conquest which many of Russia's neighbors fear?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would say the Senator from Tennessee is correct in

stating, as a postulate, that before any agreement could be reached, there would have to be understanding in kind from the other side. Certainly, if there is going to be a peaceful Germany, or a peaceful Europe, or, for that matter, a peaceful world, one of the concomitants must be a promise to be kept on the part of the Soviet Union that it will do away with such actions as trying to carry out various kinds of propaganda, subversion, and other means which have as their purpose the undermining of regularly constituted authority and the strengthening of world communism as a whole.

So I think the Senator is absolutely correct in the postulates which he has raised this afternoon.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to yield.

Mr. GORE. It may be that the Soviets have a real fear of a unified Germany, particularly a unified and rearmament Germany, and more particularly a unified and rearmament Germany with nuclear armaments. That would be an understandable apprehension.

Does the Senator not think that satisfaction on this potentiality and possibility may be a necessary prerequisite to unification?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. The Senator may recall that in one of the nine essentials I advanced last year, the eighth to be exact, that the Soviet Union and the western allies would guarantee a unified Germany, emerging from the German discussions, being held at that time, against military pressures from outside surrounding countries, and, these countries from German military pressures as well.

So it occurred to me that one of the fears which the Soviet Union used to have, and may still have, of a rearmament and resurgent Germany, could have been stilled if both the allies of the West and the Soviet Union had guaranteed that Germany would not be allowed to carry on aggressive tactics against her neighbors, and, by the same token, Germany's neighbors would not be allowed to carry out aggressive tactics against her.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. GORE. Just as the junior Senator from Montana and the junior Senator from Tennessee are willing to recognize this possible apprehension or fear on the part of the Soviet Union of a nuclear armed and powerful Germany, and are willing to recognize that satisfaction with respect to this point could and should properly be accorded as a basis of peaceful settlement, would the junior Senator from Montana think that Mr. Khrushchev might contemplate the other side of that coin—the possibility that such a strong and armed West Germany may be the result of intransigence and an unwillingness on his part to reach effective agreements on disarmament and peaceful settlements of the questions involving Europe, and other sensitive areas, into which aggressive Communist action is now being pushed or planned?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would say to the Senator it is entirely possible.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I commend the junior Senator from Montana for addressing himself to this problem. I noted with interest his proposals last year, and I note again with interest his proposals at the present time.

If I venture to ask the Senator a question or two or to make some comment on his remarks, it grows out of the fact that I have been in Germany six times, I think it is, since the conclusion of World War II. In 1947 I spent 5 weeks there as chairman of the Subcommittee on Germany and Austria on the so-called Herter committee, which was a special committee of the House of Representatives assigned to study economic post-war conditions in Europe. It was my privilege to write the section of the report of the Herter committee on the German situation.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I recall that very well because we were in the House together at that time.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. It is because of that background that I feel very deeply the situation calls for a reappraisal, and I commend the Senator for his statement, not necessarily saying I endorse everything which is in it, but commending him for facing facts and proposing a course of action. There was one point in his statement in particular which I want to emphasize. I do it because I hope the country will take note of it. This was his observation that the present stalemate is not in our highest interest.

The Senator said, as appears on page 11 of his statement:

If one holds that the present stalemate is greatly in our interest, then I suppose there is little point in considering these elements. If one holds, as I hold, that the present stalemate is not in our highest interest, and if we are to have a chance to avoid the pitfalls of both appeasement and conflict in the days, months, and years ahead, then these elements of a new policy, I believe, are worthy of the most careful and continuous consideration.

I could not agree more with any statement than I agree with what the Senator has said: that the present stalemate is not in our highest interest and that we ought to consider and develop steps to end the stalemate. The reactions of the Western Powers to the challenges, to the ultimatums, and to the statements of Mr. Khrushchev to date have inclined to be negative rather than positive, defensive rather than creative. I hope I am not presuming too much in intimating the Senator from Montana would agree with me on that point.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think the Senator is correct. I will say also that Secretary of State Herter at the Geneva Conference last spring did try to get away from the old generalities and did try to get down to bedrock, to the realities, but did not achieve much in the way of success because of the obduracy of the Soviet representative who, of

course, was receiving instructions day by day as to what he should or should not do.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Secretary Herter is entitled for credit in endeavoring to get the West off dead center in this matter. It is only natural that the Adenauer government should be well content to let the situation coast along, if the United States will continue to put up the dollars it is today putting up to provide a shield for West Germany.

When I was in Germany this past December I was struck by the fact that the boom in West Germany continues to go forward; that West Germany has a favorable balance of trade at the present time; that West Germany's military expenditures and dedication of personnel to armies is far less, in proportion, than in the United States. A much larger percentage of our gross national product goes into national defense than in West Germany. A much larger percentage of our manpower goes into the Armed Forces than in West Germany.

I was told there are 250,000 Americans in West Germany today, counting both civilian and military, and that they are contributing approximately \$750 million to the West German economy. It is easy to understand why West Germany should have a favorable balance of trade. On the one hand, the country does not have, proportionately, the large military expenditures we have in the United States; and, on the other hand, the dollars are available, which come from the presence of many Americans in West Germany, to make it possible for them to show a favorable balance of trade at the very same time the United States finds itself with a deficit of between \$3 billion and \$4 billion in its trade balances for the last year.

I can understand why the Adenauer government is content to let things coast along, hoping that in some way, with a policy of not dealing with the situation, they may continue to profit from the largesse and benefactions provided by the United States.

I think that is a dangerous situation, both for West Germany and for the rest of the world. That is why I do not think a stalemate is in our interest or, in the long run, in the interest of West Germany itself. It may be that the possibilities of unification are at some time in the future, but they ought to be explored, and, in my judgment, we ought to present some positive alternatives to the suggestions by the Russians.

I should like to ask the Senator if he has contemplated what would happen if Mr. Khrushchev should say that all he really wants to do is to follow the example given by the West when the quadripartite authority over Germany was broken by the Western Allies; when the Allies, in respect to the three western zones of Germany, gave the West Germans a chance to set up the Bonn government. If Mr. Khrushchev should say, "You, after all, withdrew the supervision which you maintained under the quadripartite agreements over West Germany. All we are proposing is that we

are going to remove ourselves from East Germany, as you did from West Germany," where then would that leave the West?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would say that if at any time the Soviet Union wants to conclude a treaty of peace with East Germany there is not a thing we can do about it. I would point out that when we did reach a peace settlement with the Federal Republic of West Germany we did not put Berlin in the same status as the rest of the republic. There were connections, of course, but there were also some subsidiary commitments which are still being honored by the presence of allied troops in the western sector.

So far as the concluding of a treaty of peace with East Germany is concerned, it has been true for many years that at any time the Soviet Union wants to do so there is not one single thing the Western Powers can do to prevent it.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. The Senator from Montana is suggesting it would be rather a futile thing if we were to say to Mr. Khrushchev, "You have to stay in East Germany, and we will go to war, if necessary, to compel you to stay there."

Mr. MANSFIELD. It would not only be a waste of words, but if we did so it would also be the only place in the world where we want the Russians to stay instead of to get out. In Berlin they said they were withdrawing the troops a year ago, and we were begging them to stay there so that the status quo, the present situation, could be sustained.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I recognize that if the Soviet Union wished to withdraw its troops from East Germany at any time they would still not be very far away and could be returned easily. That of course is true but it does not alter the comparison that would be made.

I agree with the Senator from Montana. I do not see that there is anything either in logic or in practical effect that we could do to require the Russian troops to stay in East Germany if Russia decides to withdraw them.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is absolutely correct. There is not a thing we could do. Any time the Russians want to withdraw their troops from East Berlin or from East Germany, they can do so, and nobody can do a thing about it.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. The Russians could point to the fact that we had modified the original quadripartite agreement so far as the three Western Zones are concerned.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct. I think it ought to be kept in mind that even though the Russians have the power to conclude a treaty of peace with East Germany, and have had that power for years, they have not as yet done so, which seems to indicate there might be a small opening of the door, a slim chance, that it would be possible to work out a treaty of peace based on the two Germanys coming together.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, I have always felt that the East Germans and the West Germans themselves would be the best parties to work out some method of agreement or

some method of operation for the reunification of Germany, and that somehow the Germans themselves have to be brought into the picture, so that it will not be a reunification forced upon them, but instead will be one which grows out of the natural genius of the German people.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I agree with the Senator.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I was impressed by the fact, when I was in Berlin the last time—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator please suspend at that point?

The time for which the Senator from Montana obtained unanimous consent to speak has expired. The Chair has been lenient with the time, since apparently no other Senator has been waiting to address the Chair.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time may be extended for 2 minutes, so that we may bring this colloquy to a normal conclusion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from South Dakota? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, when I was in Berlin the last time I was impressed by the fact that the surface transportation authorities there had worked out a method of operation whereby the transportation would run between the two parts of Berlin without hindrance, and one could buy a ticket in either part of Berlin and travel to the other.

Mr. President, in view of the time situation I shall not extend this colloquy further, except to say I thank the Senator from Montana for having brought this matter up today and for having given the constructive thought he has to his presentation. I shall read and reread his remarks with interest. If I find the time and the opportunity, and the spirit moves me, some time within the next week I hope to make further and more detailed comment upon his suggestions.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator for his kind remarks.

DANGER IN THE NEAR EAST

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I had hoped to address the Senate for about 15 minutes. May I ask whether that would be in order at this time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TAMMAGE in the chair). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator may proceed.

Mr. JAVITS. If I may say a word on what the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] has just addressed himself to, I, too, have always admired the understanding of the Senator from Montana of the critical importance of Berlin and the German problem to the peace of the world. I, too, shall read his remarks very carefully, and may take the liberty at a later date of addressing myself to his statement. As always, he is well informed, and his statement is well rea-

soned and is a real contribution, whatever may be my views in agreement or disagreement.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I shall be delighted to have the Senator do so.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I had in mind to speak briefly about another situation in the world which is also, I think, portentous to the issue of peace. I am addressing myself to it more in the spirit of an editor who must look ahead for a period of time in order to see what is on the horizon which is threatening us. In this spirit, and within this frame of reference, I address myself to the situation in the Near East.

The Near East could erupt into a major international crisis at any time. Tensions are high, shooting on the Arab-Israel borders is all too unusual an occurrence, and the leaders of the Soviet Union seem to be encouraging Arab leaders to whip up tensions and keep the area in ferment. The accelerating tempo of Egyptian propaganda beating the drums for a war of annihilation against Israel—this is almost a paraphrase of their words—of which echoes are heard on Moscow press and radio, underlines the threat. There are strong reports of Arab troop concentrations in the Sinai Desert. We should not wait to react to a Near East crisis until after it is upon us, but we should show the capability for anticipating crisis through our policy now.

I should like to state my thesis first, before proceeding to support it in terms of fact and policy.

Stability in the Near East area now requires that the following be done: First, a reaffirmation of the guarantee of the integrity of the borders of both Israel and Arab States made by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950; and second, decision by the three powers on their course of action if the declaration is invoked by aggression, or in the alternative—and I emphasize the word "alternative"—giving Israel the military equipment to maintain its own defenses.

The grave danger to this area now is that the Soviet Union will create such an imbalance in military capability by its supply of modern arms to President Nasser as to invalidate the Tripartite Declaration's guarantee. On the other hand, it is well known that Israel and its people are tough and ready to defend themselves given the means—thereby implementing the Tripartite Declaration themselves by the sheer fact of maintaining the balance of military capability in this area. There is reason to suppose that the policy of the Soviet Union calls for putting on the pressure in this area whenever the world situation makes this seem attractive to them. It ought to be made clear, therefore, that such moves will not be profitable.

I interject to point out that this is not a permanent solution for the Near East. The permanent solution is the resettlement of the Arab refugees, and the understanding that the Near East is an economic hegemony, requiring cooperation among all the nations for the pur-

poses of developing their resources and working with one another for the development of the whole area. However, as in so many other situations, if a fire is burning, nothing much can be done.

I am addressing myself today to the rather urgent situation which seems to be emerging in that area of the world by reason of the continuing and very dangerous amount of arms supply which is going to one power, and moving from the Communist bloc.

About three-fourths of all Soviet bloc military assistance to non-Communist countries—\$580 million out of a total of \$780 million—went to three Arab countries, United Arab Republic, Iraq, and Yemen, from 1955 through 1959. The largest recipient of Soviet bloc arms is the United Arab Republic in the amount of \$443 million; Iraq is next with \$120 million; and Yemen received \$17 million worth. It is reported that the huge Soviet buildup of the UAR armed forces is with new advanced planes, tanks, and other weapons. These alarming statistics are disclosed by our administration in its summary presentation of the mutual security program for fiscal 1961, published this month.

Moreover, we learn from the same source that Soviet economic aid to these Arab countries totaled \$696 million of which \$515 million went to the United Arab Republic. In addition, Moscow is providing the UAR with \$387 million for construction of the Aswan Dam. The UAR is the largest single recipient of the Soviet Union's military and economic aid program. This massive arms supply by the Soviet bloc to the UAR could threaten Israel's security by creating a serious imbalance of power in the area and at the least creates a new arms race.

There is urgent reason to help Israel militarily to maintain a balance of power in the Near East. Israel is not now included in the U.S. military assistance program. We cannot expect this hard-pressed democracy to go it alone and pay for all the arms it must have in view of the staggering amounts of Soviet aid pouring into the UAR.

It is for that reason I suggest that now, rather than when we have a crisis, we consider what we intend to do if such a crisis should come about. Should we seek to implement the tripartite guarantee ourselves, or should we seek to redress the military imbalance rapidly being created in that area of the world by assigning a greater defense role to Israel itself? If we needed any proof of the fact that Israel, given of the means, can look after its own defense, we find it confirmed by the part Israel played in the successful outcome of the Lebanese crisis in 1958.

A new assessment of the military position in the Near East must be made before the situation undergoes further deterioration, and the military assistance essential for Israel to keep abreast of defense necessities should be made available to her. We may not ignore the vital role Israel played in the successful outcome of the Lebanese crisis of 1958—Israel helped to keep the flanks of our position secure and illustrated the

key position she holds for the free world in any defense against Communist action in the Near East.

I cannot view with any degree of complacency the mounting challenge of the Kremlin in the Near East and the way it has encouraged Arab leaders—virtually on the eve of the summit conference—to whip up tensions. The Moscow press and radio have been describing Israel as “bellicose and uncompromising,” and a broadcast on March 6 charged that “in Israel the air is full of war hysteria; aggressive speeches are being made; provocative statements are being issued; and military daring has gone to the heads of the zealots.” It is not difficult to imagine the effect such propaganda attacks must have when they are coupled with reliable news dispatches telling of increasing quantities of Soviet bloc arms flowing quietly into Egypt.

There has also been a significant increase in the Egyptian submarine fleet, which now includes 12 ships, the majority of which are oceangoing types. These are Soviet submarines, and intelligence reports indicate that their crews may be made up, in part, at least, by Soviet bloc sailors. Most of these submarines are based at Alexandria, where they command the Mediterranean coastline of Egypt.

There are fresh indications that the recent Aswan Dam agreement was only one of many agreements that President Nasser has made with the Sino-Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union has more development projects in the UAR than in any other Near East country. According to the Soviet publication, *Vneshnaia Torgovlia—Foreign Trade*—of September 1959, there were 93 Soviet-sponsored projects in the UAR, as compared with 25 in Iraq, the next highest number. At the end of February negotiations for trade and cultural pacts were also under way between the UAR and Rumania, and a week earlier, on February 24, Communist China announced a new “trade protocol” with the UAR. Moreover, President Nasser’s personal anticommunism has not stopped him from selling three times as much cotton this year to the Sino-Soviet bloc, as he did 3 years ago to the same countries. This is an increase of 68 percent over 1955–56, the year of the first Soviet-Egyptian arms deal. To continue payment for his arms purchases, Nasser has mortgaged Egypt’s cotton crop for some years ahead.

With Egypt and Iraq locked in a struggle for power and Arab leadership maintaining a drumfire of propaganda keeping the area in a state of tension while at the same time heavy concentrations of Egyptian armor and infantry are being advertised as massing in the Sinai peninsula threatening Israel, there is ample justification to call the Near East situation “deteriorating,” as United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld did a few weeks ago.

“We are falling back to a position where we have been before and from which I thought and hoped that we had departed forward,” he warned in an interview with the press. That process has not been halted.

The series of belligerent speeches delivered by President Nasser in Syria following the border clash at Tawafik in the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria, recalls the critical events of 2 years ago when his armies threatened Lebanon and Jordan, and revolution-torn Iraq appeared ready to join the United Arab Republic. At Aleppo, Damascus, and other Syrian cities, the war drums were beaten and President Nasser called on the Arabs to rise “like a devastating flood” to wipe out Israel. On March 7, last, President Nasser broadened his attack by opening up on Jordan in a manner reminiscent of his 1958 barrage, accusing King Hussein of conspiring with the United States and Great Britain against him.

This is being used as a bludgeon on other Arab States, such as Jordan, to make sure that everyone reads these inflammatory remarks and threats as a test of whether he is a good loyal Arab, and really believes in the Arab cause.

President Nasser’s inflammatory remarks are being repeated and expanded by the Cairo radio commentators and by the Cairo press, and the violence of their language borders on the hysterical. Also, a marked increase in the violence of the anti-American propaganda accompanied news reports that Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had set out to visit the United States.

Those who have followed political developments in the Near East for many years have learned through painful experience that our diplomacy can only be as effective as our sense of anticipation. The signs of impending trouble are present on all sides.

When British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in an attempt to ease Near East tensions reaffirmed in the House of Commons the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, to which I referred in opening, under which the United States, France and Great Britain had pledged themselves to take action within and outside the United Nations to prevent violation of any Near East frontier by force, President Nasser reacted by denouncing the statement. This declaration, said President Nasser, was “dead and buried in the soil and blood of Port Said.”

Mr. President, as if what is happening in the Near East were not enough, we now see the development of some kind of relationship between Cuba in its foreign policy operations and the operations of the United Arab Republic. Cuba’s Foreign Minister was Cairo’s official guest in January; Cuba in turn is the first port of call for a Cairo mission headed by U.A.R. Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein Sabry which starts its tour of Latin American countries this month. President Nasser also concluded a deal on February 17 with the Castro Government for 10,000 tons of sugar, hard on the heels of Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan’s visit. Cairo broadcasts beamed to Panama accusing the United States of treating Panama unfairly were reported by the New York Times as early as December 1959, and the U.S. News & World Report disclosed on December 14 that “agents of Egypt’s Nasser have been in Panama advising the politicians of

that country on the moves to make to get eventual control over the Panama Canal away from the United States. Nasser is able to pose as an expert, having taken the Suez Canal from its owners.”

One of the gravest and most threatening problems in the situation is the Arab boycott and blockade of Israel. This boycott is illegal, a violation of the U.N. Charter and of international law; because it has not been stopped, it has grown into full-scale economic warfare—not only against Israel, but against the free world as well. Its corrupting influence has fouled up the channels of world trade and commerce, subjected American business firms and businessmen to discrimination on religious grounds, and involved the U.S. Government in the Suez Canal problem as well as in several embarrassing situations.

This Arab boycott tried to prevent businessmen from trading with Israel, and air and shipping lines from serving Israel, by threatening them with reprisals and blacklists. They are not only prohibited, according to the boycott, from trading in Arab countries, to use Arab ports, and to enjoy the other usual courtesies and rights, but also they may not be owned or operated by Jews.

While the Arab governments respect a decisive position, they exploit weaknesses; they did not retaliate when several European governments, among them Switzerland, West Germany, the Netherlands, brushed aside Arab boycott demands and vigorously rejected Arab threats of reprisal. On the other hand, the list of American firms and individuals affected by the Arab boycott continues to grow.

Arab pressures were so strong that some companies yielded to their demands. The major American and British oil companies have yielded to Arab boycott demands. Passengers on cruise ships and American airlines on Near East routes are advised that those of Jewish faith will be denied tourist privileges in certain Arab ports and stopping points. A number of American freighters have been put on the Arab blacklist because they had business dealings with Israel.

Yesterday the Lions International was reported placed on the Arab blacklist. This morning I learned that the Studebaker-Lark Corp. and the International Business Machines Corp. have also been placed on the Arab boycott list.

A number of our moving-picture actors, actresses, and singers are on the Arab blacklist, and the showing of their films or sale of their records is prohibited because they either are Jewish or appeared at a Jewish fund-raising function. The New York State law against employment discrimination was invoked against Aramco because the oil company refused to hire Jews in its New York offices out of deference to Saudi Arabia where its wells are located and which supports the Arab boycott. And there is also the economic problem created by counter boycott action against firms which have succumbed to Arab pressure.

The most serious and potentially explosive example of Egyptian intran-

sigeance is the Suez Canal boycott issue. Among other things this is a renewed attempt by Egypt to cripple Israel's growing trade with the new nations of Africa. The fact that it is being made at a time when its involvement with the Soviet bloc is growing, poses very serious policy questions. We cannot permit international shipping in the Suez to be subject to the whims of Cairo's domestic policy needs.

The highly respected Economist of London, in its March 5 number, raises this point:

Israel has known the unpleasing experience of seeing its interests put on one side while the larger powers plot their Near East policies. There is the question whether Israel's security will find room in any arrangement that Russia and the West may reach over the Near East.

On two occasions within recent weeks, I have taken the floor to protest actions by U.S. Government departments which in effect supported the Arab boycott. On January 21, I rose to call attention to the so-called Haifa clause in U.S. Navy contracts with American-owned oil tankers. This was subsequently withdrawn with a statement delivered by Vice Adm. Ray A. Gano, U.S. Navy commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, which said:

The clause was adopted with no intention to give support to any political boycott. It was deemed advantageous to both the Government and shipowners. However, MSTs can accomplish its mission without using the clause. Inasmuch as it has been mistakenly construed as providing some solace to the Arab boycott imposed on persons trading with Israel, the Navy will discontinue its use.

The Navy, for its action was to be commended. But, on March 3, I rose again to deplore the use of a similar contract clause by the Department of Agriculture for ships carrying surplus agricultural products under Public Law 480. I urged that the practices of our Federal Government departments be coordinated with the policy decision taken by the Navy. I have written to Secretary of Agriculture Benson to protest this practice and have urged him to coordinate with the Navy's policy. In this way there will be no practice in the U.S. Government conducive to lending aid, comfort or sympathy to this boycott which has been branded as illegal in terms of international law.

Now, the use of these contract clauses cannot be dismissed simply as a matter of business protection because the United States is not a business firm. As the leader of the free world its every action is looked upon in the light of how it advances the cause of peace and justice in our own time. The Navy is not compelled to buy its oil from countries which support the Arab boycott. There are other oil producing nations in the Near East who will supply the Navy with all its requirements at no higher cost and without boycott demands. Nor should recipients of our surplus dictate who shall bring it to them. We have a firm traditional policy calling for freedom of the seas, and we cannot, therefore, condone this interference with American shipping by an illegal Arab boycott,

which includes also freedom of transit through the Suez Canal.

On the problem of discrimination against American citizens by foreign governments which has accompanied the Arab boycott, the State Department has instructed U.S. Embassies and consular offices to report any incidents involving Americans on the basis of their race or creed. They have also been instructed to make recommendations for practical means to apply section 113 of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act of 1959. This is an amendment which I introduced with Senator WAYNE MORSE condemning such discriminatory practices as in Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Overseas posts were instructed by the State Department that the United States "has never condoned discriminatory practices by foreign governments against its citizens on grounds of race or religion." The instructions also state that it remains "a basic objective of U.S. policy to seek to eliminate, within the context of existing friendly relations with other members of the free world community, all such discriminatory practices."

All this is occurring at a time when we have been increasing our assistance to Egypt.

We have been bending our every effort to bring about more cordial cooperation from President Nasser. Our objective in Egypt as in other countries has been to help the people help themselves and to assist them in developing standards of living and economic systems which will enable them to make progress by utilizing all their own resources.

But Egypt has presented us with a disconcerting paradox in our own diplomacy. We have acted on the assumption that President Nasser wants better relations with the West, and the State Department has moved swiftly to encourage measures tending to improve those relations. We have stepped up our aid program to the U.A.R. to a marked degree, but at the same time we have not closed our eyes to the fact that President Nasser's policy often is serving Communist interests, whether or not he is consciously playing the Kremlin's game.

Near East stability will require large-scale development projects involving regional planning, international financing and mutual cooperation among the states in the region. Such projects will accelerate progress in industry, agriculture, use of natural resources, and sharp increases in the standards of health and education.

The kind of massive water project that Israel is presently engaged in by which the waters of the Jordan will be carried to the dry regions of the northern Negev, should have its counterparts in other Near East countries. In this way millions of acres of barren and deserted land can be reclaimed and resettled by impoverished and homeless people in the Arab countries.

Israel today is carrying out that part of the great regional water plan worked out by Eric Johnston which was intended for its own territory. It is most

unlikely that Egyptian propaganda against this great water project will deter Israel from bringing water to the Negev.

Another step in a program for the Near East should be the broad expansion of person-to-person exchanges by the United States as well as the establishment of vocational training, college, university and other technical educational institutions. Our country should not be alone in any initiative in the Arab lands—West Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom have all indicated their interests in helping in the Near East and should be invited to join in as partners.

At the session of the United Nations General Assembly which was recently conducted, strong efforts were made but without success to break through the wall of Arab intransigence and start negotiations toward a solution of the Arab refugee problem. These efforts should be continued in every possible area.

The argument is frequently made that the Arab states might not work with us because of Arab nationalist pressure. But in efforts for regional economic development we are not confined to the Arab states alone but should include the economic region, leaving the problem of an economic bridge to Israel to be solved for the present through the United Nations. The leaders of these countries in the region outside the Arab bloc like Libya, the Sudan, Tunis, and Morocco have also led their people out of colonial status, yet with acceptance of their responsibilities in the civilized world.

In an era of peace, there is no question about the enormous contribution that Israel can make toward helping to provide the people of the Near East with the benefits of modern civilization. The technical know-how which Israel is now giving to the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa south of the Sahara could also be made available to Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq for their mutual benefit. What Israel is doing on its side of the Jordan can also be done on the other side. Moreover, if the Negev can be made to flourish, so too can part of the Sinai peninsula be made livable for the rapidly expanding population of Egypt.

Mr. President, the important thing is to see to it that a fire does not break out in that area of the world which will jeopardize everything that everyone has in mind, and which will confront us with a new crisis of major magnitude. I have made these brief remarks in order to emphasize the need for making clear, first, that the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 shall continue in full force and effect, so far as the three powers are concerned; second, to concert ourselves on the implementation of the declaration, and, if need be, to at least give Israel the necessary equipment which it needs for self-defense in view of the inflow of arms into Egypt from the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

RECESS UNTIL 3 O'CLOCK

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, at the suggestion of the majority whip, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded and that the recess until 3 o'clock may start now.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TALMADGE in the chair). Does the Senator from Florida ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and, without objection, the Senate will now take a recess until 3 o'clock, in order that Senators may be present at the ceremonies attending the presentation and unveiling of the statue of the late Senator McCarran, of Nevada.

At 1 o'clock and 54 minutes the Senate took a recess until 3 o'clock p.m.

At 3 o'clock p.m. the Senate reassembled, and was called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. MANSFIELD in the chair).

LEASING OF PORTION OF FORT CROWDER, MO.—CIVIL RIGHTS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 8315) to authorize the Secretary of the Army to lease a portion of Fort Crowder, Mo., to Stella Reorganized Schools, R-I, Missouri.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I modify the pending Javits-Clark amendment to the amendment of the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], as follows:

On page 3, line 9, strike the comma and insert in lieu thereof a period.

On page 3, lines 9-12, strike the words "unless any person named therein shall have been registered by appropriate State officials in the intervening period, in which case the order may be vacated on application duly made as to the registration of such person", and insert the following sentence: "The court may stay the effective date of an order with respect to any applicant named therein who, prior to the date of issuance of such order or within such twenty-day period, has been registered under State law, upon assurances satisfactory to the court that such applicant will be permitted to vote at any election at which he would be entitled to vote under the provisions of this subsection after such order becomes effective with respect to such applicant."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be modified accordingly.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I wish to explain that the modified amendment is designed to meet what we consider to be a major objection by the Attorney General to the Javits-Clark amendment. Indeed, it was contended that the period of time which we afforded in our amendment to allow a State by its own action to come into compliance with a decree of a court with respect to jurisdiction and voting might result in enabling the State to frustrate the court's order by registering the respective voters concerned, but,

at the same time, when their time to vote came around, they would again be challenged.

Yesterday, I argued that that would be bad faith, and that the court had authority, but was not directed, to vacate a decree under those circumstances, and that, indeed, a court would require proof that the voting would ensue after the registration.

However, in view of the fact that we think that was incorporated in the amendment, in any event, due to the fundamental powers of a court of equity, and in view of the further fact that the Attorney General had made so much of this objection, we thought that in fairness to the large number of Senators who are very much interested in the amendment, we should spell out that point.

That is what we have done; we have actually spelled out the point which we thought was implicit in respect to the authority of the court, especially in view of the fact that it was not a direction to the court.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I join in the modification submitted by the Senator from New York, although not because I have the slightest belief that it is necessary. Last evening, shortly before the adjournment, I spelled out the reason why I thought the position of the Attorney General was entirely unsound; and I still feel as I did then.

However, in order to make assurance doubly sure, and to remove any possibility that the Attorney General might have been right, and also to remove any possibility that the position he took might be used by some Senators as a ground for not supporting an amendment which otherwise they would be willing to support, I join the Senator from New York in spelling this out in great detail, so there can be no question about it. As a result, the only objection by the Attorney General which anyone could conceivably have thought had some merit has now been removed.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, yesterday, the distinguished Secretary of State, the Honorable Christian Herter, appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in open session. He appeared there for the purpose of discussing the administration's foreign aid bill, which I support, with certain modifications.

During the course of the interrogation of Secretary Herter, the junior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] submitted to him certain questions concerning the summit conference, so-called, scheduled to be held in Paris, in May. As a result of the Secretary's reply to the Senator from Idaho, I felt impelled to submit certain questions.

Mr. President, throughout Secretary Herter's appearance, he gave frank, honest, sincere, forthright answers. That is typical of Secretary Herter's

performance, not only as Secretary of State, but also when he served as a Member of the other body, along with me. His answers to the questions were disturbing, and revealed a disturbing set of circumstances and facts; but I do not believe that either his answers or the questions can fairly be termed "nonsense."

Yet, Mr. President, I read from an Associated Press dispatch the following:

WASHINGTON.—The White House today labeled as nonsense—

Mr. President, I digress to say that the White House itself is a building which does not possess a tongue or a voice. Of course, the White House has come to be recognized as an institution. The only person who can properly speak for the institution of the White House or the Presidency is the President of the United States, himself. Yet there has grown up a practice whereby some other person—some person of much lesser stature and responsibility—undertakes to speak for the institution of the Presidency.

I return to the reading:

The White House today labeled as "nonsense" any contention that President Eisenhower will go to the Paris summit conference without advance planning regarding talks with Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

At a news conference, Press Secretary James C. Hagerty was told that some Democratic Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had said that the administration is approaching the May 16 summit meeting without any plans.

"That's a lot of nonsense," Hagerty commented.

A reporter told him that Secretary of State Christian A. Herter had in substance agreed with Senators who asserted there has been no advance planning for the summit conference.

Hagerty replied that was not what Herter had testified.

He said the Secretary had told the Senate committee that there is "an element of risk" as to whether the summit meeting will produce any constructive results, and that there should not be too much optimism as to prospects for a successful conference.

Hagerty met with newsmen shortly after Eisenhower and Herter conferred again regarding Russia's latest nuclear test ban proposal.

Reporting on that meeting, Hagerty said the President and Herter reached no definitive conclusions.

I will not proceed to the end of the article, because it makes no further reference to the Secretary's testimony yesterday.

Now I should like to read a UPI dispatch:

The White House rejected as nonsense today a charge by Senator ALBERT GORE, Democrat, of Tennessee, that the United States was going to the May 16 summit conference in Paris without plans.

GORE made the charge yesterday when Secretary of State Herter testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

President Eisenhower conferred with Herter early this morning. Among subjects they covered, was the recent Soviet proposal to ban nuclear weapons testing.

Yesterday, while Herter testified in behalf of the Eisenhower foreign aid program, GORE criticized the cabinet member's assertion that Eisenhower was going to Paris without a formal agenda.

GORE said he was disturbed because in his view the United States approached the

summit "without purpose, without plan, without hope of success."

Asked for White House reaction to the Gore charge, Press Secretary James C. Hagerty said, "That is a lot of nonsense."

Mr. President, in reply to this statement by Mr. Hagerty, I wish to read the verbatim stenographic transcript of that portion of yesterday's hearing dealing with this particular subject. I read a question by the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], as it appears on page 38 of the stenographic report:

Is there any plan which you have at present in the administration for inviting the participation of the Senate in the summit conference?

Secretary HERTER. There is none at this moment that I know of. The summit conference as of now has no agenda. We don't know what points are going to be discussed. We just assume that the German and Berlin question will come up. We assume that perhaps some of our disagreements, whether on nuclear testing or in disarmament, will have been so pinpointed that it will be possible for some decision to be arrived at at the summit. We have been working in different groups and analyzing possible other questions that might come up.

But how much will actually be negotiated there, I don't know. At best, the summit meeting can be only a short meeting. I can visualize this possibility, that at the summit certain agreements and rather vague principles may be come to and then the foreign ministers will be asked to see if they can work that out.

That happened in 1956 and the minute the foreign ministers got together they might just as well not have left at all. But there was complete general agreement with those at the top. So it is very difficult to visualize just how those conversations will go. Actually from the point of view of the talks themselves, you find on the part particularly of our allies the desire to talk with only four people present and interpreters, not even foreign ministers. If you have informal negotiations around the table with an agenda and knew what you were negotiating out, of course the larger participation would probably be very desirable, but as of now we can't possibly visualize the discussions going that way.

That is the end of the quotation from Secretary Herter.

Mr. President, after questions by other members of the committee on other subjects, it was again time for the junior Senator from Tennessee to have his turn.

I turn now to page 57 of the transcript:

Senator GORE. I was somewhat disturbed by your statement to Senator CHURCH that there is no agenda for the summit conference—

I digress, Mr. President, to say that this was not my statement. This was the statement of the Secretary of State.

I repeat:

I was somewhat disturbed by your statement to Senator CHURCH that there is no agenda for the summit conference, that you envisioned the result as possibly only a statement of a vague principle.

I did not bring up the subject of agreeing on a vague principle.

Continuing the question:

I was caused to wonder why there is to be a summit if it is without purpose or plan?

Secretary HERTER. The purpose of the summit was to discuss at the highest level whatever issues might be outstanding between

us. I am very frank to admit that I am not too optimistic that the summit conference will produce very great results.

We have got in disagreement with the whole question of the handling of the Berlin and the German problem, East Germany. I would be amazed if that could be resolved in a few days at a summit conference.

On disarmament we do not yet know whether the issues will be so pinpointed from the discussions that are going on now that they would be capable of a resolution, although they may be in a position where they can be moved forward for further negotiation, but I doubt whether very important specific decisions can be taken at the summit.

If they can, we would be very pleasantly surprised.

From the point of view of other issues that may be raised, as I say, we have no agenda. The Russians have not indicated what they want to raise with us. We have made it very clear we are willing to discuss anything, that this is a discussion of outstanding problems.

Beyond that nothing has been specified. We just assume that these matters will come up. We have had working groups that are still in the process of working now. We have a Foreign Minister's meeting here in the middle of April. We have another one in Istanbul early in May. We will have still a third just before the summit conference in trying to resolve among ourselves, the Western Powers, what issues we feel it is desirable to raise at that conference.

So that we may have something more precise when we get to the meeting itself. But as of now many of these matters are in the study stage.

Senator GORE. Do you think it would have been more prudent to have had an understanding about the subjects to be considered at a summit conference before agreeing to have one, or do you think this is the proper way to keep the score?

Secretary HERTER. It is a gamble. I don't know.

Senator GORE. You are gambling with high stakes, and it seems to me in a reckless manner. I am disturbed to have the Secretary of State make the statements that you have made today about the summit conference, no plan, no purpose, no understanding as to what will be discussed, what we hope to attain there.

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Senator, I view this as essentially a matter of exploration. We have the situation where an individual, Mr. Khrushchev, is the man who makes the decisions as far as we know for the Russians. We have gone through a great many diplomatic conferences at a lower level, the Foreign Ministers' level.

Their resolution could not be achieved through complete lack of flexibility or authority on the part of someone at a lower level. This as I say is an exploratory thing. As you know, our British friends have wanted a summit conference. They have had a feeling that good could come out of it through the individuals concerned having a chance to talk over some of these principal problems which they undoubtedly will, without specifying the exact context in which they will discuss them, and we are, of course, hopeful that this is true.

The French have felt the same way. As you know, the President refused to go to any summit conference until the threat, the ultimatum in regard to Berlin was withdrawn. He has been willing to go now and sit and discuss. He has said and I think correctly said with the dangers that we are facing in the world he will go anywhere at any time and talk to anyone if it may help to relieve the tensions and to move matters forward so that the world will not be quite as explosive and dangerous in places as it is now.

That I think is a very constructive way of looking at this. I think that if we began on the diplomatic level to try to be precise as to everything that we were going to talk about, we would be quarreling over that problem probably for many, many months to come. These exchanges will probably be of an informal nature. They may produce something very valuable. If they do it is all to the plus. If they fail, it will be serious only if we overexaggerate our hopes as to what may come out of the conference.

There is always danger of a high level conference falling and dashing people's hopes, and I think we would be foolish to exaggerate the hopes that we may have as to the successful outcome of this meeting.

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, this is several times I have heard the argument used as a reason for the summit, that only Mr. Khrushchev can make decisions. When you and Mr. Gromyko meet, do you have any power of decision except that delegated to you by the President of the United States?

Secretary HERTER. No.

Senator GORE. Is there any reason why the Russian dictator could not delegate the same power to his foreign minister as President Eisenhower should or does delegate to you?

Secretary HERTER. None.

Senator GORE. Then isn't that a fallacious argument?

Secretary HERTER. Not necessarily, because you are dealing with an individual personality who himself wants to be the negotiator.

Senator GORE. And therefore we accede to his personality and his desire?

Secretary HERTER. To some extent.

Senator GORE. It seems to me what you have said is that we are vague about the purposes of the conference or its results and we did not want it, but we are somewhat being pushed into it. Is that—

Secretary HERTER. I wouldn't say pushed into it. I would say that the President acceded to the desire of the others to go to a summit conference because, as he said, he was willing to go anywhere and talk to anyone if it might bring beneficial results.

Senator GORE. Well, you have also said that it is a gamble, and that if beneficial results are not obtained, it could be dangerous.

Now you say we can minimize those dangers of failure by refusing to expect too much. Are not the dangers of a total lack of agreement between the heads of state of two powerful and contending nations more real and stark than that?

Secretary HERTER. Senator, I cannot answer that categorically. We just don't know. This is exploratory. In my opinion it is desirable. There are too many chances for miscalculation, misunderstanding with the weapons that we today possess to risk taking a rigid position that we will not sit down and talk with anybody about any of these problems.

Senator GORE. I am not undertaking to say, Mr. Secretary, that it is undesirable to talk with our friends either standing or sitting. What I am undertaking to say is that a matter of such grave importance as this should be with purpose, with plan and with hope of success, and this picture you give us is not either.

Secretary HERTER. I agree with you, but I cannot do other than hope that it will be successful. I would much rather be pleasantly surprised than unpleasantly surprised.

Senator GORE. Shall I join you in the hope as indefinite as it is?

Mr. President, that concludes the colloquy. I submit the actual record, in reply to Mr. Hagerty, who is described as speaking for the White House. I regret that Mr. Hagerty did not emulate the candor of Secretary Herter in his remarks.

IMPRISONMENT OF BISHOP JAMES E. WALSH BY CHINESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I was shocked by the Chinese Communist government's sentencing of Catholic Bishop James E. Walsh, an American citizen, to a 2-year prison term for what the Chinese Communist government called the crime of American imperialism.

Throughout the world, men and women are waiting anxiously for the People's Republic of China to prove by deeds that it believes in the fundamental human freedoms which are shared and respected by the family of nations.

The Chinese Communist government instead has brutally violated these basic human rights in imprisoning a respected religious leader and American citizen, who is 68 years old and in poor health.

This government did not even show ordinary compassion for an aged and ill man, nor respect for a minister of religion.

Bishop Walsh has served many years as a Maryknoll priest in China. He had been under house arrest for several years prior to the recent "trial" and sentencing. He chose, however, to remain in China because he believed it his duty to remain with the people among whom he had lived and worked so long.

The Government of the United States has officially and strongly protested the Chinese treatment of Bishop Walsh. It is a protest in which we all, as his fellow citizens, wholeheartedly share.

Mr. President, I have urged the Secretary of State that U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Jacob Beam, communicate and reiterate to representatives of the Chinese Communist government the shock and indignation felt by the people of the United States against the outrageous imprisonment of Bishop James Edward Walsh.

SENATE BILL 8, THE SCHOOL AID BILL

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, on February 4, during the Senate deliberations on S. 8, the school aid bill, I called up as an amendment my proposal to establish a Federal college scholarship program. I later withdrew this amendment with the clear understanding that legislation dealing with problems of higher education will be taken up by this body later in this session of Congress.

Under my proposal, which was similar to the bill I introduced last year, S. 1087, 46,000 new college scholarships based on merit and need are to be awarded each year to outstanding high school students without any discrimination based on religion, sex, creed, or race. Any qualified graduate from an accredited high school—public or private—would be eligible to win a scholarship.

Each student who wins a scholarship will automatically get a \$500 merit award. The State education agencies which select the scholarship winners can award up to \$1,500 to a needy student for 4 years.

Unfortunately, an erroneous report on my scholarship proposal appeared in a syndicated column by John O'Brien stating that my scholarship program would discriminate against students attending parochial schools.

Mr. O'Brien very considerably made a correction in his subsequent weekly column for which I am very grateful.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. O'Brien's letter to me dated March 22, and his recent column written to correct the earlier erroneous report, be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter and column were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MARCH 22, 1960.

Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: In response to a request by a member of your staff, I am enclosing a copy of a column I wrote for NC Features to correct an erroneous impression of your scholarship program given in an earlier column.

I sincerely regret having portrayed your bill in an incorrect light.

Sincerely,

JOHN C. O'BRIEN.

MISCONSTRUED LAUSCHE OBJECTION

(By John C. O'Brien)

This column is written to correct an erroneous impression conveyed in an earlier column as to the purport of a bill by Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, of Minnesota, to provide a program of Federal scholarship for needy high school graduates.

The earlier column reported objections by Senator FRANK J. LAUSCHE, of Ohio, raised immediately after a statement in the Senate by Senator HUMPHREY explaining his bill and seemingly addressed to the Humphrey bill.

REASON FOR CONFUSION

Senator LAUSCHE reminded the Senate that parochial schools felt that they had been denied fair consideration in proposed Federal aid-to-education programs. In view of that he objected to the counting of students in parochial and other private schools in the enumeration of a State's school population for the purpose of determining a State's share of the proposed Federal aid.

After reading the earlier column's report of Senator LAUSCHE's remarks in a diocesan newspaper, Senator HUMPHREY explained to the writer of this column that the Ohio Senator was not addressing himself to the proposed scholarship program.

The confusion arose from the fact that Senator HUMPHREY's bill was in the form of an amendment to another bill to authorize a 2-year program of Federal financial assistance to States for school construction.

This school-construction bill would exclude parochial and private schools from participation in the Federal funds for school construction. But, Senator HUMPHREY points out, no such discrimination in favor of public high schools is provided in his amendment to authorize a Federal scholarship program. He noted that the State commissions authorized by the amendment to select the recipients of the Federal scholarships would be free to confer scholarships upon any student holding a certificate from any secondary school in a State, parochial and private, as well as public.

It was not, Senator HUMPHREY assures, to the amendment but to the original bill to authorize Federal funds for school construction, which does exclude parochial and private schools, that Senator LAUSCHE ob-

jected. LAUSCHE's complaint was that the inclusion of parochial and private school students in the enumeration of a State's school population would increase its share of the proposed Federal aid and thus impose an additional tax burden upon parents of children attending parochial and private schools.

PURPOSE OF AMENDMENT

Senator HUMPHREY has explained to the writer that the purpose of his amendment was to enable thousands of qualified graduates of both public and parochial and other private high schools who cannot afford a higher education to get one.

His amendment would authorize Federal appropriations beginning with \$46 million in the fiscal year 1961. The appropriations would be increased by \$46 million each year until the fiscal year of 1964, when the appropriations would level off at \$184 million a year.

The State commissions which would administer the scholarship program would be authorized to grant aid, in accordance with the needs of the student, up to \$1,500 a year for a maximum of 4 years. The only students excluded would be these eligible for veterans' educational benefits and holders of scholarships under other Federal scholarship programs.

The scholarship program, as explained by Senator HUMPHREY, is, of course, one to which Catholics would not object on the ground that they would be discriminated against.

The writer regrets the confusion which gave the impression that the Humphrey scholarship aid amendment provided for the same discrimination against parochial and private schools that the proposed Federal aid for school construction program does.

FOOD STAMP PLAN

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to establish food stamp programs for the distribution of CCC-owned commodities. Congress passed such authorizing legislation last session. The Secretary of Agriculture has been requested by a number of States and communities to set up food stamp programs because of the many advantages of channeling commodity distribution through retail grocery stores.

Among the cities which have requested the establishment of a food stamp program is Detroit, Mich. For some time, surplus commodities have been distributed to eligible recipients through the grocery stores in Detroit because the stores cooperated as a matter of public service. Now because of financial difficulties, the welfare department of the city of Detroit is being forced to discontinue this method of distribution and turn to the use of only one distribution center. The situation in Detroit is graphically described in a letter I have received from W. E. Fitzgerald, executive secretary of the Food Industry Committee of Detroit. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

It is my hope that if more people realize the nature of this food distribution problem, Secretary of Agriculture may be sufficiently urged that he will use the authority given him by Congress to set up food stamp programs. Failing that—and I am not optimistic regarding such a change of heart on the part of the Secretary—it is my hope that Con-

gress will approve mandatory food stamp program legislation such as is detailed in S. 3166, sponsored by myself and the junior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY].

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

FOOD INDUSTRY COMMITTEE,
Detroit, Mich., March 7, 1960.

HON. HUBERT HUMPHREY,
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HUMPHREY: The city of Detroit Welfare Department has been turned down as you no doubt know by Secretary Benson with regards to starting a food stamp program in this area. The financial situation as far as Detroit and Michigan is concerned is, of course, a precarious one. And the welfare department is up against it. The afterclap of this failure on the part of the Department of Agriculture to establish a program here is this: That the city of Detroit Welfare Department in an effort to save \$70,000 is discontinuing the use of retail stores as distributing points for surplus foods. This has, of course, not caused too much turmoil on our part, because it has been done by the retailers more as a civic duty, rather than for any thought or desire of profit. However, with the look at the sociological side of it, I am afraid there is going to be a very serious reaction to what the city plans to do and that is confine the distribution to the one depot they now have at 8300 Woodward Avenue.

When we analyze the number of persons receiving surplus foods that fall into the category of old age, the thought on our mind is, what are they going to do if they have no means of picking up this food. In January the following number of families were taken care of through the retail stores, all of which are located rather close to their homes: Social security, 1,784; old age, 4,149; blind, 203; disabled, 295; aid to dependent children, 5,354; straight welfare, 4,218.

I don't seem to be able to comprehend how elderly people without means of transportation are going to travel at least 15 to 20 miles to pick up this free food. Nor how they can afford, if they can travel, to pay 60 cents bus fare. In discussing this with the welfare department, they advised me that those receiving old-age benefits are checked every 90 days, that in January they sent out notices, asking them to come in so that they could be checked, and that 300 of these cases called and stated they either lacked transportation or were infirm and were unable to come in. So, how, by any stretch of the imagination if they could not get in for a checkup, how could they get in for their groceries. I think you realize as well as I do that if Mr. Benson had the welfare of the people at heart, a program would be established and these unfortunate would not be placed in a position that they are going to be placed in by this move on the part of the welfare department.

Kindest personal regards.

W. E. FITZGERALD,
Executive Secretary.

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION FUNDS

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, in his budget message, President Eisenhower called for a cut of \$2 million in funds available for vocational education under title I of the George-Barden Vocational Education Act of 1946.

I believe this cutback in a very successful program would be a serious mistake, even though there would be a cor-

responding increase in funds for technical education. Recently I received a very impressive memorandum on the growth and the extent of vocational education in Minnesota, where State and local funds make up 85 percent of total expenditures on vocational education.

The success of the vocational education programs and the strong support at the State and local levels raises serious doubt about the wisdom of the proposed cutback in title I funds. I urge this Congress to restore the \$2 million to the budget estimate of \$31,702,081 for promotion and development of vocational education in fiscal 1961.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a memorandum on this subject from Harold M. Ostrem, chairman of the legislative committee of the Minnesota Vocational Association, be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MEMORANDUM FROM HAROLD M. OSTREM,
CHAIRMAN, MINNESOTA VOCATIONAL ASSOCIATION LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE, ON THE PROPOSED CUT IN THE FEDERAL GEORGE BARDEN TITLE I FUNDS

According to the President's budget message there is a diminishing need for Federal assistance in the vocational education programs in the fields of agriculture, home economics, trade and industrial and distribution and an increased need for technical education funds. The President recommends a cut of \$2 million from George Barden title I funds and an increase of \$2 million in the George Barden title III funds.

In Minnesota we have carefully reviewed the total program of vocational education as well as the technical education program and we believe that we have, on the basis of facts and figures, reached certain conclusions which would tend to indicate that to carry out the proposed cut in George Barden title I funds would be a serious mistake.

Local-State-Federal funds for Minnesota vocational programs

Year	Local		State		Federal		Total
	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent	
1955.....	\$1,690,295.27	44.0	\$1,453,476.04	37.9	\$695,523.21	18.1	\$3,839,294.52
1956.....	1,886,979.82	44.1	1,633,018.87	38.1	762,459.31	17.8	4,282,458.00
1957.....	2,111,204.15	43.6	1,885,495.03	38.9	846,377.50	17.5	4,843,076.68
1958.....	2,378,862.48	43.2	2,286,975.83	41.5	843,948.14	15.3	5,509,786.45
1959.....	2,293,311.54	42.3	2,281,070.72	42.1	841,479.45	15.6	5,415,861.71

To further indicate our deep conviction that vocational education moneys, appropriated under George Barden title I, must be maintained at least at the present level we herewith submit some factual and pertinent evidence.

VOCATIONAL AGRICULTURE

In the 10-year period from 1949 to 1959 the Federal share of educating Minnesota students in vocational agriculture has decreased from 42.7 to 18.6 percent. During this same period the State has increased its expenditures over 800 percent from \$89,000 to \$739,000, while the local districts have increased their expenditures over 300 percent from \$275,000 to \$939,000.

During this 10-year period the instructional cost per student has increased from \$43 to \$79.

The vocational agriculture program has shown a constant growth. Ten years ago the total number enrolled was 14,000—today it is 26,000.

We acknowledge the fact that the technical education program is vital to Minnesota which is centered in the eight strategically located area vocational-technical schools. The program is firmly established, it is meeting an ever increasing need for technicians but we do not feel that we should in any way jeopardize the effectiveness of the vocational education programs which form the backbone of our skilled manpower training by arbitrarily diminishing the limited funds available.

We seriously question that because there is an increasing emphasis on technical education that there is a decreasing need for vocational education and vocational funds.

The vocational education program in Minnesota is serving approximately 100,000 citizens per year and each year this number increases. We recognize the fact that the technical education program is very vital to meet the increased demand for technicians and we believe that with the anticipated growth of this demand more money will be needed and can be effectively put to work in support of technical education in Minnesota.

The Minnesota program of vocational education is vital to the economy of our State. We believe that this program which is serving close to 100,000 citizens and which is being supported with 85 percent local and State moneys as opposed to 15 percent Federal moneys must continue to grow.

The following chart indicates the growth in the past 5 years:

Enrollments in Minnesota vocational education program

Year	Agriculture	Distributive	Home economics	Trade and industrial	Total
1955....	28,200	2,976	33,355	12,689	77,220
1956....	26,742	3,273	34,154	14,987	79,156
1957....	26,583	3,583	34,780	17,050	81,996
1958....	27,964	3,897	37,160	20,408	89,429
1959....	27,152	3,704	38,145	21,667	90,668

The following chart shows the amount and the percent of funds provided by the local, State, and Federal Governments in support of vocational education programs in Minnesota.

The need for vocational agriculture training is more acute today than ever before. Farming has become highly specialized, highly competitive and involves large amounts of capital. The risk is tremendous. Agricultural education is a critical need in Minnesota and we cannot under any circumstances see the justification for a cut in Federal moneys.

TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL

The trade and industrial progress in Minnesota is very evident not only in the Twin-City area but over the entire State. The demand for increased skills has shown a steady growth. In 1950 the total enrollment in trade and industrial programs was 8,864. In 1959 the enrollment was over 17,500, an increase of 200 percent.

In 1950 the total Federal moneys for trade and industrial programs amounted to \$146,801, or 14 percent of the total expended. This support increased to \$179,000 in 1959. During this same period the State and local

support increased from \$915,000 to \$1,240,000, or approximately a \$10 increase in State and local moneys to every dollar increase in Federal funds.

We need to increase the availability of skilled training in Minnesota. Industrial growth in the smaller cities and towns is placing increased demands upon our vocational schools. We have a fine labor market but we need to enlarge our vocational facilities and this costs more money.

Careful examination of our needs in the trade and industrial field shows conclusively that we need to add to our facilities, our equipment and our staff and this, it seems, would mean greater expenditures of State, local, as well as Federal moneys.

We must point out that many of the people enrolled in the technical programs are those who received their initial training and experience in the trade and industrial vocational field. This we believe will continue to be an important and contributing factor to the success of technical training.

VOCATIONAL HOMEMAKING

Minnesota vocational homemaking departments have increased from 204 to 266 during the past 5 years. Enrollments during this same period have increased from 33,335 to 38,155.

The opportunities for growth are limited only by the amount of money available. There are so many pertinent factors which bring about an ever increasing need for improved and expanded programs; among these are: Rapid social, economic, and technical changes affecting homes; early age of marriage; increasing number of mothers in the labor force; care of children while parents are at work; less differentiation in roles of man and woman in the home.

Greater challenges and greater needs demand expansion of the vocational homemaking program.

DISTRIBUTIVE EDUCATION

The growth in manufacturing in Minnesota has been accompanied by a corresponding growth in the retail, wholesale, and service industries. The demands for better trained people are being met in part through the growing service of the distributive education programs being carried on by the public schools.

Minnesota training programs for distributive personnel have shown a steady and consistent growth which is evidenced by the enrollment of 5,000 in 1955 and increased to 7,000 in 1959.

In 1959 the local and State funds in support of distributive education amounted to \$189,000 or 81 percent of the total expenditure. The Federal funds provided \$43,000 or 19 percent of the total expenditure.

The need for and the costs of distributive education increase each year. This means more money must be provided.

TECHNICAL EDUCATION

The technical education program in Minnesota is vital to meeting the growing demand for technical personnel. The area vocational-technical schools located in eight communities throughout the State have expanded their facilities, added to the staff and through a close working relationship with management and labor have established the standards for technical training in several critical areas essential to national defense.

In 1959 Minnesota received and spent \$99,786.38 of Federal funds for technical education which was matched by local and State funds. For 1960 Minnesota was allotted \$162,553.00 and has asked for and received an additional \$45,857.84.

The area vocational-technical school working very closely with industry and with the State Department of Employment Security will continue to do the essential research and planning in order to insure the offering of the finest technical education to meet the needs for technical manpower.

Minnesota industry ranks fourth in the Nation in the manufacture of electronic equipment and the Minnesota Department of Employment Security predicts the need for 4,000 new electronic technicians in the next 5 years.

We want to emphasize the growing importance of technical education and we believe that Minnesota can make very good use of increased funds; however, we do not feel that any increase in technical funds, important as these funds may be, should be made available at the expense of the basic vocational program under George Barden title I.

THE WORLD COURT

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, that great lady, Mrs. Roosevelt, recently wrote an excellent column pointing up what our Nation has to gain by repealing our reservation to the World Court statute as I have proposed in Senate Resolution 94.

Two thoughtful letters urging repeal of the reservation also appeared recently in the Minneapolis Tribune, written by Mrs. A. O. Zoss, of St. Paul, Minn., and in the Toledo (Ohio) Blade, written by Lois Hittle, of that city.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mrs. Roosevelt's fine column and these two letters be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the column and letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IS THE UNITED STATES FAILING IN ITS ROLE IN JUSTICE?

(By Eleanor Roosevelt)

NEW YORK.—Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY has sponsored a resolution to delete the Connally reservation—a power that gives the United States the right to choose whether we will submit certain questions to the World Court at The Hague or not.

In adhering to this resolution we are putting ourselves on the side of the Soviet nations and preventing the International Court at The Hague from becoming a fully useful judicial body. Our action in repudiating the Connally reservation would give the world an example which we might well hope would be followed by other nations.

Why should we insist that disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of America as determined by the United States of America shall not come before the International Court of Justice? Does this mean that we are afraid?

In that case, we must be conscious of areas where we are falling short of meeting conscience of the world today, and we fear that we may be called to account. It will not help us to hide behind such a reservation.

We had better face ourselves and realize that if we want to see force removed in international relations, we must be willing to build a stronger legal system in all areas of international affairs.

[From the Minneapolis (Minn.) Tribune, Feb. 24, 1960]

REPEAL OF CONNALLY AMENDMENT IS URGED
To the EDITOR:

A huge nonpartisan majority of those Americans who can tell time, including President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, Adlai Stevenson, Hubert Humphrey, and the American Bar Association are pressing for the prompt passage of Senate Resolution 94 to repeal the Connally amendment and strengthen the World Court.

These people are aware that the year is 1960, the nuclear age, and that those handy

salt-water moats surrounding our beautiful shores are just not the width they were.

They know that the United States is a country genuinely dedicated to furthering understanding between nations and working toward a just and lasting peace through rule of law.

We live, whether we like it or not, in today's world, a world which simultaneously shrinks and expands. The known earth grows smaller, the unexplored universe looms larger, closer.

Either our country shows the world it prefers the rule of law to the anarchy of force, or we can all make ourselves sit through two showings of "On the Beach," repeating, at 5-minute intervals: "It can happen here. Any day now."

Mrs. A. O. Zoss.

[From the Toledo (Ohio) Blade, Mar. 4, 1960]

REPEAL RESERVATION

To the EDITOR OF THE BLADE:

The United States belongs to the World Court, but our membership is made ineffective by the Connally amendment, which specifies that in any dispute with another country the United States shall be the judge whether or not the case is under the jurisdiction of the World Court, making us the judge in our own case.

A resolution is now before the Senate to repeal the Connally amendment. The resolution is endorsed by the President, the Vice President, Secretary of State, and the Attorney General, and also by such leading Democrats as HUBERT HUMPHREY and JOHN KENNEDY.

The opponents of the resolution are very active. If you agree that the World Court should be strengthened by repeal of the Connally amendment, write your Senators and also to Senator FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

LOIS HITTLE.

THE DISCLAIMER PROVISION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I have in previous statements supported repeal of the disclaimer provision of the National Defense Education Act because it is both a violation of the traditional American principle of academic freedom, and a totally ineffective means to its supposed objective. Student governing bodies of Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.; University of Wichita, Wichita, Kans.; Smith College, Northampton, Mass.; and Augsburg College in Minneapolis, Minn., have adopted resolutions urging repeal of the disclaimer.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these forthright statements from the young people most directly affected by the disclaimer be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DECISION AND RATIONALE OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF STUDENT GOVERNMENT, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ITHACA, N.Y., CONCERNING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT

The executive board has considered the disclaimer affidavit of the National Defense Education Act. For several reasons we feel that this clause is injurious to basic civil liberties.

The oath states: "I do solemnly swear that I do not believe in, and am not a member of, and do not support any organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the U.S. Government by force or violence or by

any illegal or unconstitutional means." This oath is a violation of the first amendment which specifically says that "Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech." This amendment has been modified only to the extent that advocacy to overthrow the Government when clearly an incitement to action has been declared illegal. Any abstract doctrine that advocates violent overthrow of the Government is protected by the first amendment (*Yates v. United States*). The disclaimer clause, because it fails to discriminate between the two different types of advocacy, infringes upon the constitutional rights of the individual.

Not only does the disclaimer affidavit infringe on constitutional rights, but also as the Supreme Court of the United States held in *Speiser v. Randall* and the *First Unitarian Church v. The County of Los Angeles* (vol. 357, U.S. Repts.), that by placing the burden of proof on the individual, it is in opposition to one of the basic tenets of Anglo-American law, which holds that a man is innocent until proven guilty.

The Government further obstructs freedom by proscribing not simple membership, but belief in an organization that teaches the violent overthrow of the Government. Since no criteria have been established as to what constitutes belief, the Government is allowed a dangerous latitude in its enforcement of the affidavit.

The disclaimer affidavit tends to create an atmosphere of fear in the community in which it is enforced. As Justice Black said: "Loyalty oaths, as well as other contemporary security measures, tend to stifle all forms of unorthodox or unpopular thinking or expression—the kind of thought and expression which has played such a vital and beneficial role in the history of this Nation. The result is a stultifying conformity which, in the end, may well turn out to be more destructive to our free society than foreign agents could ever hope to be." (*Yates v. U.S.*, 354 U.S. 298, 344, dissenting opinion.) When "Robin Hood" is considered subversive literature (as has happened in some schools) that stultifying conformity is a reality.

The disclaimer affidavit cannot succeed in maintaining the national security since, in general, a subversive will have no compunctions about signing the oath.

This affidavit places a restriction on academic freedom. A university dedicated to the search for truth cannot function unless its faculty and students are allowed complete freedom of thought.

Since the disclaimer affidavit is an abridgment of freedom of speech, and appears to be unconstitutional, the Executive Board of Cornell Student Government feels that adherence to principle demands that the University must refuse any future funds from the National Defense Education Act unless the affidavit is repealed.

It is the feeling of the executive board that if indications are that this would be a temporary situation provided the American universities unite in a strong stand in opposition to the disclaimer affidavit, this affidavit will be repealed by Congress.

We feel that any action short of withdrawal would be ineffectual. Acceptance of the funds seriously weakens any protest against the disclaimer clause because it is an admission by the university of its dependence on Federal funds and would be a tacit recognition of the power of the Federal Government to regulate academic freedom.

It is the responsibility of the university to safeguard the rights of its individual students. The act of an individual student in refusing funds under this act is insignificant in affecting the status of the disclaimer clause. The decision of a great university, such as Cornell, however, substantially affects both our legislators and the other American universities.

In future years, universities will rely increasingly on Federal funds. It is important now to establish the principle of academic freedom in regard to Federal aid to education.

The executive board feels that much can be accomplished if Cornell strongly asserts its disapproval of the cause. The Kennedy-Clark motion to repeal the disclaimer proviso failed to pass the Senate and was referred back to committee by the narrow margin of 42 to 49 at the last session of Congress. Since then, Harvard, Yale, and Oberlin have returned funds joining Princeton, Swarthmore, Haverford, Bryn Mawr, Amherst, and many others who originally rejected the funds. President Eisenhower has publicly disavowed the clause and Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Flemming has spoken against the affidavit. Cornell cannot stand aside and allow other institutions and public figures to defend its own academic prerogatives. The executive board believes that now is the proper time to express the strongest possible protest against this disclaimer affidavit.

The executive board policy concerning the disclaimer affidavit of the NDEA is, as of December 17, 1959, the following:

1. The executive board will request the University to refuse any future funds under the act unless the disclaimer affidavit is repealed during the forthcoming session of Congress.
2. The executive board will send letters to Senators CLARK and KENNEDY, and to Senators KEATING and JAVITS, of New York, supporting their attempts to eradicate the disclaimer clause from the act.
3. The executive board will write to other schools, explaining its position in this matter, encouraging them to take similar stands.
4. The executive board will request that the university explore all possibilities of substituting funds for the Federal loans.
5. The executive board will make every effort to transform the above-stated policy into university policy.

RESOLUTION BY STUDENT CONGRESS OF UNIVERSITY OF WICHITA

Whereas the disclaimer affidavit provision of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 is an insult to the American college student, labeling him as being prone toward subversion; and

Whereas such affidavit sets penalties for previous beliefs and attempts to impose a restriction upon the future thought of the oath taker; and

Whereas such restrictions upon the conscience of free men is entirely outside the American idea of academic freedom and freedom of thought and expression; and

Whereas such an attempt to dictate the present, past, and future thoughts of students is completely ineffective in dealing with subversive elements due to the lack of conscience displayed by these elements: Therefore be it

Resolved by the student congress of the University of Wichita, acting in behalf of the student body of that institution, That the use of the so-called loyalty oath disclaimer affidavit as a condition of financial aid should be abolished.

STATEMENT BY SMITH COLLEGE, NORTHAMPTON, MASS., MARCH 3, 1960

We reaffirm our statement of April 9, 1959. We oppose section 1001(f) of the National Defense Education Act both in principle and in practice. The principle of attaching loyalty oaths and disclaimer affidavits to Federal grants for education undercuts our expressed confidence in American ideals. It is a basic tenet of our educational philosophy that everyone have a right to free inquiry into and free choice among all points of view.

This philosophy asserts that such free inquiry and choice will lead to a fuller understanding of all principles and to an affirmation of the American way of life. Free intellectual inquiry does not imply seditious belief.

Furthermore, we doubt the effectiveness of the loyalty oaths and disclaimer affidavits. Loyal citizens may be antagonized by being required to take such oaths because it conflicts with the principles stated above. Disloyal persons will not hesitate to take the oath and sign the affidavit nor will these actions prevent them from acting according to their beliefs. Requiring a loyalty oath and a disclaimer affidavit as a condition for Federal aid to students establishes a precedent of unwarranted Government interference with academic freedom.

We urge the immediate repeal of section 1001(f) on these grounds.

DISAPPROVAL OF LOYALTY OATH AND DISCLAIMER AFFIDAVIT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT BY STUDENT COUNCIL, AUGSBURG COLLEGE, MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

In recent years American college students have witnessed a proliferation of various types of loyalty oaths and disclaimer affidavits. At present, attention has centered upon section 1001(f) of the National Defense Education Act of 1958. At least 15 colleges have refused to participate in the NDEA program solely because of this section. Other colleges have participated in the program, but nevertheless have objected to this specific provision.

Therefore the Augsburg College student council states its belief in the following principles:

1. That loyalty is based upon ideas and cannot be legislated or created by slogans;
2. That, historically, loyalty oaths and disclaimer affidavits have been a source of much abuse (e.g., 17th century English test oaths);
3. That loyalty oaths are objects of disapproval for—

(a) They do not serve their purpose. No subversive bent upon destroying the Government would have any qualms about signing a loyalty oath. On the other hand, loyal Americans who refuse to sign because of principle are singled out by the oaths.

(b) They offer a subtle threat to academic freedom, for—

(1) There is danger that they will serve as a first step toward more restrictive legislation;

(2) There is danger that their meaning may be expanded through interpretation (e.g., the word "defend" in section 1001(f) of the NDEA);

(3) The requirement of signing a loyalty oath implies that a college student is disloyal until he makes a positive statement expressing his loyalty. This requirement does not indicate a belief in the basic loyalty of American college students;

(4) A student's refusal to sign because of principle unfortunately results in suspicion of disloyalty.

(c) They are discriminatory. Section 1001(f) of the NDEA singles out college students to sign loyalty oaths to receive Federal aid, whereas other recipients (e.g., farmers) do not have to sign such oaths.

4. That disclaimer affidavits are even more so objects of disapproval, for—

(a) They do not serve their purpose. Again, no subversive would have any qualms about signing an affidavit;

(b) They represent a serious threat to academic freedom, for—

(1) They may serve as a basis for more restrictive legislation;

(2) The requirement of signing a disclaimer affidavit implies that a college student is disloyal until he makes a positive statement expressing his loyalty.

This requirement does not indicate a belief in the basic loyalty of American college students;

(3) Refusing to sign because of principle results in suspicion of disloyalty;

(4) In the case of the NDEA, the affidavit's effect is to proscribe certain beliefs. But it is nearly impossible to ascertain accurately what an individual's beliefs are. Such a provision cannot be justly executed.

(5) In the case of the NDEA, the affidavit is terminologically unclear (e.g., the words "believe in," "supports," and "illegal methods"). This leaves a wide area for interpretation and the danger of a resultant expansion of the meaning of the act. It also leaves a student in the position of not knowing whether in believing in and in supporting a certain organization and in receiving money under the provisions of the NDEA, he is committing a crime under this act.

(c) They discriminate against college students. Section 1001(f) of the NDEA singles out college students to sign disclaimer affidavits to receive Federal aid, whereas other recipients (e.g., farmers) do not have to sign such disclaimer affidavits.

5. That no individual who is proved in the courts of the United States to be actively seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by force or violence should be allowed to receive funds under the program of the NDEA. However, section 1001(f) does in no way expose and/or exclude such an individual.

The Augsburg College Student Council expresses its general opposition to laws requiring students in their position as students to sign loyalty oaths and disclaimer affidavits. Specifically, we urge amendment of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 by deletion of section 1001(f).

Furthermore, we direct the student society president to—

1. Communicate this bill to all Minnesota Members of the U.S. Congress.

2. Communicate this bill to all major Minneapolis and St. Paul newspapers.

3. Communicate this bill to all members of the Augsburg College faculty, urging them to consider seriously its contents.

4. Communicate this bill personally to the president of the college urging him to take necessary action to inform the Federal Government that Augsburg College accepts this money under protest.

5. Communicate this bill to all member schools in the National Student Association, Minnesota-Dakotas region.

6. Urge individual students of the college to write letters expressing their opinions concerning the loyalty oath and disclaimer affidavit of section 1001(f), National Defense Education Act of 1958, to their Representatives in the U.S. Congress.

SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, last fall I spoke often around the country on the Geneva negotiations for a treaty to ban further tests of nuclear weapons. I pointed out that the real hope for progress in controlling and reducing armaments is a treaty for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests under effective controls. The importance of a treaty is just as evident today as it was several months ago.

Among the places I spoke on this subject was Pontiac, Mich., where I outlined a four-point program to serve as a basis for an effective test ban treaty. Because these four points are now central to the conclusion of an effective and acceptable treaty I wish to review and

discuss them in relation to the current proposals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

My four-point program was and is as follows:

First. A test ban treaty should cover a permanent ban on all tests in the atmosphere, underwater, in outer space, and underground down to a certain threshold. In these categories detection and control are fairly simple. Last fall figures issued by the Government indicated that between 25 and 50 on-site inspections would be needed to inspect all unidentified events equal to 5 kilotons and above. Below the threshold, no on-site inspection was to take place for a limited and specified period. It was in this category that the distinction between earthquakes and tests was so difficult that inspection of all unidentified events was either impractical or politically unacceptable.

Second. A moratorium on weapons tests below the threshold should be declared and agreed to by the nuclear powers for 2 years.

Third. During the period of the moratorium the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom should conduct a high priority research program to improve the capabilities for detecting small yield underground tests and distinguishing them from small earthquakes.

Fourth. If the research program indicated positive results, then the permanent ban should be extended to cover, with on-site inspection, all tests.

If the research program showed that improvements were not forthcoming or that the Soviet Union was not cooperating in the installation of the control system, then the moratorium would end and weapons tests would be permitted beneath the threshold if military security required it.

If there was any indication during the moratorium period that the Soviet Union was not observing the moratorium and was testing below the threshold, the United States would be free to resume its tests.

Although on-site inspection would not be allowed during the moratorium period below the threshold, the United States would have at least three ways in which a small test conducted secretly might be discovered. First, the control posts being established in the Soviet Union would detect many signals even in the low range; second, the United States would still have available to it its highly sensitive national stations and stations in other countries which furnish data on earthquakes and possible nuclear explosions; and third, our regular intelligence sources would furnish information on whether suspicious activity was going on in certain areas.

On February 11, President Eisenhower authorized the United States to propose a threshold agreement to the Soviet Union which resembled in its key features my proposal. A threshold agreement was suggested. All tests above a seismic signal equal to about 19 kilotons would be permanently banned. About 20 on-site inspections a year would be needed under this system. That figure,

I might add, is a very rough estimate. I would suggest that it might be that 20 or 30 so far as on-site inspections are concerned, in order to have a safety factor.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I would appreciate it if the Senator would permit me to finish my statement first; then I shall be happy to yield.

In order to improve detection techniques, a joint research program would be conducted, with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union participating. As improvements were realized, the threshold would be lowered so that eventually all tests could be permanently banned.

The President thus included in his offer three of my points—namely, the concept of a threshold treaty, a joint research program, and provision for the extension of the permanent ban to cover tests below the threshold.

The President was silent on whether a moratorium on small tests below the threshold should be included. He did not deal with this question.

On March 19, 1960, only a few days ago, the Soviet Union announced its acceptance of a treaty which, first, would ban permanently tests above a threshold of 19 kilotons; second, would include a joint research program to improve detection of small tests; third, would extend the permanent ban with inspection to cover small underground tests as improvements were made; and, fourth, would have a moratorium on tests below the threshold for a specified period pending the outcome of the research program.

The Soviet proposal is similar to my proposal, with the principal exception that it fails to specify how many on-site inspections will be allowed. I might add that particular exception is an important key point, because it is the number of on-site inspections which will really lend validity to an inspection and control program.

I had suggested 25 to 50; the U.S. proposal had specified 20. Another difference between my proposal and that of the Soviet Union is that I suggested the time period be 2 years, and the Soviets have suggested 4 or 5 years. However, it is my understanding that this time period is subject to negotiation.

I repeat that the key point of difference is the failure of the Soviets to mention anything with respect to on-site inspections. It is the on-site inspection which is so vital to any form of control and inspection. This would be particularly true if there were any agreements entered into which are commonly called threshold agreements. It would only be through on-site inspections that it would be possible to have a reasonable degree of surveillance or observation or inspection to check on the possibility of cheating with lower yield explosions underground.

The Soviet proposal specified that only chemical explosions should be used in the research program whereas I have suggested that some nuclear explosions may be necessary. I do not see, how-

ever, that the Soviets can refuse to consider nuclear explosions since they have already agreed in principle that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes may be permitted. Certainly research to improve detection techniques comes under the category of peaceful purposes.

Two other features of the Soviet proposal should be mentioned. One is that if the research program does not show that small tests can be effectively controlled the Governments involved "would have to work out new arrangements for the future."

Second, the Soviet Union would allow on-site inspections for suspicious events both above and below the threshold.

Both the February 11 proposal of the United States and the March 19 proposal of the Soviet Union move the test-ban talks closer to a successful conclusion. The Soviet proposal should be regarded, not as a major shift in position, but as a significant indication that the U.S.S.R. may be willing to accept the necessary number of inspections to monitor a test-ban treaty and to work for the improvement of the control system.

The big difference between the United States and Soviet proposals are two: First, the United States did not specify whether it would agree to a moratorium on tests below the threshold for a designated period whereas the Soviet Union has asked for such a moratorium; the second difference is that the United States indicated that 20 on-site inspections would be needed for a threshold of approximately 19 kilotons whereas the Soviet Union has not stated the number of on-site inspections to be allowed.

It must be made clear that these are not the only unresolved questions which impede the signing of a treaty. Other important differences remain: The number and nationality of the staff at the control posts and in the mobile inspections team; procedure for adoption of the budget; composition of the control commission; the control system for detection of high altitude tests; extension of the treaty to areas other than the territory of the three nuclear powers; procedure for conducting explosions for peaceful purposes; and a few other points. But sufficient negotiation on all these points has taken place to make it fairly clear that none of these matters need obstruct for long the signing of a treaty.

At least these points have been given thoughtful consideration, and some progress has been made toward the resolution of the differences. I would not wish to have my statement indicate that these matters will be easily resolved. They are, however, subject to further negotiation, and possible treatment at the summit conference.

From almost the very beginning of the negotiations the big stumbling blocks have been how many on-site inspections can be or must be allowed and how can all tests be banned when the small ones are so difficult to distinguish from earthquakes.

With the President's proposal of February 11 and the Soviet proposal of March 19 the way is paved for the res-

olution of these two stumbling blocks. The Soviet Union must be willing to accept at least 20 inspections a year. And the United States must be willing to accept a moratorium on small underground tests for a designated period pending the outcome of the research program. This, I say, is the manner in which the test-ban deadlock can be broken.

Some may object to this proposed solution. It may be argued that the Soviet Union might try to sneak a few tests beneath the threshold which would go unnoticed; that is, detected but unidentified and uninspected. Is this possibility too great a risk to take for a 2-year period? This is the question to answer.

My answer is that the acceptance of a moratorium is not too great a risk to run, considering that the United States still has the three means of detecting even small underground tests I mentioned earlier: the international control posts, the existing national control posts, and regular intelligence sources. Each of these can help to police the moratorium.

I wish to emphasize the fact, of course, that the international control posts would have to be established as a part of any type of agreement, including a moratorium.

But some of my colleagues may contend that even these three techniques are not sufficient to guard against cheating. However, there are other steps that can be taken to reduce further the element of risk. One of the most important of these is the installation of unmanned, robot, seismic stations to record signals even from very tiny earthquakes and tests—a few tons, for example. Studies are now under way, to be completed within a few weeks, to show how such automatic auxiliary seismic stations may be used as supplements to the manned control posts. The addition of robot stations could reduce the risk substantially. Enough of them might even eventually reduce the number of on-site inspections needed.

Whether this aid to detection can be included in the test ban control system depends on two factors, one scientific and one political. The scientific factor is whether the robot stations can be installed so that the Soviets could not tamper with them unnoticed. The evidence to date is that the Soviets will not be able to get away with tampering, but we must obtain further data from the study now being made by the Bell Telephone and the Sandia Laboratories. The political factor is whether the Soviet Union will accept the addition of unmanned stations. An official answer has never been given to this question because an official proposal from the United States has never been made. I think such a proposal should be made. There is reason to think, however, that the Soviets will come to look on this suggestion for automatic stations in a favorable light. All recommended improvements in instruments thus far have been accepted by the Soviets. And anything which might promise a reduction of the number of on-site inspections should be welcomed by them.

Furthermore, there is one more step which could be taken. If the manned or unmanned control posts, national seismic stations, or intelligence sources, give real indication that the Soviet Union is attempting to test secretly, then I believe we should ask for the right to inspect the suspected area. In other words, we may have to insist on the right to have the quota on inspections apply below as well as above the threshold, if necessary.

It is my view that this is a proposal which ought to be placed at the conference table and, indeed, urged upon the Soviets. As I noted previously, the Soviet Union has evidently agreed that this procedure should be followed.

My conclusion is that a comprehensive treaty is in sight. The remaining differences can be solved. We may still have to wait for the outcome, but the ingredients for the solution of the remaining problems are now before us.

Mr. President, I believe that some of these problems will not be solved until the so-called summit conference takes place this spring. It appears that the negotiations at Geneva will be the working level of negotiations, and that the consummation of agreements on some of these matters will be at the political conference table, rather than at the conference table of the specialized representatives who are dedicating their energies to this one particular subject.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a policy statement of the advisory committee on science and technology of the Democratic Advisory Council, dated Monday, March 14, 1960, and entitled "Nuclear Tests and National Security," may be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NUCLEAR TESTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
(A policy statement of the advisory committee on science and technology of the Democratic Advisory Council)

INTRODUCTION

The present and projected national security is based upon a policy of nuclear deterrence. According to this policy an aggressor will be deterred from launching an attack by the threat of counterattack. It is basic to this policy that the retaliatory capability survive the impact of the aggressor's first nuclear strike. A vulnerable retaliatory force would upset the equilibrium of this so-called nuclear stalemate and might even invite attack. Even a highly invulnerable striking force would not guarantee continuation of the stalemate. The balance of force is not static nor is it simple. The equation of this quasi-equilibrium is complex and includes factors which are incalculable. For example, nuclear war may break out as a result of accidents; i. e., mental aberrations, misintelligence, or as a result of action by a third power or of uncontrolled growth of a limited war.

Security in the long run requires that there be a universal reduction and control of the methods of wide-scale destruction. This involves a paradox since one must go in two directions: (a) Establishing a sufficiently invulnerable deterrent to create a semistable stalemate and (b) achieving the controlled reduction of arms. The testing of nuclear weapons influences both of these objectives. To reach a sound policy on nuclear testing,

the benefits of testing must be compared to the advantages of a test ban as a step toward arms control.

MILITARY VALUE OF NUCLEAR TESTS

Nuclear weapon design is such that it includes nuclear and nonnuclear components. The latter may be tested without resort to nuclear detonations. For example, one can test the electronic controls and the weapon ordnance and mechanical details of the bomb without including nuclear materials in the device. Many phases of new weapon design may also be worked out by experimental testing of the nonnuclear components of the weapon.

The world's first nuclear explosion, the Trinity shot at Alamogordo, N. Mex., was preceded by a very intensive testing of the nonnuclear components with chemical explosives. The theory of the uncontrolled chain reaction was studied carefully even though only relatively crude computers were available for use. The proof test at Alamogordo was successful and substantially exceeded the average estimates of yield made by the scientists at the Los Alamos Laboratory. The bomb exploded over Hiroshima was of a different design but it was fired without a nuclear proof test. Its yield compared with that of the Alamogordo bomb and was only slightly less than the power of the third bomb dropped on Nagasaki. All three bombs were in the range of 13 to 23 kilotons within an error of perhaps 3 kilotons. This constitutes a remarkable performance considering the fact that there was no prior test art.

Since 1945 the United States has greatly augmented its store of knowledge about the science and technology of nuclear weapons. Its nuclear test program includes the explosion of 145 successful shots and several "duds." The total yield of all U.S. tests through 1958 amounts to roughly 100 megatons; i.e., 100 million tons of TNT. This is 60 times the total weight of all high explosive bombs dropped on Germany throughout World War II.

The United States has also built up two major nuclear weapons research and development laboratories. It has devoted over \$2 billion to weapons development and testing. Furthermore, huge electronic computers have been acquired to facilitate the theoretical evaluation of new weapon designs. The comparison of theoretical calculations with the nuclear test data permits scientists to have greater confidence in predicting the performance of new weapon types. Accordingly, a test ban does not mean stagnation in weapon design. In fact, an enforceable test ban could give some advantage to the United States because of its greater experience in the nuclear weapons field.

Nuclear weapons are sometimes tested to determine their physical effects under different environments. In general the effects of nuclear weapons at sea level are well known and no further testing is necessary. This applies both to surface bursts and to low altitude detonations. There is only limited experience with nuclear weapon explosions at extremely high altitudes and much remains to be learned about weapon phenomena, especially ionospheric effects and kill capabilities as related to ICBM's. Underground nuclear tests are required to determine the efficiency of seismic detection. Additional research is necessary to determine the extent to which underground cavities can be used to muffle or hide nuclear explosions. There is no experimental data obtained with nuclear explosives to substantiate the theory of nuclear muffling.

In the main, future tests would be aimed at testing new principles of weapon design and proving out weapon prototypes. Nuclear tests are quicker, easier and more convincing than calculations or studies of simulated ex-

plosions. Some radical innovations in weapon design might not prove calculable. A test ban can therefore be expected to reduce the rate of development in those weapons for which there is the least prior experience.

U.S. NEED FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT

Further experiments could produce minor improvements in weapons of medium power; i.e., in the range of 10 to 100 kilotons. There is an ample supply of nuclear material for such weapons so that improvements in nuclear efficiency are not vital. Nuclear tests would be more significant if they were needed to perfect special warheads for antiaircraft and antimissile applications. Antiaircraft missiles have already been fitted with nuclear warheads so that the adaptation of existing weapon designs seems possible without further testing of their nuclear components for antimissile warheads.

The range of weapons below 10 kilotons is generally considered to be the province of tactical or battlefield weapons. Such weapons extend down to fractional kilotonnages. The lowest yield tactical weapons can be packaged in containers weighing less than 100 pounds. The investment in nuclear material for these weapons is approximately the same as that required for medium-power weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons, it is claimed, are essential for the deterrence or the conduct of limited wars. In this line of argument it should not be forgotten that one of the greatest dangers of a limited war is the strong possibility that it will develop into a major war. Various authorities have attempted to rationalize the limitation of a nuclear war by postulating self-imposed restraints on the caliber and targeting of nuclear weapons. So far as weapon power is concerned it would appear that whereas small or medium power bombs might be employed initially there would be an inevitable tendency for higher power weapons to be employed. This tendency would be aggravated by a number of factors including precipitous action by a local commander, a rapidly degenerating military situation, inadequate intelligence, and counteraction against missile launchers or aircraft bases. In many areas such as Western Europe medium-power or inaccurately aimed low-power bombs could cause a spillover of nuclear destruction to civilian areas. This could lead to reprisal attacks upon conjugate targets by the enemy and to an expansion of the area of conflict.

Some analysts who advocate reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons have not adjusted their thinking from the days when the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly. Today we must consider that both sides engaging in war may have available all calibers of nuclear weapons. In the event that U.S. forces used nuclear weapons against Soviet satellite forces, it is most likely that Russia would supply our adversaries with equivalent or even superior weapons. Nuclear weapons used in equal measure by both sides would generally be to our disadvantage; in most geographical locations we would be required to supply the active ground forces through a long and highly vulnerable logistic system. For example, if the Korean war had been fought with nuclear weapons the U.S. supply problem would have been an impossible one.

By far the most important need for nuclear testing is the military requirement for developing higher yield warheads for the next generation of ballistic missiles such as the Minuteman. The latter is a solid-fueled, three-stage ICBM which has a much smaller warhead than the Atlas or Titan. Both the Atlas and the Titan are designed to be operated from fixed, continental bases. The demonstrated high accuracy of long-range, ballistic missiles severely compromises the integrity of Atlas and Titan bases. Hardening these bases by placing the missiles under-

ground in blast-resistant configurations reduces but does not remove the vulnerability of the ICBM bases.

There is an urgent and surpassingly important national requirement for a deterrent in the form of retaliatory missile systems of high survivability. It would be highly desirable to base this deterrent force so that it would be highly mobile and not draw nuclear fire to the mass of the U.S. population. A number of weapons systems qualify for such a deterrent. These include the submarine based Polaris missile system, IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missiles) systems based off the U.S. continent either in mobile land form or on surface vessels.

Some of these smaller missiles can deliver a warhead which is only a small fraction of the megatonnage deliverable by B-52 bomber but this weapon is still very impressive. The military gain to be expected from increasing the yield of these ballistic missile warheads depends upon the type of targeting and the accuracy of the missile. For example, if we consider "soft" targets such as cities and industrial complexes the number of retaliatory weapons required would not decrease in proportion to all increase in the warhead yield. This follows because the power of a fractional megaton weapon is sufficient to destroy all the largest of such "soft" targets. Thus for such targets the military need for greatly increasing the warhead yield is not urgent. If retaliation features reliance upon radioactive fallout as a weapon, then the areas contaminable to a lethal level would be expected to increase roughly in proportion to the increase in yield of the nuclear explosives.

A more urgent need for more powerful warheads for these smaller missiles is involved if the United States depends upon them for a counterforce blow as, for example, a strike at enemy strategic bases. The number of missiles required to insure destruction of a target is large unless the warhead yield is increased or the accuracy of delivery is improved. Further testing of nuclear warheads could cause some reduction in the number of missiles needed. However, greater military gains can be obtained by improving the accuracy, reliability, and reaction time of the missiles. At the same time development of the missile to carry weightier warheads would allow for increased warhead yield without further nuclear testing.

In summary, the principal U.S. military need is to achieve a relatively invulnerable deterrent weapons system as well as to acquire adequate numbers of weapons. The present predicament of extreme U.S. vulnerability is not due to a lack of nuclear testing but to the vulnerability of the nuclear delivery systems and to inadequate numbers of weapons. This deficiency cannot be overcome by nuclear testing; priority must be assigned to the building up of such missile systems.

RUSSIAN NEED FOR NUCLEAR TESTS

Russian performance with long-range rockets provides convincing evidence that Russian ICBM's have truly intercontinental range, high accuracy, and heavy warheads. The power of the heavy warheads projectible by the Soviets must be assumed to be at least equal to and, probably greater than, the Atlas-Titan megatonnages. The heavier weight of the Soviet warheads compensates for their assumed inferior nuclear efficiency. These highly accurate ICBM's jeopardize the Atlas-Titan complexes now being built west of the Mississippi; but to some extent the Soviet planners must have some concern about their own strategic base vulnerability. Even though they know that the United States is committed to a policy of never striking the first blow, they must consider a counterforce strike designed to forestall continuing Soviet missile launchings. For

this reason, Soviet planners must protect their missile launch capabilities. They have several electives—hardening their bases, relying upon mobility, concealment or sheer numbers of weapons.

The further development of small or tactical nuclear weapons would appear to be of less value to Russia in light of its large ground forces. No doubt the Soviet military leaders are compelled to stockpile tactical nuclear weapons in order to be able to match weapons with the United States but it is doubtful if they attach as much importance to these weapons as do many U.S. experts.

The two most obvious Russian needs for further testing are: on the defensive side—the development of more efficient weapons for antiaircraft and antimissile applications; and on the offensive side—the development of higher yield warheads for submarine based missiles.

ARMS CONTROL AND TESTING

The development and maintenance of a less vulnerable deterrent must be the keystone of any national military defense policy. Gains to be expected from further nuclear tests must be measured against this national requirement. We have seen that the most urgent needs in this area are not met by nuclear development but rather by missile development. Even if the most urgent need were nuclear, the decision to resume testing must look beyond the immediacy of short-term benefits of weapon development and encompass a view of long-term national goals. In other words, there must be a balance struck between short-term rewards and long-term risks.

At best an arms race promises nothing more than a temporary respite. This is important to be sure, since a position of inferiority or enemy-estimated weakness might splinter the keystone of deterrence. But a superarms race takes humanity on a course beset with calamitous pitfalls, unsightly detours and genocidal cul de sacs. Arms development and production now compels nations to seek security via a different course. Real security requires control of armaments.

The view that political settlements must precede arms reductions has often been advanced. While this view may have had some validity in the past, it no longer seems to be applicable. At present and in the future, all-out war will be so devastating to victor and vanquished alike that no political gain justifies the waging of such a war. Accordingly, the only rational incentive to launch an all-out attack is fear of an imminent attack upon one's homeland and a consequent compulsion to ward off this anticipated attack by striking a preemptive blow. Even though an attack were not in the offing, a nation might seize upon a temporary advantage in the arms race (i.e., a point of imbalance brought about by technology or arms production).

Arms controls offer a path of freedom from an arms race. As nations more fully perceive the perilous security of "peace through mutual terror," they will increasingly seek a means of reducing and controlling modern arms. Arms controls thus offer the possibility of reducing the magnitude of a war and at the same time reducing the likelihood of war.

BENEFIT OF ARMS CONTROLS TO RUSSIA

Most of the advantages of arms controls apply equally to both sides. Neither side wants to see a war start as the result of a systems error, say, spurious signals on a radar screen. Neither nation wishes to see a war triggered by an act of irresponsibility on the part of a few individuals. Neither can view with complacency the prospect of a war instigated by the action of a third country. Russia could not tolerate spread of nuclear

weapons to its own satellites. And it must be disturbed by the continuing drain which armaments make upon its growing civilian economy.

Russia is within range of an arc of U.S. air-bases and a small number of intermediate range ballistic missiles bases. These bases are highly vulnerable but, even so, the Russians are anxious that they be removed.

INSPECTION: KEY TO ARMS CONTROL

In the days when arms consisted largely of battleships and mass armies, there was little need for inspection to verify arms reduction agreements. Aircraft in numbers sufficient to transport strategically significant quantities of conventional explosives are equally difficult to conceal. The development of the hydrogen bomb and the ICBM completely changed the dimension of the inspection problem. Both the necessity for, and the difficulty of, weapon inspection became critical.

A nuclear attack of 8,000 megatons, it is generally agreed, would be sufficient to devastate a country as large as the United States. A smaller attack could destroy our strategic bases. In a few years such an attack will be deliverable by ICBM's numbered in the hundreds or by a smaller number of submarines equipped with Polaris-type missiles. These numbers come within the realm of what it is possible to conceal from ordinary intelligence. However, such a force can be detected by developing thorough inspection techniques and implementing large-scale inspection programs.

Inspection for nuclear weapons or weapon material already produced is much more difficult than inspection for the weapons carriers. Even large quantities of nuclear explosives can most certainly be hidden and escape detection within the vastness of a country such as Russia. On the other hand, nuclear explosives are only one component of an integrated weapons system and are useless unless deliverable. The delivery systems lend themselves more readily to inspection. Complete inspection will require extensive development but it should not delay agreements on more limited inspection. We should be careful not to derive an unwarranted sense of security from a limited agreement.

NUCLEAR TEST CONTROLS

A first step in instituting arms controls is an agreement to cease nuclear testing subject to detection by a reliable inspection system. Such a system would consist of monitoring posts located throughout the world and equipped with instruments designed to respond to test signals.

A logical extension of inspection for nuclear tests would be the establishment of inspection posts for monitoring missile testing. One would not anticipate a total ban on missile tests since certain high-thrust missiles are required for space exploration. Such missiles would be policed by the inspection system and would serve to calibrate and determine the effectiveness of the monitoring. A natural extension of this missile system would be the development of safeguards against surprise attack and accidental war. Eventually, inspection for arms production and products might be developed.

Russian handling of the arms control issue reflects a traditional esteem for secrecy and great caution in permitting foreigners to penetrate freely into the sensitive areas of Soviet economy and geography. In the military domain the Soviet Union has a priceless advantage in the concealment of its missile bases. Any uncertainty in the exact location of missile bases adds a high degree of invulnerability to them. This is of immense value to the Soviets and must give them confidence that the United States will not strike the first blow. The Soviets may also be fear-

ful of exposing their population to the free flow of ideas that might accompany the installation of many inspection posts within the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. The Soviets are apt to view an inspection system as tantamount to an instrument of political penetration and intelligence procurement. Accordingly, they may be expected to negotiate at length and to seek U.S. concessions in exchange for any compromise of its security through secrecy.

PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS

Early postwar proposals made by the United States were rejected by the Soviet Union. It became obvious that the Soviets did not wish to negotiate from a position of nuclear inferiority. Almost a decade elapsed before the Soviet leaders relaxed their rigid attitude on inspection. No doubt Soviet success in the thermonuclear field and in rocket development had much to do with their subsequent proposals on arms controls. Whatever the reason, on May 10, 1955, the Soviets made a dramatic proposal on arms controls including ground inspection at various critical points such as harbors and bases. President Eisenhower reacted to the sudden shift of Soviet policy with his "open skies" aerial inspection proposal.

In the summer of 1958 a conference of experts to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on suspension of nuclear tests was held at Geneva. The experts found themselves in general agreement on the technology of nuclear test detection. They proposed an international grid of monitoring posts, spaced about 1,000 kilometers apart, to provide reasonable assurance that illicit tests would be detected.

In 1959-60 the United States requested a reexamination of the conclusions reached at Geneva in 1958. The United States took the position that the inspection network specified in 1958 was inadequate.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

At present the United States has proposed the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in all the environments that can now be effectively controlled. This means that all atmospheric tests, all space tests out to a distance that is monitorable, all ocean tests and all underground tests are banned above the threshold of detection. The United States takes the position that the threshold for underground tests corresponds to a seismic magnitude value of 4.75 and that all tests below this value (corresponding to explosions of more than 19 kilotons by U.S. calculations) will be permitted. The Soviet response to the U.S. proposal is a reiteration of its plea for a ban on all tests regardless of size and a declaration of its willingness to allow limited inspection of sites where seismic data point to "suspicious events."

U.S. negotiations seem to be dominated by fear that the Soviets will cheat on a test ban. On the other hand, Russian negotiations are overlain with a fear of free inspection. Russia appears to have no worries about U.S. cheating, presumably because of the efficiency of its intelligence services and the obvious openness of the U.S. society. Accordingly, they register no concern about the adequacy of a control system and maintain that the 1958 Geneva system is still adequate.

WHAT CONTROL AGREEMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE?

If the United States is to forgo the immediate military advantages of further nuclear testing, it should seek compensation in the form of a corresponding gain in its long-term security. This raises the question: What kind of a test control agreement would insure such a gain?

One aspect of the agreement is simple; it would necessarily include inspection of Russian territory. This inspection system

could provide a beginning for controlled, meaning inspected, arms reduction. Accordingly, the system should include the maximum number of technical features which would facilitate its extension toward other uses. A limited aerial inspection—such as would be useful for onsite survey—would be a valuable adjunct to a seismic network. Radar equipment would be useful for the detection of high altitude explosions. Both of these systems would be of the greatest value for extending the system to the monitoring of missile tests and the prevention of surprise attack.

Another aspect of the agreement is that the controls should provide reasonable safeguards against violations. It would be unwise to underwrite a control system in which one could place little confidence. Such an agreement would be the breeding ground for suspicion and recurrent anxiety. It is for this reason that any agreement should provide for improvement of the inspection system. On the other hand, it is not necessary for the United States to insist upon a 100 percent foolproof system designed to be certain of detecting any nuclear explosion, however small. It is important that any significant test series would be likely to be detected. In other words, it is necessary that there be no certain method of defeating the system.

There is a penalty attached to a test-ban violator in the form of world opinion which would turn against any nation found guilty of breaking the nuclear agreement. The latter will be no ordinary agreement. It will symbolize a veritable turning point in history—an attempt to make a small but firm step on the road to disarmament. A nation which violates such an agreement automatically sets into motion an arms race from which there may never be an end. The notion that a nation could gain some supreme momentary advantage in the arms race by a quick series of tests is fanciful. It takes years to convert test data on weapon innovations into the stockpiled weapons of war.

THE 1958 GENEVA SYSTEM

The inspection system agreed to at Geneva in 1958 provides adequate assurance for the detection of nuclear tests in the ocean, in the atmosphere, and in near-earth space. However, the spacing of the seismic grid is too great to give reasonable certainty of detecting underground explosions and locating them with accuracy. The Hardtack (1958) series of underground nuclear explosions did not reveal this inadequacy; they merely confirmed it. Moreover, the theoretical possibility of muffling explosions underground emphasizes the need for closer spacing of the grid.

These deficiencies in the 1958 proposals must be recognized and corrected. The present U.S. approach is to outlaw those tests which are clearly detectable. While this position has the merit of forcing Russian acceptance of improvements in the seismic system, it suffers from two major faults. First, it does not lead to a worldwide ban of all tests. Thus, it does not prevent the spread of tested weapons to other powers. Second, by stipulating a threshold of detection of 4.75 on the seismic magnitude scale without specification of the maximum allowable yield for weapons tested, the United States presents what is probably an unacceptable proposal to the Soviets. The United States could, through the use of muffling techniques, test weapons in the range of 100 kilotons without violating the threshold on the seismic scale.

THE MUFFLING ARGUMENT

The possibility of decoupling or muffling nuclear explosions was recognized in 1958. Preliminary calculations of a theoretical nature were first published early in 1959. This classified document was made available to

the Soviet delegation at Geneva later that year. According to this theory, the seismic signal generated by an underground nuclear explosion may be reduced by detonating the device inside a deep cavity. If the underground chamber is large enough, the shock wave will produce only an elastic deformation of the chamber wall so that much less energy will be imparted to a seismic wave. It is estimated that under proper conditions muffling may reduce the seismic signal 300-fold. In effect, then, a 90-kiloton explosion could by the process of muffling produce a seismic signal characteristic of a 0.3 kiloton nonmuffled explosion.

Experiments have been conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission to test the validity of muffling theory as applied to conventional explosions up to a limit of 1 ton of TNT. Assuming that the theory is verified for conventional explosions and that a 1,000 to 100,000 scaleup of the data is valid, then the possibility of muffling will make seismic detection more difficult but by no means impossible.

With an adequate number of seismic stations, the problem is not to observe the seismic signal but to distinguish it from signals representing natural events. In most circumstances an explosion of 1 ton of TNT (0.001 kiloton or one-third kiloton with maximum decoupling) usually yields an ample seismic signal out to a distance of 400 kilometers. An explosion of 10 tons is detectable with high reliability within this distance.

It is interesting to note that one can define three types of seismology: earthquake seismology in which natural events are recorded at very great distances, explosion seismology in which manmade explosions are recorded out to a distance of several hundred miles, and oil well or geophysical seismology where small charges of explosives are studied within a few miles of the detonation. In the United States emphasis has been placed on earthquake and oil well seismology with very little research being devoted to explosion seismology. The Soviets have done intensive work in explosion seismology. There is a gap in U.S. experience and knowledge in this very important field of research.

Experiments are needed to determine whether muffled explosions do not generate peculiar signals which will render them more readily recognizable. For one thing, it is expected that repeated explosions in the same earth cavity would generate identical seismic records; i.e., a seismic signature. This point is important if a test violator wished to use a cavity for a series of nuclear tests.

While muffled explosions may minimize seismic signals and make seismic detection more difficult, one has to consider the practical aspects of muffling. Cavities large enough to decouple large explosions would involve very large-scale excavation and earth removal. It is estimated that the cavity required to muffle a 70-kiloton explosion would necessitate a 2- to 4-year excavation program costing \$25 to \$50 million. Approximately 20 million tons of material would have to be excavated, an amount greater than the annual anthracite production in the United States. Preparations for a muffled nuclear test would probably be verifiable long before the test took place. After the shot, the evidence would remain to be investigated over a long period of time. For example, if the suspicious event turned out to be a muffled test involving a large earth cavity, the survey team could look for a variety of clues. Seismic and gravity surveys could reveal the existence of a subterranean cavity. Any trace of escaping radioactive gas would be a telltale sign of a nuclear explosion.

In summary, the construction of huge cavities in the earth to hide nuclear explosions does not seem to be a practical method of

evading test detection. The possibility of firing small nuclear weapons in natural earth cavities does make it necessary to consider even small seismic signals as suspicious events.

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GENEVA SYSTEM

The principal change required in the Geneva system is a reduction of the grid spacing to 400 kilometers or less. This could be achieved either by adding more manned stations to the grid or by filling in the gaps with unmanned or robot monitors. This closer spacing of monitors would permit: (a) detection of the seismic signal of a 3-kiloton test even though this explosion was thoroughly decoupled, (b) more precise location of seismic signal origins, and (c) the possibility of discriminating against most earthquakes by unambiguous observation of the direction of first motion.

Precision in location of the suspicious event is of great importance since it would limit sharply the total area to be studied by the onsite inspection team. This fact alone should make the onsite inspection less objectionable to the Russians. Furthermore, the smallness of the area to be searched would expedite the survey and give confidence to conclusions reached by the onsite inspectors.

The onsite inspection problem has not been given sufficient attention to date. It would be highly desirable to have some independent groups, as as the National Peace Agency proposed by the Democratic Advisory Council undertake a thorough study of the means available for detecting the after effects of nuclear explosions in a small area subject to onsite inspection. If the area subject to onsite inspection is reduced to 3 square miles by the closer detection grid then air-portable instruments could be developed for making investigations of radioactive, geophysical, thermal, and gravity anomalies in the suspect areas in order to verify the existence of a test-ban violation. Highly sensitive devices can be developed for sensing the presence of infinitesimally small traces of bomb-produced radioelements. Any intelligence such as that provided by a detector a long time after the illicit test could be verified by onsite inspection since the radioactive residue of the explosion is quite indelible.

Given the closer grid spacing for the inspection system the number of onsite inspections required per year need not be large, perhaps 30 per year, particularly if a somewhat larger number of aerial inspections are permitted. The latter could rule out many events in inaccessible regions.

Improvements in the seismic detection system suggested in December 1959 were agreeable to the Russians and it seems quite possible that additional improvements, such as those outlined above, would also be acceptable. These improvements would go far to prove to a potential violator that there would be no safety in cheating.

CONCLUSIONS

The negotiations for a ban on nuclear testing have assumed greater importance than the testing warrants per se. This is because the test ban has been looked upon as a critical proof test-of-arms control. The nations of the world are waiting to see if a turning point in world affairs has been reached where international agreements can lead to mutual trust and to substantial reductions in arms.

If the nations of the world cannot agree to ban nuclear tests under a system of international inspection and control, then the future appears quite easy to predict. Most surely, both sides will resume limited nuclear testing, probably on an underground basis. Self-imposed limits on the power of weapons tested will be disregarded as the nuclear competition increases in tempo.

Above-surface testing of megaton-class weapons is likely to follow and radioactive contamination of the atmosphere will be resumed. The arms race would intensify and within a relatively short time other nations would test nuclear weapons of their own design and the number of nuclear powers would multiply. The problems of turning back the clock and reattempting an arms control agreement will then be vastly more difficult. The prospects for humanity disentangling itself from this nuclear mess seem bleak, indeed. It is, in fact, the contemplation of the ultimate consequences of an uncontrolled arms race that motivates many people to attach great importance to a cessation of nuclear tests on a controlled basis.

If the nations of the world meet with success in their negotiations on nuclear testing, then the first step may have been taken on the road toward a new system of world security.

Members of the advisory committee on science and technology: Dr. Ernest C. Pollard, chairman, Biophysics Department, Yale University; Dr. Samuel K. Allison, professor of physics, the Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies, University of Chicago; Dr. Harrison Brown, professor of geochemistry, California Institute of Technology; Dr. James F. Crow, professor of medical genetics, University of Wisconsin; Dr. Louis B. Flexner, chairman, Department of Anatomy, School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania; Mr. Trevor Gardner, chairman and president, Hycon Manufacturing Co.; Dr. H. Bentley Glass, professor of biology, the Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Leslie C. Dunn, professor of zoology, Columbia University; Dr. David R. Goddard, director, Division of Biology, University of Pennsylvania; Dr. Frank Goddard, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology; Dr. David L. Hill, consulting physicist, New York City; Dr. Polykarp Kusch, professor of physics, Columbia Radiation Laboratory, Columbia University; Dr. F. T. McClure, chairman, Research Center Applied Physics Laboratory, the Johns Hopkins University, Silver Spring, Md.; Dr. Richard B. Roberts, vice chairman, Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Carnegie Institution, Washington, D.C.; Dr. John S. Toll, chairman, Department of Physics, University of Maryland; Dr. Harold C. Urey, Institute of Technology and Engineering, University of California, LaJolla, Calif.; and Dr. Gilbert F. White,¹ chairman, Department of Geography, University of Chicago.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I read his statement of yesterday. I believe the Senator will find that while on the surface there may appear to be substantial differences of opinion about our respective statements, the conditions which I have set forth eliminate some of what appears on the surface to be a controversy.

Mr. ANDERSON. I compliment the Senator from Minnesota upon his statement. I congratulate him for continu-

ing to hold fast to the things which we believe are essential. I would not do otherwise than compliment him on his statement. If he does not mind, I should like to emphasize two or three points connected with his statement.

Has the Senator seen a translation of the Russian proposal?

Mr. HUMPHREY. No. I have seen the press commentary and an official summary of the proposal. I believe the Senator from New Mexico is making a very valid point. As always, his judicious and prudent temperament helps one in the Senate. My remarks, and I imagine also the Senator's remarks of yesterday, are based upon what one might call press reports from Geneva.

Mr. ANDERSON. I think it is strange that a proposal which was made many days ago in Geneva has not yet been received in Washington; or, if it has been received in Washington, has not been made available.

I would only show the Senator, because he is entitled to see it, a summary I got from the State Department today. It is marked "For Official Use Only," so I cannot discuss it. But it is all that the State Department has thus far released, so far as I know. I have just been to the office of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the committee has less. So I assume the text of the statement is not available to the Committee on Foreign Relations, where I think it ought to land first.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. ANDERSON. It is not available to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, where I hope it might land secondarily.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The point the Senator from New Mexico makes is realistic at this time, because here again is a situation where the public and the press receive information which, so far as we know, may be based upon a sketchy interpretation or a limited interpretation of the full document or the full presentation. I believe that in this instance we need to have a transcript of the translation even though we do have a summary of the informal conversation which took place at the time and a summary of the proposal as it was presented. Otherwise we shall have inadequate information.

Mr. ANDERSON. I agree with the Senator. The Senator referred in his statement to proposals which he made in Pontiac, Mich., on October 30, 1959. I observe the able Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] on the floor. A long time ago he made what I thought was a very thorough, forthright, constructive suggestion at the conference and upon his return from the conference.

I can only say again that I believe this is a matter of great importance. I hate to see the mind of the American people being made up on it before they are in possession of any information on which they might base a judgment.

For instance, the Senator from Minnesota, in his statement, said that he believed that the Soviet Union must be willing to accept about 20 inspections a year.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I altered that statement to 20 or 30 inspections.

Mr. ANDERSON. I think that is an interesting figure to at least discuss. Has the Senator seen any indication on the part of the Russians, at any time, that they are willing to settle on any number of inspections whatever? I base that question on the fact that when the discussions were taking place in Geneva, the Russians were asked, time after time, the number of inspections they would permit in a year. The answer was that that was a political question, not a scientific question.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The statement of the Senator from New Mexico is correct, as I expected it would be. The Soviets have accepted "in principle" on-site inspection; but they have never specified the number of such inspections. It is, of course, the number of such inspections which is so vital, because while the Soviets may have accepted the matter "in principle," nevertheless, if too few on-site inspections are agreed upon, it might be just as well not to have any, for practical purposes. It is necessary to be on the safe side in asking for an adequate number, and perhaps an overadequate number, to be certain that there is no cheating.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. It was my privilege to sit in at the meeting in Geneva of the three-power committee—the 149th meeting—shortly before Christmas. At that meeting, the Russian delegate suggested that the Soviet Union would be willing to accept control teams to make some inspections. The specific number was not discussed, but the idea of accepting inspections in the other country's territory was proposed, after a great deal of beating of United Kingdom and U.S. delegates on the head for some past dilatoriness, from the standpoint of the Russians.

However, in discussing this matter with Ambassador Wadsworth and members of his staff afterward, I raised the question of the number; or, at least, we discussed the possibility of the number of inspections which would be required.

I am certain the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON] and the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] are much more conversant with the details of the whole matter than I. But I got the impression that an appropriate number would be a number somewhat in excess of the number of natural earth tremors which history has shown to be the accepted number in any given period of time. In various parts of the world, earth tremors of various degrees are a matter of record. Whatever the number of inspections should be, they would be somewhat in excess of the number of tremors which could be expected from natural causes.

Mr. ANDERSON. I may say to the Senator from Minnesota that I do not question that the Russians have said they would negotiate. I only remind the Senator that the device of saying, "We will negotiate the number of inspections," was a device which was developed in order, apparently, to pit the British against the United States. Prime Minister Macmillan made his proposal or

¹ Dr. Gilbert F. White does not subscribe to this policy statement. Dr. White writes: "I feel that the paper is a competent technical analysis but that it overvalues the soundness of nuclear deterrence as national policy directed toward the maintenance of peace. I would prefer that greater emphasis be placed on the urgency of establishing a National Peace Agency, as proposed by the committee, and carrying out the functions planned for that agency."

suggestion as to an agreed quota, and the Russians then jumped at it quickly and said, "We will use this proposal to negotiate with you." That threw the United Kingdom and the United States into the field of controversy.

The Soviet representatives wanted us to agree to a quota first before even discussing the number of inspections.

This point then came up: "Yes, having agreed to something, and having settled it, we could then proceed to negotiate for 10 years, if need be, and not reach a solution."

The figure which the Senator from Minnesota uses—20 or 30 inspections a year—is certainly a minimum.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. ANDERSON. But when that proposal was discussed informally with representatives of the Soviet Government, it appeared that their idea might be two or three, although they were not willing to talk about it.

They said, "This is not a scientific question; it is a political question." They said, "We will sign the papers that we will establish a quota then, subsequently, we will sit down to negotiate the number of inspections in the quota."

Therefore, I say to the Senator from Minnesota that he gives me comfort, as I knew he would, when he says the Russians must agree to at least 20 or 30 on-site inspections a year. But I want to predict now, openly, to him that that will be the stumbling block.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I understand that the Senator is making the point that in the discussion of this matter in the media of public information, this point, which is the heart and core of any agreement which the Senate would ratify, was not discussed. Is that correct?

Mr. ANDERSON. I quite agree. The Senator has pointed out that the Russians have stated that only chemical explosions can be used in testing these devices. I say to the Senator that, as he well knows, that is like saying, "I will show you the effect of a cannon ball, by tapping you on the shoulder, and then you can tell what the impact of a cannon ball would be like." In other words, no chemical explosion could possibly approximate the effect of a 20-kiloton nuclear explosion.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is correct. Furthermore, as he knows, I insisted that the atomic explosion aspects be considered, as well.

Mr. ANDERSON. That is why I compliment the Senator from Minnesota. The Berkner report points out that in addition to chemical high explosives—such as we now are conducting in Louisiana under Project Cowboy—we must also have additional underground nuclear tests to prove out the proposed control system.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Exactly.

Mr. ANDERSON. But the Russians have said, "Yes, we will agree to test the effect of these small explosions, but only chemicals can be used"—with the result of completely destroying the value of the tests and completely destroying the possibility of testing the instruments that will be needed; and therefore the pro-

posals amounts to proposing something which in my own heart I believe the Government of the United States will never accept.

Let me also point out that the type of media in which a nuclear device is detonated underground will make a very considerable difference; and this matter has to do with the figure of 4.75 earthquake magnitude. If the test is being conducted in solid rock, that is one thing. If the test is being conducted in a salt dome, that is something else. If the test is being conducted in ice, that is still something else. A 20-kiloton device, detonated underground will vary depending on the media as to what the equivalent earthquake magnitude will be. Decoupling also will effect this. We need to have something which will be applicable across the board. Therefore, we need to have extreme flexibility.

So I am happy that the Senator from Minnesota has always recognized that principle—not only at this time, but in our previous discussions.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Those are scientific points which really are not subject to political differences. There are certain scientific aspects of inspection and detection, and they must be evaluated on a scientific basis. On the other hand, if political judgments are placed ahead of the scientific judgments, no really effective result will be achieved; instead, there will be, in effect, a suspension of effective negotiation.

Mr. ANDERSON. But the Russians themselves made the point that the matter of the number of inspections to take place was a political question, not a scientific question. However, if the negotiations take place on the basis that that is a political question, then the negotiations in regard to the number which would take place could drag on and on for an indefinite period of time.

Yesterday, I tried to point out, in a very brief statement I made to the Senate, that the negotiators between these countries sat for 6 solid weeks trying to decide whether there would be two treaties or one treaty to cover the same thing. It struck me that they were not trying to agree very rapidly, if they would waste 6 weeks on discussions of that type.

I only wish to say at this time to the Senator from Minnesota—I desire to be brief, for I know that other Senators wish to speak—that I know it is his desire to see this matter concluded, just as I have a desire to see something accomplished in regard to the matter of tests. I am happy that he recognizes that on certain basic things we must not surrender if we hope eventually to work out a good solution. I hope he recognizes that the willingness to have inspections conducted is one of those things. The Senator from Minnesota may have read into our proposal of February 11 a proposal to include a requirement for inspection. I do not so read it, although I say frankly that it may be subject to that interpretation.

I was particularly anxious to find out whether the Russians had made any agreement as to any inspections at all.

But I do not find in the text anything which would indicate any such agreement.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Does the Senator refer to the most recent proposal?

Mr. ANDERSON. As to the recent proposal, I cannot find in the State Department anyone who will say it represents an agreement in regard to when and how the inspections will take place. Some read into it a proposal for the establishment of 180 stations. But an agreement in regard to the establishment of 180 stations without adequate inspection might very well be like an agreement in regard to a slum-clearance project: If, after the slum is cleared, no one is allowed to live in the new houses, or travel freely to and from the houses very little will have been accomplished. Similarly, if the Russians agree to permit 180 stations to be established, but if then the Russians insist that two-thirds of the crews which will use the stations must be Russian, and one-third of the crews may represent the other nations of the world, we might just as well not have the 180 stations established in the first place.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from New Mexico is entirely correct; and I, too, have said that the composition of the crews which man the international stations, the number there will be, what will be the national background of the members of the crews, how many will represent the United States-United Kingdom area, and how many will represent the Soviet bloc areas, are problems which I believe require meticulous negotiation.

I believe that the debates on these matters which have occurred in the Senate—although some of those in the executive branch may feel that at times we take an overly critical view, or, at other times, an overenthusiastic view, depending on how the debates proceed—are vitally important, because, after all, any agreement which may be arrived at, either at Geneva or elsewhere, will eventually have to be placed in the form of a treaty; and unless there is in this body an understanding of what is agreed upon, the treaty will never be ratified.

I happen to want a test-ban agreement. But I want to caution all persons who also want such an agreement—and I want one very much—to remember that our desire for progress must not be allowed to prejudice the effectiveness of the system which needs to be developed in order to assure that real progress will be made. In other words, I do not want to gain a so-called political mile today, only to find, a year from now, that we have slipped over the precipice and have fallen into a very dangerous situation where cheating, avoidance of inspection, and so forth, could occur, and when we would find that the entire agreement which we had thought to be very worthwhile and very important would prove to be of little or no value, and perhaps would even prove to be harmful to us. Widespread fear of the possibility of such a development would have an extremely prejudicial effect on disarmament negotiations.

Therefore, Mr. President, I believe it most important that what is done now be done in so substantial a way that the people will be assured that there is hope for progress. After all, in the absence of that, people will become terribly disillusioned.

In fact, I had a chance to say this to Mr. Khrushchev, when we discussed the matter of test-ban negotiations. I said to him that I thought the people of the world want progress made, but do not want steps taken allegedly in the direction of making progress, only to find out, all too soon, perhaps, that they have been a hoax, because if such were to prove to be the case, there would be disillusionment; and then the only alternative would be to proceed willy-nilly in a reckless arms race, which could lead to catastrophic conditions and conclusions.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, again I compliment the Senator from Minnesota upon his presentation.

We may not agree as to what may happen in the future; and, of course, one of the tragic situations in connection with what is being promised and programed is that we cannot judge them in the light of what the future holds.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONROE in the chair). Does the Senator from Minnesota yield to the Senator from South Dakota?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, I think it well that this matter has been brought to the attention of the Senate. As the Senators who have been discussing it have pointed out, anything which may be consummated at Geneva or elsewhere presumably will eventually come before this body in the form of a treaty which will require ratification. Therefore, I believe it important that the Senate discuss these matters and obtain as much information as it possibly can obtain, so as to be able to approach the subject as intelligently as possible.

The original agreement for the meeting contemplated discussion and negotiation in regard to the control teams to be established in the host country. But the discussion went beyond that point; and the Russian delegate, Mr. Tsarapkin, presented a proposal in regard to the composition of the teams. Although at that time no agreement on the proposal the Russians made was reached, it was evident that it was a step in the direction of the United Kingdom-United States position that the teams should represent three parties, rather than only the United Kingdom-United States and the United Nations.

I hope that the Senator, if he has not had an opportunity to see it, will attempt to get a résumé of the proposals made by Mr. Tsarapkin at the 149th meeting.

Mr. HUMPHREY. May I ask the Senator the date of that proposal? I believe I have seen it. I want to be sure of the date.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. It was the last meeting before the recess over the holidays.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Very well.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. The question I should like to ask the Senator from Minnesota is this: Does the Senator regard the 20-kiloton size blast as the proper dividing line between those explosions which might be completely banned and those upon which an agreed number of inspections would be required?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I believe that is about as close an estimate or evaluation as we have been able to get, with any degree of certainty, relating to inspection and control. There has been a difference of opinion on this matter. Some people have felt that we could lower the threshold. But I gather the 19-kiloton cutoff line is an explosion yield that gives a degree of certainty as to inspection and control procedures to be applied.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. That is my understanding also, in spite of the story that appeared in the papers this morning relating to an explosion conducted in certain forms of mass or material. I assume it is true, as the Senator from New Mexico has pointed out, that an explosion in a rock cavity would be one thing, and an explosion in a sandy area or in a salt mine area would be another thing. The defect of the smothering would be different, depending on the composition of the surrounding material.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes; but it is my view, subject to alteration by scientific information being brought to my attention, that the seismic signal equal roughly to 19-kiloton cutoff takes into consideration the difference in the physical environment in which explosions might take place. In other words, the 19-kiloton yield still permits reasonably safe detection and inspection systems to operate without the possibility of sneak explosions, which could go on undetected.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. To complete my observations, I think it is important that the Senate discuss these matters and that Senators do their homework on this subject as much as possible, because if a treaty is brought before the Senate, it should be debated with as much competence as possible. We do not want a hoax, but we do not want a prevention of disarmament if it can be obtained safely. The stakes are pretty high in this question.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I want to thank the Senator from South Dakota, who is an able, thoughtful, and diligent member of the Armed Services Committee, for his keen interest in and study of this subject. I am sure it is going to mean a great deal to the Senate, because those of us in this body respect the Senator from South Dakota and his knowledge of the armed services problems and the security problems of our Nation. The fact that he has applied himself so diligently to nuclear test cessation and disarmament problems is reassuring—reassuring in the sense that, if the Senate

gets before it a treaty and we debate it, we are going to need consideration of it not only by Senators who are on the Foreign Relations Committee, but also members of the Armed Services Committee. These two committees are not in conflict, but they are complementary to each other. We shall want to engage in the consideration of such a problem and have a meeting of the minds not only of Senators who are familiar with the foreign policy needs of our country, but those who are familiar with the weaponry needs of our country.

I compliment the Senator from South Dakota for bringing to our attention the many areas in which we have made progress. I wish the record to be clear that while there are several unresolved questions between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., at the Geneva test-ban conference we have made substantial progress. I have forgotten the number, but I think there are 13 to 15 items on which we have reached tentative agreement. We have had preliminary discussions in which the Soviets have seemed to indicate some openness of mind as to the resolution of the problems involved.

Mr. President, I hope the State Department will do two things: First, make available to the Congress, as soon as possible, the full transcript and translation of the official Soviet proposal, with our Government's comments and commentary on that proposal; and, second, that it will give very careful consideration, in consultation with our allies, to those points in the Soviet proposal which seems to lend themselves to a change in the Soviet position. This will have to be done slowly, and will require very careful attention.

STATE DEPARTMENT INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Mr. President, yesterday, for the first time in recent history, the U.S. State Department broke precedent of minding its own business and issued a statement criticizing the Government of South Africa for the way in which it has handled racial problems in that part of the world. I think that if the State Department knew just how high feeling is running at the present time in South Africa, it would have stayed out of the affairs of South Africa.

Mr. President, in so doing, the State Department has now invited every nation on earth to criticize the internal affairs of the United States. We can now expect to see other nations intervening in our internal affairs in the fields of labor, politics, race relations, and any other issue upon which they may wish to comment. The State Department has made a grave mistake; in fact, the State Department should not have made any comment whatsoever on the internal affairs of South Africa, and should not make comment on the internal affairs of any other country.

One would think the State Department had learned its lesson when it got

burned in its backing of the Castro revolution and its censuring of the Batista government of Cuba. The State Department, by its blunderings at that time, added official sanction of the U.S. Government to the Castro revolution and withheld any support the Batista regime may have been able to obtain from this country. The State Department apparently will not intervene in a Communist-inspired revolution at our own backdoor, but it does not hesitate to be outspoken regarding the internal affairs of a friendly nation on a domestic matter with which we have no legal concern.

Everyone abhors violence and death, but it is not the duty nor the purpose of the existence of the State Department to butt the nose of Uncle Sam into the business of other nations, except when U.S. citizens or their properties are involved.

The State Department should be concerning itself with the lives of Americans who are threatened in Communist-dominated Cuba, and it should be concerning itself with the millions of dollars' worth of American properties that are being seized in Communist-dominated Cuba, instead of firing hastily drawn up statements concerning matters about which the State Department knows very little, if anything.

The State Department's press spokesmen prepared the statement supposedly representing the American Government's feelings in this South African matter before the news reports from Africa were even complete as to what happened.

I hold in my hand an article which was printed in the Washington Post and Times Herald this morning entitled "United States Deplores Violence Used by South Africans."

I ask unanimous consent that the article may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED STATES DEPLORES VIOLENCE USED BY
SOUTH AFRICANS
(By Murrey Marder)

The United States, in the bluntest comment of its kind, yesterday deplored the violence used by South African police against Negro antisegregation demonstrators.

In doing so a spokesman acknowledged that this country ordinarily does not comment on internal affairs of governments with which it has normal relations.

Officials said privately that the dimensions of the violence employed against thousands of Africans protesting white supremacy regulations made it impossible for the United States to remain silent.

At the time the State Department made its comment yesterday, more than 60 Negroes were reported slain by police using sub-machineguns, tear gas, armored cars, and other weapons. The toll continues to mount.

BRITISH REACTION STRONG

In Great Britain, the head of the Commonwealth to which South Africa belongs, the reaction was much stronger—but unofficial. The British Labor Party tried unsuccessfully to adjourn the House of Commons as a symbol of national mourning, as hundreds of protestors picketed London's South Africa House chanting "murder, murder, murder."

State Department press spokesman, Lincoln White, said the U.S. comment was prepared in anticipation of questions.

It said:

"The United States deplores violence in all its forms and hopes that the African people of South Africa will be able to obtain redress for legitimate grievances by peaceful means.

"While the United States as a matter of practice does not ordinarily comment on the internal affairs of governments with which it enjoys normal relations, it cannot help but regret the tragic loss of life resulting from the measures taken against the demonstrators in South Africa."

NO AMPLIFICATION

White said he could not amplify on the statement when he was asked if it was criticizing South African racial policies, as well as the violence.

In fact its wording virtually did that by speaking of "redress for legitimate grievances." The United States is on record in the United Nations as opposing the apartheid (segregation) policy of South Africa. In 1958, the United States came off the fence on this issue, on which it had been hedging out of deference to its European allies with African problems, and because of the United States own vulnerability over segregation in the South.

With African nationalism roaring through that continent, thrusting up newly independent nations with a resulting shift of global influence, it has become increasingly difficult for any major world power even to seem to back the South African Government's policy. Stepping into the South African racial scene in any way, however, means incurring the charge of "meddling"—or worse—which the Cape Town government previously has used against the United States for much milder provocation.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Mr. President, I should like to read into the RECORD an account of some of the things which took place.

Resentful Africans hid in the bush around their villages. One police patrol near Langa was ambushed by a number of Negroes. A police sergeant opened fire and wounded one of the attackers.

During the night, the blacks in Langa set fire to at least eight buildings including churches, the library, a recreation hall, a reception center, an office building and Negro settlement workshops.

The battle between the police and the mobs was waged by the light of the fires and the beams of armored car searchlights.

That shows what was going on.

Mr. President, I think it is the duty of the Congress of the United States to censure the State Department for this revolutionary approach to international diplomacy, because if we do not stop the State Department, the United States will find itself the subject of criticism from every nation on earth on every subject imaginable.

The Government of South Africa has as much right to criticize the running of our Federal Bureau of Investigation, or our Federal Communications Commission, or our Post Office Department, as we do to comment on some tragedy which occurred in South Africa. I doubt if anyone regrets the incident in South Africa any more than the South African Government, and our State Department has no right to chastise that Government for what it has done.

I hope the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations will look into this development and will determine from the State Department if it intends to branch out further in this unprecedented step.

It is my personal conviction that if the State Department does not keep its nose to the grindstone on American problems abroad, and keep its nose out of the problems of other nations, then the country might as well abolish the State Department, for it will have outlived its usefulness.

I heard a radio commentator this morning say that an unidentified spokesman for the State Department said it was necessary for the State Department to make this unprecedented comment on internal affairs of South Africa because the Russians forced us into making it. This is a ridiculous justification for the State Department's action and, to my thinking, it only confirms my opinion that our foreign relations on many fronts have been operated in a negative fashion, full of reaction. It seems we do more reacting than we do acting.

How can we justify our traditional Monroe Doctrine policy of "Hands off the Americas" to foreign countries if we are going to jump across the Atlantic Ocean and dive headon into the affairs of South Africa, or of any other nation? The very nature of the statement issued by the State Department would seem to encourage further violence in South Africa, and may lead to even more deaths because, when we place the official sanction of the most powerful nation on earth in opposition to the existing law and order in a land on behalf of rioting people, then we can expect them to be encouraged in more rioting.

Mr. President, I have not seen the latest reports, but as of this morning it appeared to me that the United States was the only nation on the globe which had issued such a blunt, undiplomatic-like comment regarding these internal affairs of South Africa.

Mr. President, the State Department's comments on the internal affairs of South Africa are unfortunate, unwarranted, and have opened the door for provoking a never-ending barrage of charges and countercharges between nations regarding internal affairs.

I urge that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate investigate this situation and put an end to the development of any policy within the State Department to continue meddling with the internal affairs of other nations. To do otherwise will certainly invite meddling in our internal affairs by other nations.

In my opinion, we have plenty to attend to much closer to home. I think we should give a close view to what is taking place in Cuba. I think we had better, at an early date, call a halt to some of the things going on in Cuba. If we sanction the taking of American property and not compensating the owners therefor, I think we will be on dangerous ground, not only in Cuba but also in all other countries where Americans have invested approximately \$60 billion. All

that property will be endangered, and part of it will be confiscated. That will be only the beginning, if we do not call a halt to the confiscation of American property in Cuba. I warn the American Government and the American people, "You had better get your money out of other nations and bring it home."

Mr. President, I make the point that a quorum is not present.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lusk in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Mr. President, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. The clerk will continue the calling of the roll.

The rollcall was resumed and concluded, and the following Senators answered to their names:

[No. 129]

Alken	Fulbright	Martin
Allott	Gore	Monroney
Anderson	Green	Morse
Bartlett	Gruening	Morton
Beall	Hart	Moss
Bennett	Hartke	Mundt
Bible	Hayden	Murray
Bridges	Hennings	Muskie
Brunsdale	Hickenlooper	O'Mahoney
Bush	Hill	Pastore
Butler	Holland	Prouty
Byrd, Va.	Hruska	Proxmire
Byrd, W. Va.	Humphrey	Randolph
Cannon	Jackson	Robertson
Carlson	Javits	Russell
Carroll	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Case, N.J.	Johnston, S.C.	Schoeppel
Case, S. Dak.	Jordan	Scott
Chavez	Keating	Smathers
Church	Kefauver	Smith
Clark	Kennedy	Sparkman
Cooper	Kerr	Stennis
Cotton	Kuchel	Symington
Curtis	Lausche	Talmadge
Dirksen	Long, Hawaii	Thurmond
Douglas	Long, La.	Wiley
Dworshak	Lusk	Williams, Del.
Eastland	McCarthy	Williams, N.J.
Ellender	McClellan	Yarborough
Engle	McGee	Young, N. Dak.
Ervin	McNamara	Young, Ohio
Fong	Magnuson	
Frear	Mansfield	

Mr. MANSFIELD. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] is absent because of illness.

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER] is necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I do not wish to be placed in a false light. I wish my colleagues to know that I did not ask for a live quorum.

Mr. RUSSELL. I must apologize to the Senator from New York. I did not know he was addressing a statement to me. I am afraid I was conversing with the Senator from Washington.

Mr. KEATING. No; I was merely explaining, for the benefit of my brethren, that I did not ask for a live quorum. However, I believe the Senator from Georgia is to follow me—and I shall be

brief—so that those who are now present may remain to hear my friend from Georgia.

Mr. RUSSELL. I appreciate the generosity of the distinguished Senator from New York. I am certain that the other 99 Members of the Senate could listen to the distinguished Senator from New York with great profit, and in doing so, would improve their knowledge of the existing legislative situation generally and the state of the Union as a whole. I may say that the Senator from Georgia did not suggest the absence of a quorum either.

Mr. KEATING. That is quite true. Mr. RUSSELL. Although I would have been glad to suggest the absence of a quorum for the benefit of the distinguished Senator from New York, if that had been necessary.

Mr. KEATING. I would do the same for the distinguished Senator from Georgia. I merely wished to set the record straight on that point.

LEASING OF PORTION OF FORT CROWDER, MO.—CIVIL RIGHTS

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 8315) to authorize the Secretary of the Army to lease a portion of Fort Crowder, Mo., to Stella Reorganized Schools, R-I, Missouri.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, it has been my view that the plan proposed by the Attorney General for voting referees is the best single approach to the problem of implementing the constitutional guarantee of the right to vote without discrimination on the ground of race or color.

I would therefore be vigorously opposed to any effort to water down or dilute in any way the Attorney General's proposal. Indeed I believe that if any change is to be made in the voting referee plan it should be in the direction of adding more strength to its operation, and I believe that to add an alternative administrative remedy would add that strength.

I had hoped all along that the Committee on Rules and Administration would give such alternative proposals full study and would eventually approve the most effective plan for guaranteeing voting rights.

Mr. President, I would appreciate it if I did not have quite so much competition in being heard.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. KEATING. Despite the fact that more than a month has elapsed since the Committee on Rules and Administration concluded its hearings on this subject, there have been no meetings of the committee at which the different plans could be considered. The failure of the Committee on Rules and Administration to act on these measures and to resolve their different features is one of the reasons why it is now necessary to submit to the Senate a number of different plans. I regret as much as anyone else the necessity for this, but I believe those who are advancing the different proposals—and I am not one of the cosponsors

of the particular amendment before the Senate—should be commended for making an effort to secure a test of the sentiment of the Senate without jeopardizing the basic provisions of section 7 of the Dirksen substitute, because we are dealing here with section 3 of that substitute.

I opposed the tabling of the amendment offered last week, which would have allowed the appointment by the President of temporary Federal registrars. I shall also support the pending amendment or shall vote against any effort to table it.

This amendment leaves virtually intact the chief provisions of the Attorney General's plan, but it adds thereto an important supplementary basis for action by the President in appropriate cases.

When this problem was being considered in the hearings before the Committee on Rules and Administration, I proposed an alternative administrative or executive remedy, as well as a judicial remedy, for voting deprivation cases. A question was raised about the constitutionality of such a dual approach. As a consequence of that question, I sought the advice of an old friend of mine, and a very distinguished lawyer, who is a professor of constitutional law at Harvard University—Prof. Arthur E. Sutherland. Professor Sutherland has submitted to me an opinion on this subject which has been very helpful in resolving these issues.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, may we have order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, Professor Sutherland concluded in his memorandum that—

There is no constitutional obstacle preventing the provisions of both administrative and judicial remedies for one deprived by State functionaries or others acting under color of State laws, of either Federal or State voting rights.

Professor Sutherland's letter to me points out that the availability of alternative procedures could have, as he puts it, "practical advantages." The same view has been expressed by a number of other constitutional authorities. I believe there is now very little doubt that what is proposed is entirely permissible under the 15th amendment.

Mr. President, I believe we must do everything we can to assure every American the opportunity to participate in the political processes of his government. The right to vote is the chief hallmark of any democratic system. There is no doubt that today hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of our fellow Americans, many of whom have fought on the battlefields to protect our country, are being denied the right of franchise. This is an indefensible condition, warranting the fullest exercise of our remedial powers.

We should do everything we can to meet that situation. Sincere differences of opinion can develop over which is the best of the plans proposed. I intend to support the pending amendment, as I have said. But if this amendment

is rejected, I hope that all those who support a real advance in the field of civil rights will join in support of the voting referee plan alone.

I consider yesterday's action by the other body, approving the voting referee section of the administration bill, very gratifying. While I believe this plan would be strengthened by supplementing it with an alternative administrative or executive procedure, there is no doubt that the Attorney General's plan, as approved by the other body, would go a long way toward securing the right to vote as guaranteed by the 15th amendment.

Both the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune in editorials published in today's editions commend the action of the House of Representatives as a victory for voting rights. I believe an effective civil rights measure should deal with other problems, and should not be limited to the curbing of voting deprivations. There is no doubt, however, that the guarantee of the right to vote must be one of the cornerstones of any progressive action in this field. The central importance of this subject is emphasized in the editorials published in the Times and Herald Tribune.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these editorials may be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Mar. 23, 1960]

A VOTING RIGHTS VICTORY

The House of Representatives took an important step forward when it approved the voting referee provision of the civil rights bill. The provision included yesterday had none of the crippling amendments that the southerners, with a persistence and ingenuity worthy of a better cause, have tried so hard—and last Friday with such near success—to attach to it.

We should note the historic importance of the House action. A large majority of the Members of one of the two Chambers of our National Legislature recognized that the existing voting procedures in our Southern States operate to deprive a substantial group of our people of their rights as citizens, and that machinery must be set up to end that deprivation. The willingness to recognize the facts and to do something to end that blot on our democratic system has been too long in coming. But yesterday's events in the House promise to enter our history as a major milestone on the road to an America in which our reality will more nearly coincide with our basic ideals.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Mar. 23, 1960]

THE CORE OF CIVIL RIGHTS

Now that the House has adopted the undiminished voting referee section of the civil rights bill, the passage of the whole measure is expected to follow in short order.

The enforcement of the right to vote is, of course, the key part of the bill. And it is of the greatest importance that this was not narrowed.

The proposal for the Federal court-appointed referees stands. They will supervise registration, voting and vote counting wherever it is determined that Negroes are kept from exercising their constitutional right. Furthermore, this enforcement is to apply to State and local as well as Federal elections.

That the right to vote was guaranteed 90 years ago under the 15th amendment and that Congress is only now hassling over a law to put the Constitution into effect may seem fantastic. Yet such is the fact.

The snail's-pace progress to freedom and full citizenship for all only goes to show how fundamental is the voting right. Because from the practice of this right, the untrammelled assertion of citizenship, come all the other rights of free men.

The Senate, plainly enough, awaits the House bill. The leaders of both parties, Senators JOHNSON and DIRKSEN, want it brought straight to the floor. They are confident that this is a common denominator of civil rights on which a majority can and will agree.

If the southerners choose to filibuster again, as is being threatened, the Senate surely has no option but to invoke cloture.

MR. KEATING. Mr. President, in conclusion, I wish to reiterate that we must not fall prey to any opposition methods which seek to fatally divide those of us who have been working for a meaningful civil rights bill in the field of voting rights. Politics must be put aside if we are to succeed in retaining in this bill an adequate provision in regard to voting rights. We should not be whipsawed into defeat by failing to unite behind the best plan which can be adopted at any stage in these proceedings.

In the hearings before the Committee on Rules and Administration, I pointed out that there was danger that the opponents of any plan might side with one group, at one time and with another group at another time, and eventually might defeat all proposals. Certainly we do not want to find ourselves in that situation.

If the pending Javits-Clark amendment is rejected, Mr. President, and I hope it will not be, I am prepared to offer to section 7 of the Dirksen substitute amendment a revised amendment incorporating the changes which were made in the other body. I hope that if this revised amendment is called up it will receive the favorable consideration of all Senators on both sides of the aisle who favor the enactment of meaningful legislation in this field.

MR. MORSE. Mr. President—

MR. RUSSELL. Mr. President—

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART in the chair). The Senator from Oregon is recognized.

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to discuss for a few minutes—

MR. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield for a parliamentary inquiry with the understanding that in yielding for that purpose he will not prejudice his right to the floor?

MR. MORSE. Yes, with the understanding that it will not result in causing me to lose my right to the floor; and I so request.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

MR. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Chair whether any list is at the desk—

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. As the Chair believes the Senator from Georgia knows, a list is at the desk; and the name of the Senator from Georgia is

next on the list, after the name of the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. WILLIAMS], who is not present at this time.

MR. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I did not know that it was possible for an absent Senator to direct the course of recognition by the Chair.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is, of course correct.

MR. RUSSELL. Then the Chair simply decided that he would not follow the list—

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry—

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair was wholly conscious that this situation would develop, and determined—and advised those here—that he would adhere to rule XIX, namely, to recognize the Senator whom the Chair heard first address the Chair. In good conscience, the Senator who is now in the Chair adhered to that rule.

MR. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I do not know who selects the Senators who are to preside over the Senate, or just what courtesy they think might be paid to those who have gone through the ordinary ritual of the Senate and have placed their names on the list.

I do not like to quibble about these matters; but it seems to me that it is highly extraordinary procedure to have a list, and to have the list followed until a certain stage of the proceedings is reached, and then get in the chair a Senator who decides that he will not follow the list, but will revert to the rule. The Chair has that right; but I also think I have a right to cry out against such practice.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Let the Chair state that he only recently came into the chair, and is sure he was not called to the chair for the purpose of unfairly applying any rule.

Within a very few minutes after the present occupant of the chair arrived in the chair, he became conscious that this dilemma would present itself. The Chair thinks the only protection the Chair has in such circumstances—and let the Chair state that he has not sought this role—is, in his judgment, to recognize the Senator whom he first hears address the Chair, because the only rule, "when the heat is on," is rule XIX. The Chair did his very best.

MR. RUSSELL. Mr. President, several pages were sitting directly to the right of the chair, and it occurs to me that the Chair might have called one of them, and might have directed the page to tell the Senator from Georgia that, although his name appeared next on the list, the Chair was abandoning the list, and intended to revert now to rule XIX. If the Chair had done so, the circumstances might not have been so extraordinary.

But as it is, I still feel that the procedure is highly irregular and improper.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair respectfully states that in such circumstances, in a situation just short of the intolerable, the only possible procedure is to adhere to the rule.

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, in defense, and in commendation of the present occupant of the chair, I wish to

state that the procedure of recognizing Senators in accordance with the appearance of their names on a list is, of course, at all times, procedure by way of sufferance, and is in violation of the Senate rule. It has no legal, binding effect on the Senate. There happen to be some of us who previously have been heard, to protest the practice of keeping a list of Members at the desk.

In this particular situation, because of the parliamentary situation which developed in the Senate in connection with the consideration of a measure which some of us sincerely believe is of great concern to the welfare of the Nation, we protested against having any list followed. We insisted upon our right, as Senators, to have the rules of the Senate apply. So I believe that under those circumstances—

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield for a question?

Mr. MORSE. Not at this point, Mr. President.

So I believe that, under those circumstances, the Presiding Officer had really no ethical choice but to proceed to follow the rules of the Senate.

I wish to discuss the parliamentary situation which I believe confronts the Senate at the present time. Mr. President, the Senate has now been engaged for quite some time in debate on the Clark-Javits amendment, which in the civil-rights debate draws a great issue, I believe, for those of us who hold to the point of view that the Clark-Javits amendment is essential if any meaningful voting rights bill is to be passed at this session of Congress.

Now—at long last—things are beginning to move very rapidly in connection with the civil rights issue, Mr. President.

I believe it is fairly well understood that we have been waiting and waiting and waiting for a civil rights bill to come to the Senate from the House of Representatives. A civil rights bill was passed today by the House of Representatives, and a request to have an engrossed copy of the bill prepared has been made. Under the regular procedure, the engrossed copy of the bill will probably come to the Senate tomorrow.

Mr. President, some of us believe that bill is inadequate in many respects. We also believe that, as realistic legislators, we must face the fact that it looks as if the only legislation in the field of civil rights which can possibly be passed this year by the Congress will necessarily be limited to some form of a voting rights bill.

We believe that such a voting rights bill should provide for procedures along the lines of those called for by the Clark-Javits amendment, which would really make it possible to get the names of colored people or any other people, anywhere in the country, who may now be denied—by one device or another—the precious right to vote, enrolled on the registration books.

Once the names of persons now denied the right to vote but who are really qualified to vote are placed on the registra-

tion books they will be in a better position through administrative procedures as well as through judicial procedures—to have guaranteed to them the right to vote, and to assure that they may vote.

Mr. President, for a long time during the debate in the Senate on the Clark-Javits amendment there was no doubt about what was the parliamentary plan of some. It was to have that amendment laid on the table—in other words, to kill that amendment by means of a motion to lay the amendment on the table.

The debate has been very interesting. I believe a magnificent job has been done, during the debate, by the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], and other Senators who are in support of the Clark-Javits amendment. I am proud to be one of the cosponsors of it.

Mr. President, I believe a rollcall record of where we now stand on the Clark-Javits amendment should be made. I think that such a record is of the utmost importance, not only as it applies to the proposed legislation, but it is of the utmost importance for future reference. We are not going to be through with civil rights legislation with this session of Congress. That fact is well known. We are not going to come anywhere near, in this session of Congress, of passing a broad, effective civil rights bill.

I think everybody in this body knows that I put my parliamentary cards on top of the table. I am putting them there now, because we are engaged in a vitally important procedural battle in the Senate. We have to work with the Senate procedures which are available to us. Those procedures have to be used in order to make the record in regard to a matter such as this. Precious human rights are involved in this great parliamentary battle for an effective civil rights bill. Many of us consider the Clark-Javits amendment essential to an effective voting rights bill.

I would vote against a motion to lay on the table this amendment but I think it is of the utmost importance that we make a record here in the Senate on the Clark-Javits amendment, and that we make it now.

In my judgment, Mr. President, if we do not make it now, the possibility is very great we will never have the chance to make it. I know something about the rule book of the Senate, too. I learned a long time ago I had better know something about it if I was going to protect my rights here in the Senate.

There is a whole multitude of procedural devices that can be used to deny us the chance to vote on the Clark-Javits amendment, if we do not take advantage of this opportunity to put the Senate on record on the Clark-Javits amendment by offering a motion to lay on the table the pending amendment known as the Clark-Javits amendment.

Therefore, I move that the Clark-Javits amendment, which is pending, be laid on the table.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold that motion, for an inquiry?

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President—

Mr. MORSE. Give me time to protect my rights here.

Mr. President, I am going to withhold my motion only if I have unanimous consent that I will in no way lose my right to the floor, and with the understanding that I yield for no parliamentary action or proposal of any kind by any Senator who would seek in any way to take away from me my controlling position here on the floor of the Senate in respect to my proposed motion to lay on the table the Clark-Javits amendment. I shall yield only if it is to be understood that in yielding I will in no way be precluded from making my motion. If I have that unanimous consent, I will yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I should like to ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Oregon may yield to me for the purpose of making an inquiry of him, without his losing the right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I may state that, following the Senator's motion, I plan to make a motion, but I want to be sure the Senator from Oregon understands, and that other Members of the Senate understand, that there are presently Members of the Senate who desire to offer amendments to the Clark-Javits amendment; that there are presently Members of the Senate who desire to address themselves to the Clark-Javits amendment; that there are Members of the Senate who have gone to their homes with the understanding that Senators would address themselves to that amendment; and if a motion to table should prevail, those Members of the Senate would not have the opportunity of offering amendments and they would be cut off their rights to even discuss their amendments.

I do not think any Senator would—and I hope no Senator would—want to do that at this stage of the proceedings, in light of the fact that many speeches were made today that were not on this subject, and since Senators have amendments to offer that are important, and have statements to make they consider are very important statements in connection with the amendment. I hope we would not seal their lips without giving them an opportunity at least to speak for 5 minutes as Members of the House are permitted to do under their rule.

I have made such a statement in order that all Senators will be on notice.

I yield the floor back to the Senator from Oregon in order to make his motion, at which time I am going to ask the Chair to recognize me to make a motion to recess until tomorrow.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I think that is a happy solution—

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President—

Mr. MORSE. I should like to answer the majority leader.

I think a motion to recess after I make my motion to lay on the table is a happy

solution if the majority leader is concerned about the time element, Mr. President. I desire to make clear that I am not acting alone in my proposal to obtain a record vote on the Clark-Javits amendment. Many of us are convinced that the only way to get it is by way of my proposed motion to lay on the table the amendment. However, I wish to assure the majority leader that I take full responsibility for this parliamentary move although I am not acting alone.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. That is obvious, from the Chair's ruling.

Mr. MORSE. I am not acting alone, but I take all the responsibility for this parliamentary situation. We have had days to debate the Clark-Javits amendment. We have debated it. I want to say, frankly, we fear we are going to be maneuvered into a position where we will never have a record vote on the Clark-Javits amendment, and my motion gives the best opportunity to get a record vote on the Clark-Javits amendment.

Mr. President, I should like to make an inquiry. I assume, if I make the motion to lay the Clark-Javits amendment on the table, and the majority leader moves to recess the Senate, as he has announced he will, my motion would be the pending business at the convening of the Senate tomorrow. Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senate recessed, it would be the pending motion when the Senate reconvened, the Chair is advised.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I make one further explanation here of the position of those of us who think it is an exceedingly important parliamentary situation that is before us. We think it is exceedingly important that we have a vote on the motion to lay on the table, keeping in mind, may I say to the majority leader, that if the motion is defeated—and I hope it will be defeated, and I shall vote against the motion—then all the Senators who have amendments to offer will have all the time they need to offer the amendments and make explanations. I am not in favor of cutting off debate of any Senator who really wants to continue on the Clark-Javits amendment. All they have to do is vote against the motion to lay on the table. We will welcome them in voting against the motion to lay on the table.

Therefore, I repeat my motion. I move that the pending amendment, the Clark-Javits amendment, be laid on the table.

RECESS

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock tomorrow, and I ask for the yeas and nays on the motion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Texas that the Senate recess until tomorrow at 12 o'clock.

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I announce that the Senators from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON and Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senators from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT and Mr. GRUENING], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE], the Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], and the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY] are absent because of illness.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senators from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON and Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senators from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT and Mr. GRUENING], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senators from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE and Mr. O'MAHONEY], the Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], and the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] would each vote "yes."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER] is necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 85, nays, 1, as follows:

[No. 1301]

YEAS—85

Alken	Fulbright	Martin
Allott	Gore	Monroney
Beall	Green	Morse
Bennett	Hart	Morton
Bible	Hartke	Moss
Bridges	Hayden	Mundt
Brunsdale	Hennings	Muskie
Bush	Hickenlooper	Prouty
Butler	Hill	Proxmire
Byrd, Va.	Holland	Randolph
Byrd, W. Va.	Hruska	Robertson
Cannon	Humphrey	Russell
Carlson	Jackson	Saltonstall
Carroll	Javits	Schoeppel
Case, N.J.	Johnson, Tex.	Scott
Case, S. Dak.	Johnston, S.C.	Smathers
Church	Jordan	Smith
Clark	Keating	Sparkman
Cooper	Kefauver	Stennis
Cotton	Kennedy	Talmadge
Curtis	Kerr	Thurmond
Dirksen	Kuchel	Wiley
Douglas	Lausche	Williams, Del.
Dworshak	Long, Hawaii	Williams, N.J.
Eastland	Long, La.	Yarborough
Engle	Lusk	Young, N. Dak.
Ervin	McClellan	Young, Ohio
Fong	Magnuson	
Frear	Mansfield	

NAYS—1

McNamara

NOT VOTING—14

Anderson	Ellender	Murray
Bartlett	Goldwater	O'Mahoney
Capehart	Gruening	Pastore
Chavez	McCarthy	Symington
Dodd	McGee	

So the motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 35 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Thursday, March 24, 1960, at 12 o'clock meridian.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 1960

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Proverbs 14: 34: *Righteousness exalteth a nation.*

O Thou Supreme Ruler of the Universe and our Divine Creator, who hast endowed us with certain inalienable rights, may we be eager to safeguard those rights for all the members of the human family.

We earnestly beseech Thee that our President, our Speaker, and the Members of this legislative body, who have been entrusted with leadership in the affairs of state, may be blessed with the guidance of Thy holy spirit in their ultimate decisions.

Grant that during these tense and trying days the bonds of good will and peace may be made stronger among the people of our great Republic.

Inspire us with lofty aspirations and noble impulses and with a sense of our sacred responsibility to establish policies and enact laws which are just and righteous, bringing blessedness to our beloved country and glory to Thy great and holy name.

Hear us in the name of the Prince of Peace. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

VIEWS OF THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the Record.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oregon?

There was no objection.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, at the risk of sounding a sour, even inhospitable note, permit me to list a few facts about Spain's Foreign Minister, now here in Washington on an official visit.

Senor Castiella and the present Spanish Ambassador in Washington wrote a book in 1941 praising Hitler and Mussolini extravagantly and mocking the democratic countries then engaged in the war. Here is a sample of what they wrote:

Nonbelligerent Spain does not conceal her fervent cordiality toward one of the two sides in the war which was unleashed on September 1, 1939, 5 months after we achieved our own victory, in an act of indescribable insanity by the British and French democracies against the Third Reich under the Fuehrer, Chancellor Adolf Hitler.

During World War II our distinguished visitor fought in the Spanish Blue Division with the Germans against the Soviet Union. He was awarded the Iron Cross.

After the war the British refused to accept him as Ambassador from Spain.